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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis explores the potential of a regulatory oversight role for the ECOWAS aimed at driving 
further effectiveness of regulatory framework for transnational corporations in Nigeria, as well as 
ameliorating constitutional concerns that hinder effective protection for victims of environmental 
pollution. It reviews constitutional failures and judicial obstacles within Nigeria that hinder 
effective protection of victims of environmental pollution and reviews specific regulatory concerns 
within the Nigerian regulatory framework which require reform. It argues that constitutional and 
regulatory failures in Nigeria as well as the government’s attitude towards enforcing existing 
regulation justify the need for a regulatory oversight framework. 
Specifically, the thesis is concerned with problems relating to persisting oil pollution in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria. It examines the implication of oil pollution on the environment, rights of 
local communities, the Nigerian economy and specifically the Nigerian government’s 
responsibilities towards preventing or remediating oil pollution. The thesis identifies ineffective 
regulation as primarily responsible for persisting oil pollution and transnational corporations as 
the major perpetuators of oil pollution in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. This thesis is therefore 
concerned with interrogating existing framework for regulation of Oil Companies in Nigeria and 
reasons why such existing regulations are not effectively enforced, including the Nigerian 
government’s involvement in oil extraction and potential conflict of interest for enforcing existing 
regulation.  
The research provides scholarly insight into challenges and consequences of ineffective regulation 
of TNCs in Nigeria while exploring the potential of a novel approach to addressing seemingly 
intractable challenges. It provides a useful contribution to identifying concerns relating to 
protection and promotion of human rights of local communities, regulatory framework for 
regulation of the oil and gas industry, and protection of the environment as well as suggestions 
regarding reforms in the problem areas identified. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
 
1.1 Introduction and Context of Research Problem   
In 2001, following an inquiry by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
degree of environmental oil pollution in the Niger Delta1 region of Nigeria was described as 
“nightmarish”2 and “humanly unacceptable”.3 Several years after the Communication of the 
African Commission, the environmental pollution in the Niger Delta seemed unchanged and if 
changed at all, seemed to have only worsened. Environmental pollution and perhaps the activities 
of militant protesters of oil activities in the Niger Delta forced the Nigerian government in 2011 
to request the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to investigate oil pollution in 
Ogoniland (one of the local communities in the Niger Delta) and make recommendations for the 
remediation of the effects of oil pollution on the region.4 UNEP’s Report was quite damning, 
providing details of pollution that had gone on for over 50 years, and recommended several 
measures for environmental restoration and alleviation of suffering on local communities.5 Since 
the Report however, rights groups have alleged that little or “no progress” has been made regarding 
implementing the recommendations of the UNEP and insisting that environmental pollution 
infringes rights of local communities.6 
Concerned therefore about the persisting oil pollution in the Niger Delta region, its effects on the 
environment and rights of local communities and the Nigerian government’s responsibilities 
                                                          
1 The Niger Delta region is made up of 8 oil producing states in Nigeria. It consists of a total land mass of 
approximately 70,000 square kilometers, with a population of approximately 20 million people. See Damilola S. 
Olawuyi, The Principles of Nigerian Environmental Law (Ado Ekiti, Nigeria: Afe Babalola University 2015) at 173 
[Olawuyi].  
2 The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria 
(Communication 155/96) African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 27 October 2001, online: ACHPR 
http://www.achpr.org/communication/decisions/155.96/ [SERAC Case]. 
3 Ibid,  Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi-Actor Contracts, Competing Goals and Regulation of Foreign 
Investment” (2014) 65, U.N.B.L.J. 269 at 285 [Odumosu-Ayanu, Multi-Actor Contracts]  
4 See Foreword of the United Nations Environment Programme, “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland Report” 
at 6 
Online:http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/EnvironmentalAssessmentofOgonil
andreport/tabid/54419/Default.aspx [UNEP Report]. 
5 UNEP Report Ibid. 
6 Amnesty International, “No Progress: An Evaluation of the Implementation of UNEP’s Environmental Assessment 
of Ogoniland, Three Years On” Online: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/013/2014/en/  
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towards preventing or remediating oil pollution, this thesis interrogates existing mechanisms under 
the Nigerian judicial and regulatory system for responding to oil pollution in local communities. 
The thesis also concerns itself with what is described by one scholar as state complicity in 
acquiescing to continued environmental pollution by Transnational Corporations (TNCs).7 The 
research is specifically interested in investigating the regulation of TNCs because 95 percent of oil 
production in the Niger Delta is carried out by TNCs such as Shell, Chevron, ExxonMobil and 
others.8 As one might expect, indigenous oil companies in Nigeria do exist, however TNCs make 
the largest contribution to pollution given their domination of the oil extracting industry. As such, 
the thesis is interested in investigating legal and regulatory framework in Nigeria for the regulation 
of oil companies, with a view to proposing a framework that addresses ineffective regulation of 
oil companies.  
In setting the context, it is necessary to give a brief history of oil and gas exploration in Nigeria. 
Oil extraction can be traced to 1908 when a German entity, the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, 
commenced exploration activities in the Araromi area around what is now known as Ondo State.9 
These pioneering efforts ended abruptly with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Oil 
prospecting efforts resumed in 1937, when Shell D'Arcy (the forerunner of Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria) was awarded sole concessionary rights covering the entire 
territory of Nigeria.10 In 1959, the sole concessionary rights were reviewed and extended to 
companies of various nationalities such as Mobil and Gulf (now Chevron). However due to its 
previous monopolistic role, Shell remains the largest producer of oil in Nigeria.11  
After Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the government mandated all foreign oil companies to re-
register as Nigerian entities in a bid to secure local control of the industry.12 In 1971, when Nigeria 
joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the organization encouraged 
                                                          
7 See generally, Larisa Wick, “Human Rights Violations in Nigeria: Corporate Malpractice and State Acquiescence in 
the Oil Producing Deltas of Nigeria” (2003-2004) 12 Mich. St. U. J. Int'l L. 63.  
8 The Climate Justice Programme, “Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, Environmental and Economic 
Monstrosity” (2005) online: https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/gas_flaring_nigeria.pdf at 8 [Gas 
Flaring in Nigeria]. 
9 Yinka Omorogbe, Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria (Lagos, Nig.: Malthouse Press, 2003) at 16 [Omorogbe].  
10 Ibid at 17. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Rhuks Ako, “Resource Extraction and Environmental Justice” in Francis N Botchway, Natural Resource 
Investment and Africa’s Development (Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub, 2011) at 73.  
3 
 
it members to undertake more prominent roles in oil mining, incorporate national oil companies 
(NOCs) and acquire equity shares in TNCs operating within their regions.13 Nigeria then acquired 
34 percent equity shares but later increased it to 60 percent in 1974, making the government the 
principal player in the oil industry.14    
As early as 1970, local communities had begun vocalizing their concerns against TNCs for 
“seriously threatening the well-being, and even the very lives” 15 of the Ogoni, a local community 
in the Niger Delta. That year there had been a major blow-out at the Bomu oilfield in Ogoni. It had 
continued for three weeks, causing widespread pollution and outrage.16 
In 1990, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was created by the Ogoni 
people, seeking “political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, control and use of Ogoni 
economic resources for Ogoni development, adequate and direct representation as of right for 
Ogoni people in all Nigerian national institutions and the right to protect the Ogoni environment 
and ecology from further degradation”.17 These agitations attracted international attention as the 
leader of MOSOP addressed the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples in Geneva 
in July 1992 asking for international intervention in what he termed “Genocide in Nigeria: The 
Ogoni Tragedy”.18 He accused the government of Nigeria of genocide and the TNC, Shell, of 
complicity in ecological destruction and abuse of the Ogoni people.19  
Perhaps the most significant of the far reaching negative consequences of local resistance to oil 
extraction in the Niger Delta region, was the trial and execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of 
MOSOP, and eight others on charges of murder.20 At the trial, there was evidence that Shell (the 
TNC that MOSOP had fought against) and the Military Government of Nigeria were bribing the 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Project Underground, “The Life & Death of Ken Saro-Wiwa: A History of the Struggle for Justice in the Niger Delta”, 
Online: http://www.ratical.org/corporations/KSWlife+death.pdf at1 [Life & Death of Saro-Wiwa] 
16 Ibid. 
17 The Ogoni Bill of Rights, Presented to the Government and People of Nigeria with an Appeal to the 
International Community, December 1991 in Life & Death of Ken Saro-Wiwa supra note 15. 
18 Ken Saro-Wiwa, Genocide in Nigeria – The Ogoni Tragedy, (Nigeria: Saros International Publishers, 1992). 
19 Ibid at 82-83. 
20 See Michael Birnbaum QC, “Nigeria: Fundamental Rights Denied: Report of the Trial of Ken Saro-Wiwa and Others”, 
(1995) ARTICLE 19 in Association with the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales and the Law Society 
of England and Wales Online:  https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/nigeria-fundamental-rights-
denied.pdf  
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chief prosecution witnesses to testify against the accused persons.21 The trial and executions 
remain the most profound manifestation of the negative consequences of local resistance to 
environmental pollution, TNC complicity and state oppression of local communities in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria.  
These events can perhaps be explained away as having occurred when Nigeria was being run by 
military dictators who are infamous for abuse of power and violation of human rights. With 
Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, it was expected that the rights of long oppressed ethnic 
minorities would receive much greater protection from incidences of oil pollution and oppression 
as a result of oil exploration activities. However, incidences such as the “Odi massacres”22 which 
happened in November 1999 under the Obasanjo civilian administration provide justifiable cause 
for concern even in light of Nigeria’s new found democracy. It had been alleged that in November 
2009, shortly after the Nigeria’s civilian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, took office, that restive 
youth in the oil-rich local community of Odi in the Niger Delta region had killed some policemen 
while agitating against TNCs in the area.23 Human rights organizations allege that in response to 
that incident, the Nigerian government sent in Military troops to retaliate against the community 
and quell any opposition to the government, which resulted in the destruction of the village.24 
While unfortunate, scholars such as Bacher argue that such incidences of blatant assaults on local 
communities “will be difficult to repeat as Nigeria’s democratic institutions mature”.25  
Demonstrably, a number of regulatory agencies were indeed created by the National Assembly to 
ensure the compliance of TNCs with international best practices.26 Nevertheless, the problem of 
                                                          
21 Andrew Rowell, Green Backlash: Global Subversion of Environmental Movement (Great Britain: Routledge, 1996) 
at 309 [Rowell]. 
22 “Nigeria: Odi Massacre Statements”, University of Pennsylvania – Africa Studies Centre, Online: 
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_122399.html    
23 John Backer, Petrotyranny, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2000) at 89 [Backer]. 
24 Ibid, See also Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Nigerian Army Accused of Excessive Force, Rape in Niger Delta."Dec 
22, December 1999, Online: https://www.hrw.org/news/1999/12/22/nigerian-army-accused-excessive-force-rape-
niger-delta and Human Rights Watch (HRW), “The Destruction and Rape of Odi and Choba” Dec 22, 1999 Online: 
https://www.hrw.org/report/1999/12/22/destruction-odi-and-rape-choba/december-22-1999  
25 Backer, supra note 23 at 91. 
26 The National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA), established under the 
National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act of No. 25 of 2007 
empowered to enforce environmental standards, regulations, policies and The National Oil Spill Response and 
Detection Agency (Establishment) Act No. 15 of 2006 established the National Oil Spill Detention Response Agency 
to ensure compliance with existing environmental legislation     
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oil spills as a result of activities of certain TNCs remains a great source of concern to many 
academics, experts, foreign and domestic observers and more importantly to the affected local 
communities.  As such, international organizations such as the United Nations Environment 
Programme,27 and Amnesty International,28 among several others have undertaken and published 
reports on the persistence of oil pollution, its negative impact on local communities in Niger Delta 
and the need for remediation. The working hypothesis for this thesis therefore is that better 
regulation of oil mining corporations will remediate the challenge of oil pollution.  
In interrogating more effective regulation in Nigeria, it is significant to note that oil mining in 
Nigeria is carried out partly through the state-owned oil corporation, the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (the NNPC), which holds 55-60 percent interests in the oil mining leases 
of TNCs through joint venture agreements (JVA).29 Although the TNCs hold minority interests in 
the JVAs with the NNPC, these TNCs are designated as operators under the JVA and so undertake 
the actual oil prospecting, exploration and mining. Being the ones with the technical knowledge, 
the more significant capital and the foreign investment, these TNCs wield immense power which 
tilts the balance of power in their favour. By implication the Nigerian government, while in 
business with these TNCs through the state-owned corporation, is then placed in a precarious 
position of regulating the activities of its more powerful partners in production. Some scholars 
argue that the framework for regulation is plagued by a conflict of interest for the regulator 
(government) as they are stakeholders in oil extraction.30   
In addition, the character and structure of the NNPC contributes to the imbalance of power between 
TNCs and the government. While some NOCs in the other OPEC countries in the Middle East 
have succeeded in maintaining their autonomy,31 the NNPC is described as: 
                                                          
27 UNEP Report, supra note 4 
28 Amnesty International Nigeria, “Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta” (2009) online: Amnesty 
International http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/nigeria-petroleum-pollution-and-poverty-in-the-
niger-delta-report at 42 [Amnesty Report]. 
29 Ibironke T. Odumosu, “Transferring Alberta’s Gas Flaring Reduction Regulatory Framework to Nigeria: Potentials 
and Limitations” (2006-2007) 44 Alta. L. Rev. 863 at 876 [Odumosu, Transferring Alberta’s Gas Flaring Regulations] 
30 See Odumosu, Transferring Alberta’s Gas Flaring Regulations ibid at 877, Evaristus Oshionebo, Regulating 
Transnational Corporations in Domestic and International Regimes, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 
page 74-76 [Oshionebo] 
31 Marc-Antoine Perouse De Montclos, “The Politics and Crisis of the Petroleum Industry Bill in Nigeria” (2014) 52 J. 
of Modern African Studies pp. 403-424 at 407 [Monclos] 
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“neither a real commercial entity nor a meaningful oil operator. It lacks control over the 
revenue it generates and thus is unable to set its own strategy. It relies on other firms to 
perform essentially all of the most complex functions that are the hallmarks of operating 
oil companies. Yet unlike some NOCs it also fails to fit the profile of a government agency: 
its portfolio of activities is too diverse, incoherent, and beyond the reach of government 
control for it to function as a government policy making instrument.”32  
These challenges make the NNPC “structurally insolvent”33 as its crude oil sales pass directly into 
the Federation account and loses money because it subsidizes the sale of refined oil products.34 It 
is therefore constantly indebted to its partners, in addition to being plagued by problems of 
accountability, fraud and mismanagement.35 Given that the NNPC, the government’s primary 
agent for oil mining, is bedevilled by these problems, effective government regulation of the 
industry presents a formidable challenge.    
Other concerns which are also closely related to the allegation of a conflict of interest include a 
high percentage of the Nigerian government’s earnings coming from the oil industry,36 suggesting 
that it would be difficult to enforce sanctions against the highest earning industry. There is also 
the very important issue of allegations of sabotage, animosity and distrust between local 
communities, TNCs and the government. As seen earlier in the chapter, agitations against oil 
extraction and the resultant oil pollution has characterized relations between local communities, 
governments and TNCs from the early days of oil extraction. Local communities tend to regard 
governments and TNCs with distrust and resentment and the government being a party interested 
in oil extraction, which often results in pollution, has persistently failed to maintain credibility as 
one that can adequately respond to the concerns of its people. This atmosphere of animosity and 
distrust as well as government involvement in oil extraction colours relations between the parties 
and perhaps contributes to the challenge of effective regulation. An ideal regulatory regime ought 
to inspire confidence from all the parties involved in oil extraction, however the animosity that 
colours relations between the government, TNCs and local communities taints the credibility of 
                                                          
32 Mark C. Thurber, Ifeyinwa M. Emelife, and Patrick R.P. Heller, “NNPC and Nigeria’s Oil Patronage Ecosystem” 
(2010) Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University at 5 
33 Montclos, supra note 31 at 407. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Oshionebo, supra note 30 at 76. 
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any existing regulatory regime and makes the optimal functioning of such a regime almost 
impossible. While there are several factors that contribute to ineffective regulation in Nigeria, the 
bottom line remains that oil pollution persists and there is a need for better implementation of the 
regulatory framework.  
Scholars such as Odumosu37 and Oshionebo,38 acknowledging the problem of ineffective 
regulation, have suggested that the Nigerian situation possibly requires a shift in its style of 
regulation and advocate a more democratic solution to some of the problems of the industry.39 
Others have suggested closing the loop holes in existing legislative framework in Nigeria and 
empowering national institutions to enforce sanctions.40 However, the recommendations made in 
this thesis are inspired in part by the recommendations of Amnesty International in its report on 
the Niger Delta, in which it recommended an independent and coordinated oversight of the oil 
industry in Nigeria including its impact on human rights,41 as well as the work of Odumosu-Ayanu 
which proposes a potential role for regional supranational organizations such as the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to facilitate multi-actor contracts to regulate 
relations between governments, TNCs and local communities in oil extraction. 42 
In investigating problems of oil pollution in Nigeria and ineffective regulation of oil extracting 
TNCs, this thesis hypothesises that ineffective regulation is borne out of a number of concerns 
including government involvement in oil and gas extraction and therefore interrogates the potential 
role of a regional supranational organization such as the ECOWAS (in which Nigeria is a member) 
in contributing to more effective regulation.    
1.2 Literature Review 
A number of issues have been identified within scholarly literature as contributing to the seemingly 
intractable situation that is regulatory effectiveness in the Nigerian oil industry. The literature 
suggests that a number of challenges bedevil effective regulation of TNCs in Nigeria which require 
legislative and institutional reform. However, this thesis contends that such reforms require some 
                                                          
37 Odumosu-Ayanu, Multi-Actor Contracts supra note 3 at 290 
38 Oshionebo, supra note 30 at 210  
39 Odumosu-Ayanu, Multi-Actor Contracts, supra note 3 at 286  
40 Lisa Stevens, “The Illusion of Sustainable Development: How Nigeria's Environmental Laws Are Failing the Niger 
Delta” (2011 - 2012) 36 Vt. L. Rev. 387 2011-2012 at 407 [Stevens] 
41 Amnesty Report, supra note 28 at 86 
42 Odumosu-Ayanu, Multi-Actor Contracts, supra note 3 at 308  
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measure of political will if the reforms are to be undertaken. Specifically, the literature suggests a 
need for reform in the following areas:  
i. Constitutional reforms in order to recognize the right to a healthy environment;43 
ii. Amendments to legislative framework for regulation;44 
iii. Reforms within regulatory agencies;45 
The Nigerian constitution does not recognize a right to a healthy environment, instead the 
constitution provides “directive principles” to the state “to protect and improve the environment 
and safeguard water, air and land, forest and wildlife in Nigeria.”46 This constitutional failure not 
only precludes local communities from establishing a constitutional right based claim to a healthy 
environment, it places no enforceable obligation on the state to protect the environment. Although 
the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights (African Charter)47 which is domesticated in 
Nigeria provides for the right to a healthy environment,48 scholars such as Ako write that such 
legislation is inferior to the constitution and risks being repealed, amended or declared to be in 
variance with the constitution which would render it null and void.49 A detailed discussion about 
the need for constitutional reform in Nigeria is taken in the second chapter of this work.  
There seems to be a consensus among most writers that environmental pollution infringes on 
human rights.50 Rowell argues that there can be no greater human right than access to clean water, 
                                                          
43 See Kaniye S.A. Ebeku, “Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment and Human Rights Approaches to 
Environmental Protection in Nigeria: Gbemre v. Shell Revisited” (2007) 16:3 RECEIL 317 [Ebeku on Gbemre] 
44 See Oshionebo supra note 30 at 51-60. 
45 Ibid at 72-77. 
46 Section 21 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
47 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), 27 June 
1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) 
48 Cap 10, LFN. Also Article 24 of the African Charter provides for the right to a clean and healthy environment and 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The African Commission) in the SERAC case, held that such 
right to health and a clean environment of Ogoniland (the local community in issue) had been violated. See SERAC 
case supra note 2 at paragraph 52.    
49 See Rhuks Ako, Environmental Justice in Developing countries: Perspectives from Africa and Asia-Pacific 
(USA/Canada: Routledge, 2013) [Ako] at 26. 
50 Joshua P. Eaton, “The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and the 
Human Right to a Healthy Environment” (1997) 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 261 [Eaton], See also Richard Desgagne, 
“Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights”, (1995) 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 263; 
Robert K. Hitchcock, “International Human Rights, the Environment, and Indigenous Peoples”, (1994) 5 Colo. J. 
Int'L Envt’l L. & POL'Y 1; Michelle Leighton Schwartz, “International Legal Protection for Victims of Environmental 
Abuse”, (1993) 18 Yale J. Int'l L. 355 (1993); Dinah Shelton, “Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to 
Environment”, (1991) 28 Stan. J. Int’l L. 103; Janusz Symonides, “The Human Right to a Clean, Balanced and 
Protected Environment”, (1992) 20 Int’l J. Legal Info. 24 (1992); Christopher Tracy, “The Roots of Influence: 
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land and clean air.51 In his work, Eaton submits that the time has come for the recognition of the 
right to a healthy environment by way of international convention52 as well as a court with 
jurisdiction to hear cases arising from environmental abuse.53  
In the specific case of Nigeria, a number of scholars such as Eaton54 and Shinsato55 have argued 
that international human rights ought to do more to protect the rights of communities violated by 
oil pollution.56 While Eaton called for an international court for the environment to hear cases of 
human rights abuses as a result of environmental pollution,57 Shinsato identified existing domestic, 
international and United States legal framework for protection of local communities and suggests 
they be applied as short term means of protecting rights of local communities.58  
Other scholars such as Omorogbe argue that Niger Delta communities have a right to equality, 
development and freedom from domination as enshrined in the African Charter.59 Yusuf, another 
scholar, argues that the non-justiciability of economic and social rights under the Nigerian 
constitution is at variance with Nigeria’s obligations under international law (as a party to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).60 He does however, display 
some optimism regarding Nigerian courts establishing justiciability of such rights through judicial 
pronouncement.61 Rights groups have also expressed concern over violations of Niger Delta 
                                                          
Nongovernmental Organizations and the Relationship between Human Rights and the Environment”, (1994) 3 J. 
Int'l L. & Prac. 21; Jennifer A. Downs, “A Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment: An Argument for a Third 
Generation Right”, (1993) 3 Dun J. Comp. & Int’l L. 351; Brian B.A. McAllister, “The United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development: An Opportunity to Forge a New Unity in the Work of the World Bank Among 
Human Rights, the Environment, and Sustainable Development”, 16 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. R. 689 (1993); James 
T. McClymonds, “The Human Right to a Healthy Environment: An International Legal Perspective”, (1992) 37 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. R. 583; Scott D. Cahalan, “NIMBY: Not in Mexico's Back Yard? A Case for Recognition of a Human Right to 
Healthy Environment in the American States”, 23 GA. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 409 (1993). 176 
51 Rowell, supra note 21 at 1. 
52 On the African continent, the right to a healthy environment was already provided for by way of an international 
convention in the African Charter in 1998, however the protocol did not come into force until January 2005. See 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, Online: http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/  
53 Eaton supra note 50 at 1. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Alison Lindsay Shinsato, “Increasing Accountability of Transnational Corporations for Environmental Harm: The 
Petroleum Industry in Nigeria” (2005) 4 NW. J. Int’l Hum Rts. 186 [Shinsato]. 
56 Ibid, Eaton supra note 50 at 1.  
57 Eaton, supra note 50 at 305. 
58 Shinsato, supra note 55 at 209. 
59Omorogbe, supra note 9 at 146. 
60 Hakeem O. Yusuf, “Oil on Troubled Waters: Multinational Corporations and Realizing Human Rights in the 
Developing World, with Specific Reference to Nigeria” (2009) 8 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 79 at 86 [Yusuf]. 
61 Ibid.  
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peoples’ human rights as a result of oil pollution and have decried the situation, accusing the 
Nigerian government of absenteeism and failure to effectively regulate activities of oil and gas 
companies.62 A review of the literature therefore reveals a link between environmental pollution 
and human rights and identifies challenges to establishing rights-based claims to environmental 
justice in Nigeria especially in the face of an absence of constitutional provision for a right to a 
healthy environment. The research proceeds with and explores the hypothesis that this 
constitutional failure contributes to the state exhibiting a less than exemplary attitude toward 
effective regulation of oil mining and ultimately environmental protection.  
In addition to the constitutional failure to provide a right to a healthy environment, there is also 
the challenge of the failure of the judiciary to effectively protect victims of environmental 
pollution. As a democratic state, judicial process in Nigeria ought to provide redress to local 
communities in the event of environmental pollution or human rights infringement. However, 
Oshionebo argues that Nigeria’s judicial process is hampered by lack of infrastructure in courts, 
high cost of litigation and possible fear of reprisal by the government on privately instituted claims 
of pollution.63 Odumosu-Ayanu however expresses optimism on the attitude of Nigerian courts 
towards gas flaring, citing Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Corporation64 where the court 
found that the AGRA's provisions allowing continued flaring on the payment of fines amounts to 
a violation of the constitutional provisions on the right to life and are unconstitutional, null, and 
void.65 However in spite of this promising move by the judiciary the AGRA still remains in force.66  
A report by the International Commission of Jurists on access to justice regarding human rights 
abuses by TNCs in Nigeria, demonstrates the challenges of successfully litigating human rights 
abuses by TNCs in Nigeria.67 It identifies problems of poverty in local communities, thereby 
limiting their access to legal representation, issues of jurisdiction, evidence gathering and 
                                                          
62 Amnesty Report, supra note 28. 
63 Oshionebo, supra note 30 at 76-77. 
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65 Odumosu-Ayanu, Transfering Alberta’s Gas Flaring Regulations, supra note 29 at 890. 
66 Act and Regulations regulating the Oil Industry in Nigeria, Online: Department of Petroleum Resources 
https://dpr.gov.ng/index/acts-and-regulations/ 
67 International Commission of Jurists, “Access to Justice: Human Rights Abuses Involving Corporations” (2013) 
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enforcement of judgments against TNCs.68 Ultimately it seems judicial process has offered local 
communities little reprieve from environmental pollution as a result of activities of TNCs. These 
challenges underscore the need for better protection of local communities through effective 
regulation of TNCs as more effective regulation will address the problems of environmental 
pollution which give rise to appeals to the judiciary.  
Another challenge to regulatory efficiency identified in the literature relates to the existing 
legislative framework in Nigeria that addresses oil extraction. Research into legislative framework 
for regulation of oil mining in Nigeria reveals that there are numerous statutes in Nigeria that 
regulate petroleum exploration. The Department of Petroleum Resources’ (DPR) website lists 27 
Acts and Regulations that purport to regulate the oil and gas industry.69 Evidently, the challenge 
of regulation of oil pollution in Nigeria is not as a result of a lack of regulatory legislation. 
The question then becomes, what are the challenges to effective regulation? A review of the 
literature finds scholars such as Odumosu70 and Oshionebo71 for example, arguing that the existing 
legislation in Nigeria on natural gas flaring makes it more economically prudent for TNCs to flare 
gas into the atmosphere rather than re-inject the gas. The Associated Gas Re-Injection Act,72 is 
regulates natural gas flaring and seeks to compel TNCs to re-inject natural gas derived from oil 
extraction. However, the legislation provides an option of fines in negligible sums to TNCs for 
non-compliance with the requirement for reinjection of natural gas. Because these fines cost 
significantly less than it costs to re-inject natural gas, TNCs flare natural gas and pay these fines. 
Gas flaring has severe implications for the health of local communities and the environment. It 
causes heat that “kills vegetation, suppresses the growth and flowering of some plants, and 
diminishes agricultural production,”73 which are all detrimental to local communities as they are 
essentially agrarian. Other adverse effects include respiratory problems in children, acid rain and 
contaminations of drinking water.74 Scholars agree that option of fines for non-compliance with 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 
69 Act and Regulations regulating the Oil Industry in Nigeria, supra note 66. 
70 Odumosu, Transferring Alberta’s Gas Flaring Regulation, supra note 29 at 888.   
71 Oshionebo supra note 30 at 54. 
72 Cap A25, Laws of the Federations of Nigeria 2004. 
73 United Nations Development Programme, “Niger Delta Human Development Report” (Abuja: UNDP 2006) quoted 
cited in Oshionebo supra note 30 at 23-24. 
74 Henry Clark, et al., “Oil for Nothing: Multinational Corporations, Environmental Destruction, Death and Impunity 
in The Niger Delta” at 5 online: http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/Final_Report.pdf   
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provisions of the AGRA on re-injection of gas, coupled with the negligible sums to be imposed as 
fines for non-compliance prescribed by the Act hinder chances of reduced gas flaring in Nigeria.75    
Other legislation which attempt to regulate environmental pollution in Nigeria include the National 
Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act, 2007 
(NESREA)76 which has also received criticism for its prohibition of discharge of hazardous 
substances only if they are in “harmful quantities”.77 The prohibition is also not absolute but rather 
subject to “any law in force in Nigeria”.78 Oshionebo writes that the prohibition will be inoperative 
if any law in Nigeria permits such discharge.79 Also the requirement for the NESREA to determine 
whether the discharge was in “harmful quantities” or otherwise further undermines the efficacy of 
the Act as the burden of proof is shifted to the agency to first make a determination as to the 
whether or not the discharge was harmful. 
Another significant legislation regarding oil pollution in Nigeria relates to oil spills. The Petroleum 
Act,80 is one of the numerous statute in Nigeria that regulate oil spills. Regulation 25 of the 
Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations of 1969 (implementing the Petroleum Act) 
requires that companies adopt all practicable precautions including the provision of up-to-date 
equipment in order to prevent pollution, and if pollution does occur, they must take prompt steps 
to control and, if possible end it.81 Further, in 1991, the DPR expanded regulations for oil spill 
prevention with the introduction of Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum 
Industry (EGASPIN) (revised in 2002) which provides that “clean up shall commence within 24 
hours of the occurrence of the spill”.82 While these are laudable provisions, legislation requires 
TNCs to undertake self-monitoring of compliance with the provisions. This requirement for 
industry self-regulation is perhaps not unrelated to the challenges relating to technical capacity 
within agencies responsible for enforcement of regulations,83 and ultimately the need for 
institutional reforms in Nigeria, which is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
                                                          
75 Oshionebo supra note 30 at 54. 
76 NESREA Act 2007, published in the Official Gazette No. 92. Vol. 94, 31st July, 2007. 
77 Ibid at Section 27. 
78 Oshionebo, supra note 30 at 57. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Cap 350, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990  
81 Petroleum (Drilling and Productions) Regulations, L.N. 69 of 1969. 
82 Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry, (EGASPIN), 2002,  2.6.3  at 158 
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The consensus within the literature suggests that regulatory ineffectiveness in Nigeria subsists for 
reasons other than the lack of regulatory legislation. Olawuyi,84 like Steiner,85 argues that 
environmental pollution in Nigeria subsists not for lack of environmental laws and institutions but 
rather “lack of effective implementation of the series of environmental laws that have been put in 
place”.86 Steiner further argues that regulations regarding oil spills in Nigeria are sufficient to curb 
the menace if relevant TNCs would comply.87  
This thesis, following the literature, studies this existing legislation on regulation of the oil industry 
with a view to identifying if in fact these laws are sufficient to regulate oil exploration and if not, 
what are their failings and how can they be remedied. The thesis also interrogates the institutional 
framework for regulation with a view to identifying the challenges inherent to the institutional 
framework which further hamper regulatory effectiveness. In that light, we look at for example the 
DPR, which is responsible for ensuring that health, safety and environment regulations conform 
with national and international best oil field practice.88 However, the history of the DPR can be 
traced to the NNPC, which is the state-owned oil company through which the state participates in 
oil mining and exploration. The DPR (initially called the Petroleum Inspectorate) was originally 
created as a part of the NNPC, and even in 1985, when the Ministry of Petroleum Resources was 
re-established,89 the Petroleum Inspectorate (now the DPR) remained within the NNPC until 
March 1988 when the NNPC was reorganized.90 It was as a result of the reorganization of the 
NNPC in 1988 that the Petroleum Inspectorate was excised from the NNPC, and transferred to the 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources as the technical arm of the Ministry in charge of regulating oil 
mining and renamed the DPR. While Omorogbe argues that no law directly empowers the DPR to 
undertake regulatory functions because the NNPC Act empowers the Petroleum Inspectorate (the 
                                                          
84 Olawuyi, supra note 1 at 207. 
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precursor of the DPR),91 Oshionebo argues that the DPR as presently constituted creates room for 
intimidation and interference in regulation from government officials or powerful individuals.92  
The significance of tracing the history of the DPR is that it speaks to a number of issues relating 
to regulatory effectiveness in Nigeria. Firstly, it demonstrates the attitude of the Nigerian state as 
regards regulation of oil production as it hitherto expected the state-owned oil corporation (the 
NNPC) to also enforce regulation. Secondly, the close relationship between the regulator (the 
DPR) and the extractive companies (the NNPC and the TNCs) presents a considerable challenge 
for regulatory efficiency and a number of writers identify such closeness as possibly responsible 
for state ineffectiveness in enforcing regulation.93 According to the World Bank, “this situation 
has resulted in the government inadequately regulating oil pollution while at the same time, being 
party to much of the oil-related environmental problems of the Niger Delta.”94  
Other challenges regarding the institutional framework for regulation of oil mining in Nigeria 
relates to multiplicity of regulatory agencies, challenges relating to capacity, funding, duplication 
of efforts and sometimes inter-agency rivalry which hampers regulatory effectiveness. In the third 
chapter of this thesis, we examine in detail existing regulation as well as the institutional 
framework for regulation of the oil industry. In its examination, the chapter seeks to identify some 
of the challenges to regulatory effectiveness and proposes solutions to those challenges. Having 
surveyed the literature, the research proceeds with the hypothesis that the extensive legislation and 
regulatory institutions in Nigeria would benefit from consolidation and oversight respectively. It 
interrogates the potential of the ECOWAS to provide such oversight.   
Central to this thesis is the hypothesis that the most potent challenge to regulatory effectiveness in 
the Nigerian oil industry relates to the apparent conflict of interest of the Nigerian government. 
The state’s involvement in oil exploration, the precarious nature of its relationship with TNCs 
(being the operators they have the technical knowledge, capital and experience) as well as the state 
having its highest amount of earnings coming from oil has led to allegations that the state is not 
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adequately positioned to effectively enforce existing regulation. The said conflict of interest is 
identified as the most potent challenge to regulatory effectiveness in Nigeria’s oil mining industry 
as it informs the political will to not only enforce existing legislation, but to undertake reforms 
such as the ones being suggested in this thesis.  
One illustration of this conflict of interest is the existence of Joint Venture Agreements (JVAs) for 
oil exploration between the NNPC and several TNCs operating in Nigeria as sanctions enforced 
against TNCs ultimately affect the bottom line of the state-owned NNPC.95 Also the NNPC is not 
an operator under the agreements and therefore is not directly involved in oil extraction.96 The 
effect of such an arrangement is that the NNPC has limited technical knowledge of the process of 
oil production thereby increasing government’s dependence on TNCs.97 Also related to the limited 
technical skill of the NNPC are problems of endemic corruption linked to the NNPC.98 In relation 
to its JVAs with TNCs, the NNPC has often fallen short of financing its equity holdings, often 
borrowing from its TNC partners to fund the ventures.99 This heavy indebtedness of the 
government (through the NNPC) to the TNCs, often creates a conflict of interest where the 
government appears to be reluctant to empower its regulatory agencies to enforce regulations 
against corporations it is heavily indebted to.100  
Other allegations relating to the government’s conflict of interest and its seeming inability to 
enforce regulations involves allegations of political ambivalence on the part of civil servants who 
head ministries or agencies of regulation. Because governments are part of oil mining activities, 
heads of agencies may be wary of enforcing negative sanctions in order not to offend government 
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interests.101 Odumosu-Ayanu in discussing government’s interest in oil revenue without 
commiserate focus on local communities, writes that Nigeria’s problem is not a lack of capacity 
to make regulations but calculations based on interests that powerful stakeholders deem “more 
important”.102 However, she argues that the passage of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act enacted in 2010 to increase local participation in the industry, demonstrates that 
the government is capable of adopting regulatory changes in the oil industry.103 
In summary, issues identified in the literature demonstrate that the challenge of ineffective 
regulation of the oil industry in Nigeria is not restricted to one factor but to several factors. This 
thesis therefore in examining and making recommendations for reforms within the legislative and 
institutional framework for regulation in Nigeria, also advocates for constitutional and judicial 
reform which would make the failures of regulation subject to constitutional and judicial remedies. 
However, having identified the challenge of the state’s conflict of interest, the thesis investigates 
the potential of ECOWAS oversight over the Nigerian regulatory framework to introduce a party 
that is neutral in the politics of oil and gas exploration. The thesis investigates the potential 
contributions of regulatory oversight by a regional supranational institution, whose credibility is 
not coloured by involvement in oil mining, to more effective regulation of the oil industry. The 
thesis advocates that regulatory oversight provides an avenue for state agencies to surmount the 
challenges that relates to conflict of interest in enforcing regulation as an independent oversight 
mechanism is likely removed from the politics relating to regulation. Specifically, the thesis 
proposes the adoption of a framework of oversight under the ECOWAS, given Nigeria’s 
membership in the organization and the supranationality of the organization.  
Although a detailed discussion of the ECOWAS is undertaken in the fourth chapter of this thesis, 
it is prudent to provide a brief introduction to the ECOWAS to better contextualize the justification 
for the use of the ECOWAS for regulatory oversight in Nigeria. The ECOWAS is a regional 
community comprising 15 West African states including Nigeria. It was established in 1975 under 
the ECOWAS Treaty104 to garner regional and economic integration in member states.105 In 1993, 
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the Treaty was revised and the organization gained supranational status.106 A detailed discussion 
on the suprantionality of the ECOWAS is taken in the fourth chapter of this thesis. However, it is 
significant to note that as a supranational organization and not an inter-governmental organization, 
the ECOWAS represents an organization to which member states (Nigeria included) have 
surrendered their sovereignties with respect to the mandate of the organization.107 One the 
implications of the supranationality of the ECOWAS is that it can make binding decisions on 
behalf of member states which are immediately binding and not subject to ratification by member 
states. 
An organization such as the ECOWAS therefore, if presented with the task of overseeing the affairs 
of the regulatory framework in Nigeria has the advantage of being a potentially neutral party as it 
is not as involved as the Nigerian government in oil mining. It has the potential to avoid concerns 
regarding the Nigerian government’s conflict of interest and as a supranational organization, 
avoids infringing on state sovereignty as the Nigerian state has already surrendered part of its 
sovereignty to the organization. Ultimately, the thesis explores the potential of the ECOWAS to 
undertake regulatory oversight over the Nigerian oil industry. 
1.3 Justifying Regional Oversight Over the Nigerian Regulatory Framework 
As demonstrated in the previous subsection, a number of scholars such as Odumosu-Ayanu,108 
Oshionebo,109 Stevens,110 and Eaton,111 have identified the problem of ineffective regulation in 
Nigeria and have advanced potential solutions to the problem. While acknowledging the merits of 
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previously proposed solutions, this thesis charts a new course in proposing a regulatory oversight 
framework. Although the recommendation for ECOWAS oversight is (to the author’s knowledge) 
new, the selection of the ECOWAS to provide such oversight is inspired in part by existing 
research and jurisprudence. 
Pointedly, Odumosu-Ayanu’s research into Local Communities and Oil and Gas Contracts 
suggests the use of a regional framework such as the ECOWAS for the effective delivery of 
multijurisdictional large projects, suggesting that they are more robust since such frameworks are 
designed for states of similar, but not identical, socio-economic status.112 Her research advances a 
quasi-regulatory framework to run in tandem with existing frameworks to regulate large projects 
acknowledging that states are often constrained by “lack of capacity, lack of interest or even 
conflict of interest”.113 The problem of ineffective regulation identified in this thesis, shares some 
of the concerns identified in Odumosu-Ayanu’s work,  such as lack of capacity, lack of interest 
and a conflict of interest on the part of the state. Perhaps the Nigerian state can also benefit from 
regulatory oversight from the ECOWAS.  
Secondly, jurisprudence from the ECOWAS Court further informs the choice of the ECOWAS to 
perform such regulatory oversight. In SERAP v. Nigeria,114 the ECOWAS Court found the 
Nigerian government responsible for failing to effectively regulate TNCs. The court then ordered 
Nigeria to "take all measures" to restore the environment, prevent future damage, and hold the 
perpetrators accountable.115 However the Court failed to specify how the Nigerian state should 
implement the judgment.116 The significance of the judgment which is further discussed in the 
fourth chapter of this work, is that ECOWAS has in the recent past interceded in concerns relating 
to ineffectiveness of regulation in Nigeria’s oil industry. A second concern is that even though the 
ECOWAS Court reprimanded the Nigerian state for failing to effectively enforce its existing laws 
and directed it to remedy its failings, the Court failed to identify a means for Nigeria to implement 
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its decision.117 This thesis therefore proposes a framework which advocates regulatory oversight 
that anticipates the involvement of other organs of the ECOWAS, not just the Court, in getting 
Nigeria to enforce her existing regulation. The framework proposed anticipates the involvement 
of the ECOWAS and Nigerian state institutions to implement a decisive approach to regulation 
aimed at increasing regulatory effectiveness of the oil industry in Nigeria. The scope of the 
proposed oversight framework is discussed in detail in Chapter four of this thesis. It is designed to 
involve the receipt of mandatory reports from Nigeria’s regulatory institutions, provision of 
technical assistance, on-site inspections, and possible blacklisting of errant TNCs in other West 
African states. 
The employment of the ECOWAS framework would seem an educated choice for oversight 
function in Nigeria given the reasons adduced in section 1.2. The ECOWAS also has some 
experience in extractive industries,118 and its membership is smaller119 when compared to the 
membership of the African Union which inspires confidence that the framework being proposed 
would be easier to manage. In addition, the new legal regime of the ECOWAS translates all 
conventions or regulations by the Authority of the Heads of State (which is the decision-making 
body of the ECOWAS) into immediately binding law on member states, eliminating the need for 
lengthy domestication processes within member states which often frustrates progress.120 
1.4 Theoretical Framework for the Research  
The conceptual framework for ECOWAS oversight of the activities of the oil industry in Nigeria 
being proposed by the research is inspired by the concept of “carrots, nudges and sticks” put forth 
by Penelope Simons and Audrey Macklin in The Governance Gap121 while the broader inquiry in 
the research is situated in Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm “life cycle” theory. Drawing on 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory, this thesis interrogates the socialization of norms relating to 
effective regulation of the oil industry and prevention of oil pollution, into domestic practices.122  
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Central to the thesis is the argument that the normative framework relating to the right to a healthy 
environment and the prevention and remediation of oil pollution in Nigeria is need of reform. The 
second chapter argues the need for constitutional reforms relating to the recognition of a right to a 
healthy environment and the third and fourth chapters argue for institutional reforms that are 
designed to increase greater effectiveness in the regulation of oil pollution. Ultimately, the thesis 
is concerned with putting forth an argument for attitudinal, constitutional, jurisprudential and 
institutional change in the way the state responds to issues of environmental justice and oil 
pollution.   
With regard to the conceptual framework, Finnemore and Sikkink‘s theory of norm “life cycle” 
outlines three stages which a norm undergoes before it assumes universal acceptance within 
states.123 According to the theory, the first stage is norm emergence, where the norm entrepreneur 
creates a general consciousness about the norm and attempts to convince norm leaders (identified 
as a critical mass of states) to embrace this new norm.124 According to Finnemore and Sikkink, 
norm entrepreneurs are often non-governmental organizations creating awareness about the norms. 
The second stage is the norm cascade where these norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to 
become followers of the norm.125 The authors of the theory suggest that states are convinced by 
norm leaders to accept new norms for a number of reasons including: pressure for conformity, 
desire to enhance international legitimation and perhaps a desire for states to enhance their self-
esteem.126 The final stage of the cycle is internalization. The authors posit that this is when the 
norm acquires a “taken-for-granted quality”127 and is no longer a matter for broad public debate.128 
The authors admit however that the completion of the “life cycle” is not an inevitable process and 
some norms might fail to reach the “tipping point”.129 They identify the tipping point as between 
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the first and second stage of the norm life cycle, identified as when the norm receives acceptance 
from a sufficient number of states.  
The thesis, however, tests Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory as it presents the ECOWAS as both 
norm entrepreneur and norm leader. In this thesis, the ECOWAS is presented as the medium for 
creating awareness of the existence of the norm through its oversight and insistence on regulation 
of the oil industry and oil pollution (norm entrepreneur) as well as a norm leader as it will be 
responsible for convincing a “critical mass of states” to adopt the new norm. By virtue of its 
supranational status, the ECOWAS by its very nature is “a critical mass of states”, therefore its 
role in getting the Nigerian state and perhaps other member states to adopt new norms qualifies it 
as a norm leader. The potential role of the ECOWAS therefore, presents a dual role for the 
ECOWAS within the “norm life cycle” theory, which troubles and might suggest an expansion 
and refinement of Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory where norm entrepreneurs are usually NGOs 
and the norm leaders are often states, to accommodate the potential role of supranational 
organizations as both norm entrepreneurs and norm leaders.   
Ultimately, the described theoretical framework provides the optics with which the contributions 
in the thesis are to be examined. It helps to examine what role the ECOWAS can play in 
encouraging states, Nigeria specifically, to advance the life cycle of the norm of effective 
regulation and environmental protection so that the norm can achieve a “taken-for-granted”130 
quality. The authors describe the completion of the life cycle of the norm as becoming one that is 
no longer subjected to public debate. They give examples of norms that have achieved 
internalization in how people no longer question whether women have a right to vote, or whether 
slavery is useful, or whether medical personnel ought to be granted immunity during times of 
war.131 
1.5 METHODOLOGY ADOPTED FOR THE RESEARCH  
The methodology adopted in this research is multi-disciplinary. It involves an analysis of law, 
history, and international relations theory. The thesis identifies legal and social issues that hamper 
effective regulation of TNCs in Nigeria by analyzing existing legislation and institutional 
framework for oil mining, environmental pollution, and human rights applicable in Nigeria. The 
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analysis of existing legislation is derived from statutes, policy statements, international 
conventions, books, journals, newspaper articles, seminars, leaflets, periodicals, magazines, 
lecture notes and online resources. A study of history is also helpful to the thesis as it traces the 
history, growth and potentials of the ECOWAS, in a bid to determine its prospects for regulatory 
oversight. Significant to the thesis also is Finnemore and Sikkink’s international relations theory 
upon which the theoretical framework of the study is situated.  
Ultimately, the primary means of executing the research is library and internet-based research, that 
is information contained in published material available from libraries, databases and the internet. 
1.6 Conclusion  
In summary, this thesis provides scholarly insight into challenges and consequences of ineffective 
regulation of TNCs in Nigeria while exploring the potential of a novel approach to addressing such 
challenges. It provides a useful contribution to identifying concerns relating to protection and 
promotion of human rights of local communities, regulatory framework for regulation of the oil 
and gas industry, and protection of the environment as well as suggestions regarding reforms in 
the problem areas identified.  
In contributing to theory, the thesis proposes the expansion and refinement of the norm “life cycle” 
theory to anticipate norm entrepreneurs and leaders taking the form of supranational entities. The 
interrogation of the ECOWAS as a supranational organization, capable of affecting attitudes of 
sovereign state lends its voice to the growing discourse surrounding modern day redefinitions of 
the concept of state sovereignty.132 The thesis demonstrates the advantages of a shift from non-
interference as regards international relations between states to pooling of sovereignties under 
supranational organizations and the potentials of such a shift for states and ultimately local 
communities. The European Union (EU) is an example of one of such supranational organizations. 
The EU first started to evolve as a supranational organization with the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC), whose mandate was to establish a common 
market without trade barriers.133 Given the successes of the common market, European 
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governments decided to consolidate their gains and extended their delegation of power by signing 
the Maastricht Treaty134 and creating the European Union.135 Recent events surrounding the 
United Kingdom’s referendum to leave the EU have demonstrated the advantages and perhaps 
disadvantages of economic integration and shared sovereignty under a supranational 
organization.136 Nevertheless, it remains the contention of this thesis that the benefits of economic 
integration and shared sovereignties, far outweigh the disadvantages of integration and that the 
Nigerian state will benefit greatly from regulatory oversight from the ECOWAS.  
The thesis also lends its voice to the growing body of literature that propose a new governance 
model for the regulation of TNCs in extractive industries. The works of Penelope Simons and 
Audrey Macklin137 and Larry Cata Backer138 are instructive in this regard as they advocate 
governance models for the regulation of TNCs that go beyond the host states or home states of the 
TNCs. Scholars such as Nupur Chowdury and Ramses A. Wessel studying the concept of 
regulation at the EU, acknowledge that certain aspects of regulatory processes are no longer 
located in one single governmental actor.139 Although their work does not contemplate TNCs in 
extractive industries, their research provides insight into the potential for regulation beyond 
states.140    
The thesis is divided into four chapters, with the first being the just concluded introductory chapter 
outlining the scope and significance of the thesis. The second chapter undertakes an analysis of 
the debilitating effects of oil pollution on local communities in the Niger Delta, identifying the 
failure of the Nigerian constitution to provide constitutional protection to local communities 
affected by environmental pollution. In making a case for constitutional reform, the chapter 
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identifies other challenges such as limited access to justice which hamper the protection of the 
local communities that are affected by oil pollution. It identifies the significant potential of 
engaging the ECOWAS Court in protecting rights of local communities in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria. Having made a case for the protection of the environment as a human right of local 
communities, the third chapter undertakes an analysis of the existing regulatory framework in 
Nigeria. It examines the existing regulatory framework for regulation of the oil industry in Nigeria 
identifying the challenges of such framework and the need for reform. Ultimately, having 
identified the challenges to regulatory effectiveness in Nigeria, the thesis explores the potentials 
for regulatory oversight in remedying some of these challenges using the ECOWAS. The fourth 
chapter examines the ECOWAS, tracing its history, evolution and potential for regulatory 
oversight. The chapter defines a framework to be adopted under the ECOWAS for regulatory 
oversight of regulatory institutions in Nigeria. It identifies the prospects and challenges of adopting 
the said framework under the ECOWAS and concludes with a reiteration of the need for regulatory 
oversight in Nigeria and identifies reasons why the ECOWAS is well suited to provide such 
oversight.    
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Chapter 2: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT: 
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE REGULATION 
OF NIGERIA’S OIL INDUSTRY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter undertakes an analysis of Nigeria’s constitutional and judicial framework for the 
protection and promotion of the right to a healthy environment, arguing the need for such 
protection and its potential contribution to more effective regulation. It examines the normative 
basis for asserting a right to a healthy environment within the Nigerian judicial process and the 
implications of the failure of the Nigerian constitution to provide a substantive right to a healthy 
environment. In undertaking its enquiry, the chapter recognizes that the right to a healthy 
environment is guaranteed under the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights as well as 
under the African Charter Act1 (which domesticates the African Charter) but argues the need for a 
constitutional provision recognizing a healthy environment as a justiciable human right.  
Having identified certain normative challenges to asserting the right to a healthy environment in 
Nigeria, the chapter undertakes a survey of the Nigerian judicial framework for addressing 
concerns arising from environmental pollution. It identifies certain barriers that hinder the 
protection of rights of local communities in the Niger Delta and makes recommendations for 
reform. Arguing that constitutional and judicial reforms are central to achieving environmental 
justice in Nigeria, the thesis makes recommendations for the potential role of the ECOWAS Court 
in addressing specific challenges to the Nigerian judicial system of adjudicating concerns 
regarding oil pollution.  
The chapter argues that constitutional reform provides the best protection to local communities 
bedeviled by oil pollution as it provides a constitutional right to a healthy environment which in 
turn creates an obligation on the part of the state to ensure a healthy environment and therefore 
better regulate activities of oil companies which result in environmental pollution. In the absence 
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of such constitutional reform however, the thesis identifies existing human rights protection 
instruments that can provide protection to local communities, as well as remediate certain failings 
of the Nigerian judicial system through the ECOWAS Court which is an organ of the ECOWAS.  
In undertaking this inquiry, the chapter is divided into six subsections. The first is the just 
concluded subsection, giving a brief introduction to the proposed enquiry. The second subsection 
introduces the problems of resource extraction in the Niger Delta as a human rights concern and 
discusses the attitude of the government and TNCs to remediating such pollution. The chapter then 
examines the right to healthy environment under the Nigerian Constitution and domestic 
legislation. It identifies the challenges to enforcement of a right to a healthy environment in Nigeria 
in a bid to illustrate the failure of the Nigerian system to adequately provide for, and protect this 
right. The fifth subsection undertakes an analysis of judicial process in Nigeria, it argues that in 
addition to the constitutional challenges with regards providing for a right to a healthy environment 
in Nigeria, limited access to justice presents another formidable obstacle to environmental 
protection. Considering the above failures within the Nigerian constitutional and judicial 
frameworks, the next subsection of the chapter discusses the role of regional and international 
human rights protection mechanisms in lending protection to local communities in the Niger Delta 
as well as potential challenges of such international protection. The chapter concludes with the 
reiteration of the need for constitutional as well as judicial reform in Nigeria to protect victims of 
environmental pollution. 
2.2. Environmental Pollution in the Niger Delta: State and TNC Response to the 
Challenges 
“The rivers here are messed up, oil everywhere. The plants are abnormal, even we have become 
abnormal (laughs). The gas flaring is constant, and people are getting sick with illnesses that our 
forefathers didn’t have. The worst part is that no one is saying anything about it… Even the 
president (sic) does not seem to care”2 
The Niger Delta has suffered from environmental pollution for decades. This pollution is often in 
the form of oil spills, dumping of waste generated from oil exploration and flaring of natural gas 
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which damages fisheries, contaminates drinking water and ruins agriculture.3 The United Nations 
Development Programme Report of 2006 described the Niger Delta region of Nigeria as “one of 
the most severely petroleum-impacted ecosystems”.4 The report stated that “the damage from oil 
operations is chronic and cumulative, and has acted synergistically with other sources of 
environmental stress to result in a severely impaired coastal ecosystem and compromised the 
livelihoods and health of the region’s impoverished residents.”5 Oil pollution frustrates local 
communities’ access to clean water, clean air and economic activities such as farming, fishing and 
access to unaffected aquatic life.6 
In 2001, following a complaint on behalf of a local community in the Niger Delta, the African 
Commission described the environmental pollution in that local community as being at a level that 
was “humanly unacceptable”.7 The complaint against the Nigerian government that gave rise to 
the decision of the African Commission was lodged on behalf of the Ogoni people (one of the local 
communities in the Niger Delta). The decision exemplifies one of the more peaceable ways which 
Niger Delta communities have sought to protect their lives, livelihoods and their environment. 
Clearly dissatisfied with conditions of the Niger Delta, several groups in the Niger Delta have 
adopted both peaceable and more violent means of expressing their dissatisfaction with oil mining 
activities and the effects of such activities. One scholar argues that unrest and conflict in the Niger 
Delta is a direct result of the denial of economic, social and cultural rights.8 He notes that because 
of this continued denial of rights, social discontent manifests itself in in paramilitary criminality, 
hostage taking, the sabotage of oil installations and car bombings in the area.9   
Niger Delta communities have often been at loggerheads with the government given their 
dissatisfaction with oil pollution, lack of infrastructure within local communities, lack of jobs and 
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what they perceive as domination in politics by other regions even though the oil found in their 
communities provides most of the country’s wealth.10 While these grievances have often resulted 
in violence against TNCs and their operations, some groups have sought “autonomy” from the 
Nigerian state seeking to be able to participate in the affairs of the country as a ‘distinct and 
separate entity’11 along with a right to the control of a ‘fair proportion’12 of their resources for their 
development.13 
The resentment harboured by local communities against the government and TNCs has influenced 
the way the government and TNCs respond to local agitation. Successive military governments in 
Nigeria have been accused of responding to agitation by Niger Delta communities with brute force, 
quelling protests through military interventions.14 TNCs on the other hand often take what has 
been described as an “escapist stance”15 when faced with concerns of local communities. They 
argue that issues of underdevelopment or autonomy are “political” matters which are outside of 
their competence.16 TNCs respond to their protests by attempting to undertake pacifist corporate 
social responsibility projects which are often rejected by local communities suspicious of its 
motivations.17  
The relationship between the Nigerian government and local communities has been described as 
one hovering between repression and pacification.18 Since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule, local 
communities have become even more vocal with their demands for remediation perhaps prompting 
the government to request that the United Nations Environment Programme to investigate oil 
pollution of Ogoniland in the Niger Delta. The study was intended to provide reliable information 
which could serve as a baseline for government and local communities to remediate the tensions 
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between them, given the long bitter history of repression and remedy the effects of oil pollution.19 
The results of the report were quite critical, revealing that oil contamination in Ogoniland was 
“widespread and severely impacting many components of the environment”.20 As identified in the 
previous chapter, rights groups allege that “no progress” has been made regarding implementing 
the recommendations of the report.21 This chapter argues therefore that continued neglect of the 
concerns of local communities in relation to environmental pollution, is a further demonstration of 
the state’s attitude toward issues surrounding oil pollution and a violation of the right to a healthy 
environment. 
2.4. Right to a Healthy Environment 
The literature surrounding the case for the right to a healthy environment has evolved over the 
years. Earlier, writers had called for the recognition of the right to a healthy environment as a hard 
law convention, chastising the Stockholm Declaration of 197222 as soft law failing to compel state 
action.23 Subsequently, regional instruments in Africa and America guaranteed the right to a 
healthy environment as a substantive right.24 More than 100 national constitutions across the globe 
guarantee a substantive right to a healthy environment, 25 perhaps prompting scholars like Boyd to 
study the effectiveness of these constitutionally protected rights.26 Boyd  studies the impact of a 
constitutionally protected right to a healthy environment and concludes that a number of factors, 
not exclusive to constitutional protection, influence improved environmental protection.27  
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The Nigerian constitution does not provide such a right, the claim to right to a healthy environment 
is drawn out of the provisions of Chapter II of the Nigerian Constitution. The provisions of that 
Chapter of the constitution, place a mandatory duty on the State to direct its policies towards the 
achievement of certain objectives but does not place a duty on the state nor a corresponding right 
on citizens to enforce such as a right against the State in the event of failure. An example in specific 
reference to environmental protection, is Section 21 of the Nigerian Constitution, which provides 
that “the State shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard water, air and land, forest 
and wildlife in Nigeria”.28 While such provision can be extended to make an argument for local 
communities to have the right to an “improved” “water” “air” and “land”, the protection of such a 
constitutional provision is hindered from access to local communities by a number of obstacles. 
The provision is unavailing to local communities seeking to make a rights-based claim as it fails 
to establish a positive “right” to a healthy environment for citizens, nor does it provide local 
communities with a justiciable claim against the government for failing to provide a healthy 
environment under Chapter II of the Constitution.29 Section 6(6) (c) of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 which provides the courts with judicial power, specifically 
excludes provisions found under Chapter II of the Constitution from the scope of the court’s 
contemplation. It provides: 
“The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section –
shall not except as otherwise provided by this constitution, extend to any issue or 
question as to whether any act of omission by any authority or person or as to whether 
any law or any judicial decision is in conformity with the Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Chapter II of this Constitution.” 30 
[emphasis added] 
Jurists have often made pronouncements on Chapter II, calling on the state to make such provisions 
justiciable in the face of an obvious need to hold the state accountable. For example, a former 
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Justice of the Nigeria Supreme Court, Justice Uwaifo in delivering a judgement in the case of 
Attorney General of Ondo State v. Attorney General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria31 stated: 
“…to ensure that the Directive Principles are not a dead letter. Whatever is necessary is 
done to see that they are observed as much as practicable so as to give cognizance to the 
general tendency of the Directives. It is necessary therefore to say that our own situation is 
of peculiar significance. We do not need to seek uncertain ways of giving effect to the 
Directive Principles in Chapter II of our Constitution. The Constitution itself has placed 
the entire Chapter II under the exclusive legislative list. By this, it simply means that all 
the Directive Principles need not remain mere or pious declarations. It is for the Executive 
and the National Assembly, working together, to give expression to anyone of them 
through appropriate enactment as occasion may demand.”32 
Although the former Justice of the Supreme Court was not speaking in the context of 
environmental protection but as regards Chapter II generally, an argument can be made that there 
is a need to recognize environmental protection as a duty of the state and not a “mere or pious 
declaration”33 especially in the face of devastating effects of oil pollution. In agreement, and 
speaking specifically in the context of environmental rights, Ehkator asserts that the non-
justiciability of these rights under Chapter II undermine Section 13 of the Nigerian constitution 
which places an obligation on the Nigerian state and its organs to observe and apply the provisions 
of Chapter II of the Constitution.34 
Despite this seeming constitutional failure, there has been some success in litigating rights based 
claims to a healthy environment in Nigeria. While some local communities have relied on common 
law torts such as trespass, negligence and nuisance to litigate environmental pollution, 35 in order 
to maintain the scope of this chapter, we are focusing on the human rights based litigation.  
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Inspiringly, rights groups and local communities have litigated human rights claims on behalf of 
the Niger Delta people by appealing to fundamentally guaranteed human rights protected by the 
Nigerian constitution. These rights identified as fundamental by the Nigerian Constitution are 
enforceable against the state and private individuals, including corporate bodies.36A significant 
example is the appeal to the interpretation of the right to life to include the right to a healthy 
environment. This practice of appealing to fundamental human rights for environmental protection 
is a growing trend and is seen in several other countries. It has been described in the literature as 
a human rights approach to environmental protection.37  
The most celebrated case regarding such human rights based approach to environmental protection 
in Nigeria is the case of Gbemre v. Shell.38 Before that decision, Nigerian courts had often favoured 
economic benefits to the country as a result of oil exploration above environmental protection 
concerns.39 The coming of Gbemre in 2005 reawakened the faith of local communities, rights 
groups and observers in the Nigerian judicial process. It is perhaps significant to briefly discuss 
the circumstances of the case in Gbemre. 
The applicant, suing in a representative capacity, alleged that the gas flaring activities of the 
respondents (Shell and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) as a result of oil mining 
violated his constitutionally guaranteed rights to life and dignity of human person as they had 
adversely affected his life, health and natural environment. Section 33(1) of the Constitution of 
Nigeria provides that: 
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“…every person has the right to life, and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life, 
save in execution of a sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has 
been found guilty in Nigeria.” 
After hearing arguments of counsel, the court decided that: 
“…(2) The constitutionally guaranteed rights to life and dignity of human person inevitably 
includes the rights to a clean, poison-free, pollution-free, and healthy environment”40 
The decision has been applauded by many rights groups for a number of reasons. Firstly, it 
represents the first time in which a Nigerian court would change the discourse regarding what was 
previously regarded as a non-justiciable right (given the failure of the constitution to recognize it 
as such) by linking the act of environmental pollution to fundamental human rights that are 
justiciable under the Nigerian constitution.41 The procedure under which Gbemre was heard is also 
progressive and highly significant to the struggle for environmental protection. The case was heard 
using the Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement Procedure (FREP) Rules, a special legal 
procedure intended to fast track hearing of cases which involved allegations of infringement of 
fundamental human rights (such as the right to life and dignity of human person). The implication 
of the court allowing such a claim to adopt the FREP rules is indicative of the belief that an 
environmental pollution claim could in fact adversely affect the fundamental rights of the 
applicants.42  
Significant as well to rights-based environmental protection claims is the African Charter for 
Humans and Peoples Rights (African Charter)43 which has been domesticated in Nigeria as the 
African Charter Act.44 After a lengthy court battle in the case of Abacha v. Fawehinmi,45 the 
Nigerian Supreme Court settled not only that the African Charter was enforceable in Nigeria but 
that rights derived under the African Charter are justiciable. The significance of the African 
Charter to environmental protection is that Article 24 of the African Charter provides for the right 
                                                          
40 Gbemre, supra note 38. 
41 Ebeku on Gbemre, supra note 29 at 318. 
42 Rhuks Ako, Environmental Justice in Developing countries: Perspectives from Africa and Asia-Pacific 
(USA/Canada: Routledge, 2013) at 26 [Ako]. 
43 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), 27 June 
1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [African Charter] 
44 African Charter Act, supra note 1. 
45 (2000) 6 NWLR 228 S.C. 
34 
 
to “a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development.” Although initially regarded 
as “vague and ambiguous”,46 the African Commission’s finding in the SERAC case interpreted 
the provisions of article 24 of the African Charter to mean the right to a healthy environment and 
found Nigeria to be in violation of the provisions in 2001.47 Significantly as well, the FREP Rules 
avails itself to persons enforcing their rights under the Charter (which includes the right to a 
healthy environment).  
However, scholars such as Ako48 have expressed some apprehension regarding the use of the 
African Charter Act to pursue rights-based claims to a healthy environment. He argues that the 
location of environmental protection within Chapter II of the constitution makes it non-justiciable 
under the constitution. Secondly, and not unrelated to the first reason, he argues that the African 
Charter Act is a legislative enactment and so “inferior”49 to the Constitution and can be subjected 
to an amendment or repeal.50         
Nevertheless, the decision in Gbemre is adjudged a laudable use of judicial reasoning by the 
Federal High Court, even though it remains to be seen whether that decision will become the legal 
norm surrounding oil litigation in Nigeria. Presently, an appeal of the judgment is pending before 
the Nigerian Court of Appeal and there are speculations that the hearing of the appeal is being 
frustrated given the huge impacts such a decision would have on oil mining in Nigeria.51 Justifiably 
so, rights groups, academics and observers are beginning to express anxiety as to whether the 
celebration of the judgment in Gbemre is premature and such victory would be short lived if 
overturned at the superior court.52 
The study of the events surrounding the appeal of Gbemre are significant to this chapter as they 
demonstrate that even when laudable pronouncements are made by the Courts, the judicial process 
                                                          
46 Morné van der Linde and Lirrete Louw, “Considering the interpretation and implementation of Article 24 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in light of the SERAC communication” (2003) 3 Afr. Hum. Rts. J. 167 
at 174 [Linde and Louw]. 
47 Linde and Louw Ibid, SERAC case supra note 7.   
48 Ako, supra note 42 at 25. 
49 Ibid at 25. 
50 Ibid, Ebeku on Gbemre, supra note 29 at 319. 
51 Ebeku on Gbemre, supra note 29 at 319. 
52 Some scholars express skepticism on the judgment being upheld on appeal based on inherent weaknesses of the 
judgment such as the failure to cite binding or even persuasive authorities in the judgment and failing to resolve 
evidentiary issues before making this judgment. For more details see Ebeku on Gbemre supra note 29 at 319. 
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in Nigeria can be employed to frustrate genuine claims for environmental protection. Part of the 
contention in this chapter is that the provision of a right to a healthy environment under the 
constitution provides constitutional protection to environmental protection claims, such claims are 
therefore less likely to be frustrated by existing judicial process as they assume the position of 
settled law.  The interrogation in the chapter is therefore divided into two, the first (discussed 
above) addresses the failure of the Nigerian constitution to protect its citizens from environmental 
pollution and the second investigates the roles that courts can play in protecting these citizens in 
the face of such constitutional failure.  
2.5. Access to Justice for Local Communities 
Several challenges bedevil local communities in their struggle to access justice as a result of 
environmental pollution. They relate to problems regarding systemic failure of the judicial process 
and independence of the judiciary. Access to justice is a major component of the rule of law. If 
aggrieved parties are left without redress, it can be argued that the rule of law has failed in such 
regard.53 Other indicators of a state adherence to the rule of law are seen in the state’s record of 
regulatory enforcement, the independence of its judiciary and availability of access to affordable 
and effectively enforced justice.54  
For the Nigerian state, access to justice remains a great hurdle for local communities to overcome 
as a result of what is described by one scholar as “judicial obstacles”.55 Access to justice in Nigeria 
is impeded by a lack of resources on the part of local communities to litigate often expensive and 
lengthy trials at the courts. Procedural and technical restrictions regarding jurisdiction and rules of 
court often frustrate the judicial process further rendering environmental justice inaccessible to 
local communities.56  
2.5.1. Barriers to Access to Justice  
2.5.1.1. Resources 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report of 2014 
ranked Nigeria as very low on its quality of life index, evidencing widespread poverty in the 
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55 Ekhator, supra note 34 at 63. 
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country despite its oil wealth.57 In reference to access to justice, resources play a highly significant 
role as litigation is often a lengthy and costly exercise. Retaining counsel as well as payment of 
court fees are expensive ventures especially in the face of other income-generating activities which 
might be lost in the pursuit of litigation.58 Local communities, often concerned with what one 
scholar describes as “concerns of the belly,”59 are not eager to undertake lengthy and expensive 
processes that might further impoverish them.  
Scholars criticize the lack of a robust legal aid scheme in Nigeria which can potentially mitigate 
the constraints regarding access to resources of local communities. The existing legal aid scheme 
in Nigeria ironically faces challenges regarding resources itself as a result of severe underfunding 
by the government which results in its ineffectiveness.60 The scheme has been unable to create 
offices within rural areas which would have alleviated the problem of lack of access to the scheme 
within local communities.61  
2.5.1.2. Procedural Restrictions: Jurisdiction  
A number of procedural restrictions impede the Nigerian justice system and local communities in 
the Niger Delta are often victims of these procedural impediments. The first challenge relates to 
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is considered to be central to any proceedings and determines the 
competency of a court to adjudicate any matter before it. An excerpt of the Nigerian Court of 
Appeal decision in Ononye v. Odita62 demonstrates the import of jurisdiction:          
"That the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental is a matter of trite law and where jurisdiction 
of a court is challenged, that issue must immediately be determined by the court before it 
embarks on any trial or determination of the action before it. Unless a court is cloaked with 
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jurisdiction, its proceedings are rendered a complete nullity, no matter how well the case 
was determined.”63 
Jurisdiction is derived from the Nigeria Constitution which allocates specific jurisdiction to 
specific courts. The National Assembly may by legislation provide additional jurisdiction to the 
courts.64 The Courts also have power to develop rules of court that will aid interpretation of laws 
and procedure for the process of litigation.65  
In specific reference to environmental protection cases, it is important to point out that jurisdiction 
affects local communities seeking justice through tort law differently than litigants with rights 
claims. Litigants seeking the protection from environmental pollution as a human right have 
availed themselves the mechanism of the FREP Rules that provides wider protection as suits can 
be filed both before the State High Court and Federal courts.66 However even though the FREP 
Rules provide commendable protection, the debate regarding the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights in Nigeria might impede judges from applying the FREP to environmental protection cases. 
The advantages of engaging the FREP Rules in matters relating to jurisdiction is that to a large 
extent, they mitigate the challenges relating to the doctrine of forum non conveniens which 
essentially restricts litigants to specific courts in order to ventilate their claims. Because the 
doctrine is tied to the court’s jurisdiction to hear the matter, it is often invoked by defendants to 
frustrate judicial process and plaintiffs suing under torts law.  
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine which is applicable in Nigeria.67 
It provides that courts may refuse to assume jurisdiction in a case where there is a more appropriate 
forum to try the case available to the parties.68 Although federal and state high courts in Nigeria 
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66 Oder II, Rule 1, Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009 and Section 46(1) of the Nigerian 
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have concurrent jurisdiction in matters relating to human rights abuses,69 the same cannot be said 
for environmental protection matters which are brought pursuant to tort law. The Nigerian 
Constitution vests jurisdiction over matters relating to mines and mining within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.70 This situation presents a hindrance to local communities 
who may not have Federal High Courts and cannot avail themselves the use of State High Courts 
which are more readily available and perhaps accessible. It is argued that the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens mainly favours the defendant as the plaintiffs are prevented from instituting actions 
in courts of competent jurisdiction which might be closer in proximity to the plaintiffs and may be 
more favourable to their claims.71  
The argument is this chapter however is that although the FREP rules provide a wider protection 
to victims of oil pollution, the failure of the constitution to provide a constitutional right to a 
healthy environment and the fact that Gbemre is still unsettled law (given its appeal), restricts the 
amount of protection that FREP Rules can avail victims of oil pollution. In other words, some 
litigants might be forced to sue under torts law, in which case the constitutional requirement that 
only Federal High Courts have jurisdiction to hear matters relating to mining and oil will impede 
the litigant’s access to justice. Ultimately, it impedes the access to justice of local communities 
who decide to sue under tort law as they are restricted to federal high courts which are often not 
within close proximity of the communities. 
2.5.1.3. Inordinate Delays  
Inordinate delay in the Nigerian judicial process is a factor that has frustrated many litigants 
seeking to enforce claims. While some scholars identify factors such as lack of infrastructure in 
courts such as stenographers, transcribers, recorders which forces judges to write in longhand as 
hindering the speedy resolution of judicial proceedings,72 other scholars identify delay tactics 
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72 Evaristus Oshionebo, Regulating Transnational Corporations in Domestic and International Regimes, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2009) page 76-77 [Oshionebo]. 
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employed by lawyers in a bid to frustrate the plaintiffs and force a settlement.73 These tactics 
include late filing of process, unreasonable adjournments, frivolous challenges to the jurisdiction 
of the court which forces proceedings to stall until such issues are resolved and frivolous appeals 
to higher courts.74 The reasons for inordinate delay in hearing and deciding cases in Nigeria is 
perhaps a combination of lack of infrastructure in court and antics by lawyers, ensuring that claims 
for justice are frustrated by a long, expensive and torturous process. While this is not exclusive to 
environmental protection claims, it serves as a further hindrance to achieving justice through the 
courts especially in the face of failures of constitutional and legislative provisions to provide 
protection for victims.  
2.5.1.4. Enforcement of Judgements  
Related to the reasons behind inordinate delays in adjudicating matters in courts, is the problem of 
enforcing judgments given in favour of plaintiffs. While there is no evidence of flagrant 
disobedience to court orders by TNCs,75 defence lawyers are in the habit of adopting tactics aimed 
at frustrating the process of enforcement. An example is seen in the Gbemre Case where the judge 
declared gas flaring in the relevant community as unconstitutional and ordered the defendants to 
immediately desist from further flaring.76 The court further directed the Nigerian government to: 
“…immediately set into motion, after due consultation with the Federal Executive Council, 
necessary processes for the Enactment of a Bill for an Act of the National Assembly for 
the speedy amendment of the relevant sections of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act and 
the Regulations made there under to quickly bring them in line with the provisions of 
chapter 4 of the Constitution, especially in view of the fact that the Associated Gas Re-
Injection Act even by itself also makes the said continuous gas flaring a crime having 
prescribed penalties in respect thereof.”77 
After the judgment, the defendants immediately filed an appeal against the decision and brought a 
motion to stay the execution of the judgment, they then served copies of the motion on the plaintiffs 
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and the Sherriff’s office (responsible for executing judgments against the defendants).78 The filing 
and service of such applications creates a legal obligation on parties to maintain status quo pending 
the determination of such applications, often translating into the perpetuation of the status quo in 
the plaintiff community.79 The Nigerian government, perhaps as a result of the defendant’s appeal, 
has made no attempt to comply with the order of the court. In fact, in December 2006, about a 
month after the Gbemre decision was delivered, contempt of court proceedings were initiated 
against Shell (the relevant TNC) and the NNPC, for failure to comply with the decision of the 
court.80 Shell claimed it was not in contempt of court as it has several appeals pending against the 
decision.  
2.5.1.5. Interference with Judicial Process 
State interference with judicial process is often speculated in environmental protection claims 
arising from oil pollution. Given the heavy stake the government of Nigeria has in oil exploration 
and the Joint Venture Agreements (JVAs) it operates with TNCs,81 it is often difficult to discern 
which party to hold responsible in the environmental pollution cases. Although the Nigerian NNPC 
that operates JVAs with TNCs is not usually an “operator”82 and therefore does not participate 
directly in oil exploration, it does however participate in profit sharing and other ancillary matters 
as a major equity holder under the JVA.83  In the past, the government has often taken the side of 
TNCs when faced with opposition from local communities,84 it is perhaps not so far-fetched to 
speculate state interference in judicial decisions regarding oil suits.85 For example, in the Gbemre 
Case, after the judge gave such a laudable and resounding judgment, he subsequently granted the 
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application for stay of execution in favour of the defendants. Perhaps this is not strange as it can 
be argued that cogent reasons may have existed for the grant of such application. However, after 
the expiration of the application, the judge was suddenly transferred to another court in the northern 
part of the country and the file went mysteriously “missing”. Peter Roderick, the co-Director of 
Climate Justice Programme, a Non-Governmental Organization in Nigeria (NGO) remarked: 
“Many disturbing aspects have emerged during the process of the Iwherekan case 
[Gbemre]. First, Shell’s lawyers pull out as many delaying tactics as possible in court, even 
trying to get the judge kicked out of the case before it has barely started. Shell then fails to 
comply with the court order to stop flaring. And now, after the judge has extended the 
period of time for Shell to stop flaring, they ignore the order again and don’t even turn up 
to court…To add to this, the fact that the judge has been removed from the case, transferred 
to the north of the country, and there have been problems with the court file for a second 
time, suggests a degree of interference in the judicial system which is unacceptable in a 
purported democracy acting under the rule of law.”86  
 TNCs in environmental pollution cases are often sued alongside the NNPC, the state oil 
company.87 This can create a situation where the state perceives any confrontation against the 
TNCs by way of litigation as threat against the state as well. Scholars such as Ebeku also note that 
judicial decisions in environmental protection cases are decided with regards to economic benefits 
of the country as opposed to environmental protection concerns.88 This informs legal reasoning 
that puts concerns regarding the “source” of state revenue over those of victims of environmental 
pollution.89 Ebeku writes that the pro-economic attitude of judges has often deterred the success 
of environmental protection claims.90 Buttressing his point, he notes that the former Chief Justice 
of Nigeria, Justice Mohammed Lawal Uwais, observed that: 
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“The greatest deterrent to prosecution of [oil-related] environmental damage in Nigeria 
today is skepticism with which prosecutors are likely to approach the courts having regard 
to what is known as judicial posture.”91 
Although the allegations surrounding state interference with judicial process are unsubstantiated, 
speculations surrounding such dampen the credibility of the process, and in addition to the other 
factors that plague the judicial process, impede environmental justice. Evidently there is a need for 
the judicial process in Nigeria to be reformed if it is to be employed to achieve justice for victims 
of environmental pollution.  
As discussed earlier in the chapter, this author is of the view that constitutional reform to recognize 
the right to a healthy environment best serves the argument for environmental justice and better 
regulation of TNCs. However, the concerns identified in this subsection reveal a significant 
concern that hampers environmental justice in addition to the constitutional failure to recognize a 
right to a healthy environment. The chapter therefore suggests a reforms to the judicial process 
which will mitigate this constitutional failure and advance environmental justice. However, it is 
important to highlight the role of the National Human Rights Commission, as a non-judicial means 
of ventilating concerns regarding environmental protection before exploring the recommendations 
for reforming the judicial process.  
2.5.2. Non-judicial Means of Accessing Justice  
2.5.2.1. The National Human Rights Commission 
The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission (the Commission) was established pursuant to 
the United Nations resolution enjoining states to create institutions for the protection and 
promotion of human rights.92 The enabling Act of the Commission was amended in 2010 to expand 
the mandate of the Commission to include conducting of investigations and enquiries into 
allegations of human rights abuse in a manner it considers necessary and instituting civil actions 
on behalf of  victims, making determinations as to damages or compensation payable.93 Most 
significantly, it has the power to summon any public body, agency or corporate body to appear 
                                                          
91 M. L. Uwais, “Recent Development in Nigeria Strengthening Legal and Institutional Framework”, Paper 
presented at the Global Judges Symposium in Johannesburg, South Africa, cited in Ebeku on Gbemre, supra note 
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before it for the purposes of conducting a public enquiry into the allegations of human rights 
violations.94  
Most relevant to this thesis however is the potential for the Commission to make positive 
advancements for environmental protection rights. The Commission is empowered by its Act to 
promote rights guaranteed not just by the Nigerian Constitution and the African Charter95 but also 
the United Nations Charter,96 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,97 the International 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)98 and all international and regional 
instruments which Nigeria is a party to.99 Under the Commission’s enabling Act, the requirement 
for a right to be protected by the Commission is that Nigeria sign and ratify the relevant 
instrument.100 The Commission can also receive complaints not only by the victims themselves 
but from persons acting on the victim’s behalf and members of an interest group or class of 
persons.101 The expanded mandate of the Commission holds great potential for local communities 
in the Niger Delta as it is less expensive and has power to make orders for compensation and 
initiate legal proceedings against perpetuators of environmental pollution.  
Perhaps the biggest challenge that faces the Human Rights Commission in relation to fulfilling its 
mandate and ensuring rights protection is funding.102 Funding constraints, which cut across a 
number of public agencies in Nigeria, affects the ability of a number of these agencies to procure 
manpower, build offices and build staff capacity necessary for the discharge of their mandate.103 
In the case of the Human Rights Commission, it maintains only six offices in a country with 36 
states.104 It has only one office in the South-South region of the country where the Niger Delta is 
located and given the wide geographical area and the remoteness of a number of these local 
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communities, the possibility of one office sufficiently providing for the whole area is 
impracticable.     
In summary, environmental protection claims in Nigeria both through judicial and non-judicial 
means suffer a number of shortcomings, as identified in this chapter. To overcome these challenges 
however, the Nigerian state must be able and willing to undertake recommended reforms. 
2.5.3. Recommendations for Reforms to Increase Access to Justice 
Firstly, funding plays an important role in addressing a number of concerns expressed in this thesis. 
Funding of agencies responsible for non-judicial means of responding to environmental pollution 
as well as providing legal aid would enable these agencies develop their capacity, expand their 
reach to include rural areas and also educate the local communities of the obligations owed to 
them. The potential result of such enhanced funding will also reduce tensions and apprehension 
usually borne against government by local communities.  
Increased funding of the judicial process will also address some concerns, particularly regarding 
the provision of resources through a legal aid scheme to local communities, expanding the reach 
of the legal aid scheme and address, to an extent, the challenge of inordinate delay in proceedings 
by providing the courts with infrastructure. This will however require a significant financial 
commitment from the government and as pointed out earlier, there must be ability and willingness 
on the part of the government to invest. Given that the Nigerian state earns a considerable amount 
of money from export of these natural resources which pollute the environment, there is little doubt 
regarding its ability to provide sufficient funding to these quarters. 
Secondly, as noted earlier, there is a need to amend the Nigerian Constitution. Section II of the 
Constitution which hinders justiciability of environmental protection claims should be amended to 
include a right to a healthy environment, not just declarations of what the state should aspire to. 
Constitutional amendments to include the State High Courts’ ability to exercise jurisdiction over 
oil related claims would also serve litigants who are often constrained by the constitutional 
provision which restricts litigation of oil related claims to the Federal High Court. Such expansion 
will not only unburden the Federal High Court but will also increase access to justice as state high 
courts are often in closer proximity to local communities.   
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Most significantly, constitutional amendment which serves to incorporate international human 
rights treaties which have been ratified by Nigeria directly into the Nigerian constitution will 
further serve environmental protection. Such incorporation would make international treaties 
immediately enforceable in Nigeria thereby eliminating any reservations that courts might have in 
enforcing rights guaranteed by international instruments which have been ratified by Nigeria but 
not domesticated. This provision will eliminate obstacles relating to awaiting domestication of 
treaties by the legislative arm and any reservations which judges might have regarding enforcing 
treaties not yet domesticated in Nigerian law. This is especially significant to the struggle for 
justiciability of socio-economic rights, given that Nigerian courts have consistently held that 
provisions of Chapter II of the Nigerian constitution are non-justiciable.105        
Having identified the challenges to successfully litigating claims relating to oil pollution in 
Nigeria, the need for reform and the reasons why this author expresses skepticism regarding the 
Nigerian’s government’s willingness to undertake reforms, this chapter argues that international 
human rights mechanisms hold great promise for the realization of environmental protection in 
Nigeria. These international mechanisms are often broader and address a number of concerns that 
plague environmental protection as a right in Nigeria. The chapter’s thesis therefore is that in the 
absence of constitutional or judicial reform, the ECOWAS Court has the potential to mitigate some 
of the challenges relating to environmental justice in Nigeria.  
The next subsection will address international human rights mechanisms and discuss the potential 
of litigating such claims at before a regional human rights court such as the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) Court. The promise of the ECOWAS Court lies in its mandate 
as simply a human rights court, it is not limited by concerns regarding justiciability of a right or 
the lack of such and it has power to bind the Nigerian state to its decisions by virtue of its 
protocol.106 This promise will be discussed in further detail in the next subsection. 
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2.6. Regional Human Rights Protection Mechanisms: Promise for Environmental 
Protection in the Niger Delta 
“The Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic 
and Social Rights (CESR) communication against Nigeria before the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission or Commission) reiterates the fact 
that inadequate protection of human rights at the domestic level necessitates the existence 
of human rights mechanisms at an international level”107 
This subsection discusses specific human rights owed to Niger Delta people of Nigeria in the 
context of oil and gas under international human rights instruments. It identifies that although the 
right to a healthy environment is generally considered a socio-economic right, its established link 
to civil and political rights such as the right to life creates an even more serious obligation on states 
and international human rights institutions to offer protection to victims. The subsection 
undertakes a brief analysis of some rights that can protect victims of environmental pollution. 
Having identified the challenges to enforcing the right to a healthy environment in Nigeria as a 
right, the thesis makes a case for the use of regional human right enforcement mechanisms. It 
advances the use of the ECOWAS Court to enforce rights guaranteed under international 
instruments in an attempt to provide much needed support to the struggle for environmental 
protection in the Niger Delta.  
2.6.1. Rights under International Human Rights Instruments 
International human rights instruments such as the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment 1972108 recognize the relationship between human rights 
and the environment. Principle 1 of the Declaration states that there is “a fundamental right to 
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life 
of dignity and well-being”.109 The Stockholm Declaration however has no binding power on states; 
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it is viewed as an aspirational document which international human rights mechanisms cannot 
strictly enforce.110 
There are a number of instruments on an international level that provide opportunities for filing 
communications in cases of torture, arbitrary detention, racial discrimination, discrimination 
against women and violations of freedom of speech and religion,111 generally considered civil and 
political rights. However, national and international levels of government have often viewed 
economic, social and cultural rights, which provide for healthy environments, “with caution, 
skepticism or triviality”.112 It seemed that while the world would be outraged by certain breaches 
of civil and political rights, there was a hesitance to express the same amount of outrage for 
economic, social and cultural rights.113 The African Commission in deciding the SERAC Case114 
against Nigeria, upheld the argument that socio-economic rights were no less important than civil 
and political rights. It held that: 
“Internationally accepted ideas of the various obligations engendered by human rights 
indicate that all rights, both civil and political rights and social and economic, generate at 
least four levels of duties for a State that undertakes to adhere to a rights regime, namely 
the duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil these rights. These obligations universally 
apply to all rights and entail a combination of negative and positive duties. As a human 
rights instrument, the African Charter is not alien to these concepts and the order in which 
they are dealt with here [in deciding the case] is chosen as a matter of convenience and in 
no way should it imply the priority accorded to them. Each layer of obligation is equally 
relevant to the rights in question.”115 
                                                          
110 In 1996 however, a majority of the International Court of Justice declared that the Stockholm Declaration “‘is 
now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment”, further illustrating that the principles of 
the Declaration had attained the status of international norms. See Dinah Shelton, “Stockholm Declaration (1972) 
and Rio Declaration (1992)”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law [MPEPIL] at para. 22 
 online: <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1608>.    
111 Catarina de Albuquerque “Chronicle of an Announced Birth: The Coming into Life of the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – The Missing Piece of the International Bill of 
Human Rights” (2010) 32 Human Rights Quarterly 144 at 145. 
112 Ibid.  
113 Ibid at 145 -146.  
114 SERAC Case, supra note 7. 
115 Ibid at paragraph 44. 
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 The contention of this thesis is that environmental protection, reflected in the right to a healthy 
environment is a hybrid right. While it is often viewed as a socio-economic right, it has certain 
elements (such as the ability to violate a person’s life and quality of life) that make it qualify as a 
civil and political right.116 This position reflects one of the perspectives of the position of the right 
to a healthy environment in scholarly discourse. Boyle postulates that environmental protection is 
tied to civil and political rights and one cannot be divorced from the other.117  Evidently, the right 
to healthy environment has elements of both socio-economic and civil and political rights. 
Focusing specifically on international human rights instruments we identify a few rights, in 
addition to the right to a healthy environment, significant to the achievement of environmental 
justice in the Niger Delta. 
2.6.1.1. The Right to Life 
This right is guaranteed under a number of international human rights instruments. It is also 
guaranteed by the Nigerian Constitution. Specifically, article 6 of the International Covenant for 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),118 article of 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)119 and article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)120 all guarantee the 
right to life on an international plane.121 Most significant to this thesis, are the comments of the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee on the right to life guaranteed under the ICCPR. They 
clarify that the right to life imposed by article 6, imposes an obligation on states to “take positive 
measures for its [right to life] protection”.122 Evidently, states’ failure to take positive measures to 
protect the right to right to life would amount to a failure to fulfill the obligations under the ICCPR 
and a violation of article 6 of the ICCPR. It can be argued that a failure of the Nigerian state to 
effectively regulate oil exploration which results in spills and threatens that right to life is a failure 
to take positive measures to protect and promote the right to life.123    
                                                          
116 A detailed discussion of this perspective is seen in Obiora, supra note 59. 
117 See Alan E. Boyle, “The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the Environment”, in 
Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Oxford/Clarendon Press, 1996) at 48. 
118 Adopted 16 December 1966, (entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
119 UDHR, supra note 96. 
120 U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25, 1989 (ratified by Nigeria, Apr. 1991) 
121UN Climate Change Report, supra note 109. All three international instruments have been ratified by Nigeria.  
122 Human Rights Committee, general comments No. 6 (1982) on art. 6 (Right to life), para 1, and No. 14 (1984) on 
art. 6, para. 1 in UN Climate Change Report, supra note 109. 
123 The African Commission in the SERAC Case, upheld such argument and found Nigeria to be a violation of Article 
4 of the African Charter relating to the right to life, see SERAC Case, supra note 7. 
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2.6.1.2. The Right to Health 
While Article 16 (1) and (2) of the African Charter provide for a right to a healthy environment, 
other international instruments provide for the right to the highest attainable standard of health. 
Articles 7(b), 10 and 12 of the CESCR, Article 25 of the UDHR, Article 24 of the CRC among 
other international instruments, enjoin states to provide “services and conditions which enable a 
person to live a healthy life”.  The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the CESCR notes that: “the right to health 
embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which people can 
lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health, such as…a healthy 
environment.”124 
Evidently, constant environmental pollution that poisons the air, water and waterways, not only 
violates the right to a healthy environment, it also threatens the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health.125  
2.6.1.3. Right to Water and Food 
If you want to go fishing, you have to paddle for four hours through several rivers before you can 
get to where you catch fish and the spill is lesser…some of the fishes we catch, when you open the 
stomach, it smells of crude oil.126 
Local Fisherman in the Niger Delta 
The right to safe drinking water and the right to adequate food and being free from hunger are 
guaranteed in articles 11 and 12 of the CESCR. The right to adequate food provides for “the 
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger”. Elements of the right include the possibility 
of feeding one’s self from the natural resources accessible to the individual. In the case of the Niger 
Delta, environmental pollution often damages farm lands, destroying crops in the ground and 
affecting the productivity of the soil.127 Other impacts of oil pollution on the right to food include 
                                                          
124 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (2000) on the right to the highest attainable standard of health (Article 12 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Rights, E/C.12/2000/4), para 4.  
125 The African Commission in the SERAC Case found the Nigerian government to be in violation of Article 16 of the 
African Charter. See SERAC Case, supra note 7 at paragraph 50. See also Amnesty Report, supra note 3 at 35.   
126 Interview with local fisherman reported in CEHRD’s, Report On the State of Human Rights Abuses and Violence 
in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, 2008, Online: http://www.cehrd.org/files/Human_Rights_Report_2008.pdf at  
p157.  
127 Amnesty Report, supra note 3 at 30-33. 
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damage to fisheries and creeks, killing or poisoning aquatic life local communities depend on for 
food.128  
The right to water guarantees the right of everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically 
accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses, such as drinking, food preparation 
and personal and household hygiene.129 The authors of the UNEP Report, had taken samples from 
28 wells at 10 communities adjacent to contaminated sites in the Niger Delta and had found high 
levels of hydrocarbon contamination. 130 In some seven wells, the hydrocarbon levels in the 
samples were at least 1,000 times higher than the Nigerian drinking water standard of 3 ug/l.131 
Local communities were said to be aware of the level of contamination but continued to use the 
water for drinking, cooking and other domestic use because they had no alternative.132 
Evidently the circumstances demonstrate another failure on the part of the Nigerian state to meet 
its obligations under the CESCR. A situation where oil pollution threatens and impedes the right 
to life, health and a healthy environment, food and water of residents of local communities, clearly 
violates international obligations. The African Commission upheld such arguments in its decision 
in the SERAC Case. Finding the Nigerian government to be in violation of the right to food, it 
held:  
“The right to food is inseparably linked to the dignity of human beings and is therefore 
essential for the enjoyment and fulfilment of such other rights as health, education, work 
and political participation. The African Charter and international law require and bind 
Nigeria to protect and improve existing food sources and to ensure access to adequate food 
for all citizens. Without touching on the duty to improve food production and to guarantee 
access, the minimum core of the right to food requires that the Nigerian Government should 
not destroy or contaminate food sources. It should not allow private parties to destroy or 
contaminate food sources, and prevent peoples’ efforts to feed themselves.”133 
                                                          
128 Ibid at 14- 19. 
129 UN Climate Change Report, supra note 109. 
130 UNEP Report on Ogoniland, supra note 19 at 12. 
131 Ibid.  
132 Ibid at 11. 
133 SERAC Case, supra note 7 at paragraph 65. 
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 Given that the situation has persisted without much change, and the significance of reforming the 
system to achieve environmental justice, the thesis proposes the use of the ECOWAS regional 
human rights enforcement mechanism to pursue the enforcement of these rights. 
2.6.2. The ECOWAS Court of Justice 
As seen in the previous chapter, the ECOWAS is a regional community comprising 15 West 
African states including Nigeria. It was established in 1975 under the ECOWAS Treaty to garner 
regional and economic integration in member states.134 The ECOWAS Court as an organ within 
the organization, was initially created under the Treaty to "ensure the observance of law and justice 
in the interpretation of the provisions of [the 1975] Treaty" and to "settle such disputes as may be 
referred to it" by the member states.135 The growth and development of the ECOWAS Court 
however saw its jurisdiction growing to reach protection and promotion of human rights within 
member states of the ECOWAS region. The significance of the ECOWAS Court to this thesis lies 
in the applicability of its decisions to Nigeria and its “indeterminate human rights jurisdiction”.136  
While other courts may be restricted by a particular body of law which they serve to interpret and 
apply, the ECOWAS Court has no such body of law or charter and is at liberty to interpret and 
apply any number of international human rights instruments which member states have ratified.137 
Some have criticized this indeterminate human rights jurisdiction, insisting that rights guaranteed 
by international instruments might overreach especially in the rapidly evolving international 
scene.138 Others however have charged the Court with being at risk of interpreting instruments that 
are directory and not legally binding on states.139   
The Court however responds to this criticism by describing its indeterminate jurisdiction as an 
“opportunity to define and delimit the scope and legal parameters of its human rights mandate in 
its own image.”140 The Court has often underscored the primacy of the African Charter, noting the 
                                                          
134 Ekhator, supra note 34 at 72. 
135 Articles 11 and 56 of Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, May 28, 1975, 1010 UNTS 17, 
14 ILM 1200. 
136 Karen J. Alter, Lawrence R. Hefler and Jacqueline R. McAllister, “A New International Human Rights Court for 
West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice” (2013) 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 737 at 755 [Alter, Hefler and 
McAllister] 
137 See the ECOWAS Court Supplementary Protocol, supra note 106. 
138 Alter, Hefler and McAllister, supra note 136 at 755. 
139 Ibid.  
140 Tony Anene-Maidoh, “The Mandate of a Regional Court: Experiences from ECOWAS Court of Justice”, paper 
52 
 
explicit reference to the African Charter in the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, and the significance of 
all ECOWAS states being parties to the Charter.141 Significant to the thesis also is that ECOWAS 
judges have often applied the UDHR and UN human rights conventions that member states have 
ratified,142 including the ICCPR, the ICESR,  and the UN Convention Against Torture.143 
The Court also consults and considers a wide range of sources when interpreting human rights 
norms, drawing inspiration from the 1991 Protocol’s directive to “apply as necessary, the body of 
laws as contained in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.”144 The Statute 
of the International Court of Justice specifies that treaties, customs and general principles of law, 
as well as national judicial decisions and the teachings of highly qualified publicists, are all sources 
of international law.145 The ECOWAS Court relies on this provision to interpret cases brought 
before it. Another significance of the ECOWAS Court is that there is no requirement for domestic 
remedies to be exhausted at a national level before approaching the court and private and individual 
litigants are free to approach the Court.146  
Also on the subject of the Court’s jurisdiction, the Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 and the 
Protocol establishing the Court originally designed the Court as an inter-state court. The Court was 
to hear and decide matters between ECOWAS member states, its institutions and offer advisory 
opinions to the member states.147 Subsequently however, the protocol of the Court was amended 
so that individual and corporate bodies could also approach the Court to seek reprieve from 
activities of states and other ECOWAS organs.148 Through its jurisprudence however, the Court 
has further defined its jurisdiction, precluding suits between individuals and other individuals or 
even corporate bodies.149 The Court held that such matters can be adequately addressed by 
                                                          
presented at the Regional Colloquium on the SADC Tribunal, Johannesburg (Mar. 12-13, 2013) (statement by 
ECOWAS Court chief registrar) cited in Alter, Hefler and McAllister, supra note 136 at 755. 
141 E.g., Alade v. Nigeria, Case No. ECWICCJ/APP/05/1 1, Judgment, para. 24 (June 11, 2012); Keita v. Mali, 
Case No. ECWICCJlAPP/05/06, Judgment, para. 34 (Mar. 22, 2007).   
142 Alade v. Nigeria, Judgment, supra note 141, para. 25 (asserting the authority to interpret "UN Conventions 
... acceded to by Member States of ECOWAS"). 
143 Alter, Hefler and McAllister, supra note 136 at 755. 
144 Art. 19 ECOWAS Community Court of Justice Protocol 1999 (A/P.1/7/91)   
145 Article 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice, U.N. Doc. AJIL Supp. 215 (1945) 
146 Alter, Hefler and McAllister, supra note 136 at 756. 
147 Article 9 and 10 of the ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 106.  
148 Ibid.   
149 Peter David V. Ambassador Ralph Uwechue cited in Tony Anene-Maidoh, “The Mandate of a Regional Court: 
Experiences from the ECOWAS Court of Justice” Regional Colloquium on the SADC Tribunal, Johannesburg, South 
Africa 12th to 13th March, 2013. 
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domestic courts.150 It also maintains that only cases involving allegations of human rights 
violations against states and ECOWAS institutions can be brought before the Court,151 thereby 
excluding suits against TNCs.152  
In specific reference to ECOWAS decisions in relation to TNCs, it is significant to discuss the 
SERAP v. Nigeria153 case. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the case involved a claim by an 
environmental protection NGO on behalf of the people of the Niger Delta to hold the Nigerian 
state and Shell Nigeria (one of the TNCs in Nigeria) responsible for environmental pollution in 
the region. The Court declined jurisdiction over the TNC citing that they were not parties to the 
ECOWAS Treaty and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.154 While this can be 
viewed as a failing of the Court to hold TNCs accountable, the contention of this thesis is that in 
directing the Nigerian government to take immediate steps to remedy pollution in the Niger Delta, 
the Court showed significant promise. The Court’s decision provided significant validation to the 
claims of the local communities and therefore mandated Nigeria to better regulate TNCs.  
Admittedly, the inability of the Court to hold TNCs accountable for environmental pollution 
illustrates one of the limitations of the ECOWAS Court. In recognition of such challenge, the thesis 
then focuses on employing the ECOWAS framework to strengthen the regulatory capacity of 
Nigeria in order to better regulate TNCs. A detailed discussion of the framework proposed by the 
thesis for regulatory oversight is discussed in the fourth chapter of the thesis.           
However, given that Nigeria is a party to the ECOWAS treaty155 and the ECOWAS Court 
Protocol,156 the ECOWAS Court can successfully adjudicate environmental protection claims 
under any of the international treaties identified in the thesis which Nigeria has ratified but failed 
                                                          
150 Ibid.  
151 The Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v. President, Federal 
Republic of Nigeria ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09 Ruling of 10th December, 2010 [Serap v. Nigeria] 
152 However, Article 3(6) of the ECOWAS Court Supplementary protocol provides for parties to confer jurisdiction 
on the ECOWAS Court by agreement. In such case, the Court would have jurisdiction to hear the suit between two 
private parties. See Petrostar v. Blackberry Nigeria Ltd (Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/05/11) cited in Ibironke T. 
Odumosu-Ayanu, “Governments, Investors and Local Communities: Analysis of a Multi-Actor Investment Contract 
Framework”, 2014, 15 Melb. J. Int’l L. 473 [Odumosu-Ayanu, Governments, Investors and Local Communities] at 
507. 
153 Serap v. Nigeria, supra note 151.  
154 Ibid.  
155 See ECOWAS member states, online: http://www.ecowas.int/member-states/    
156 See ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 106.  
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to domesticate. Also, given that Nigerian courts are only bound to apply legislation which has been 
domesticated, these characteristics of the ECOWAS Court make it even more attractive to 
adjudicating environmental pollution claims. The Court’s wide human rights jurisdiction means it 
is unhindered by constitutional provisions (such as Chapter II) and can therefore make binding 
findings of human rights violations against the Nigerian state under international human rights 
instruments.  
2.6.3. Potential Challenges to employing the ECOWAS Court in the fight for environmental justice 
in the Niger Delta 
Thus far, the thesis has identified the failures of the Nigerian judicial system, specifically focusing 
on the challenge of establishing a right to a healthy environment given constitutional restrictions 
and judicial obstacles. We have examined rights owed to individuals in local communities under 
international legal instruments and the potential of the ECOWAS Court to provide protection to 
local communities through international conventions ratified by Nigeria. This subsection examines 
the challenges to effective performance of such role by the ECOWAS Court and recommendations 
to mitigate those challenges. 
2.6.3.1. Funding and Access  
As identified above, the challenges which constrain the effective litigation of human rights abuses 
in Nigeria are often related to funding. Local communities are often poor and can hardly afford to 
initiate proceedings against TNCs or the government in event of breach of their human rights. 
However, NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have been extremely helpful in 
providing dedicated legal representation and resources to local communities in a way that mitigates 
some of funding challenges which local communities might have.   
Another challenge that potentially impedes the employment of the ECOWAS Court by local 
communities is accessing the Court. This challenge is closely related to the funding challenge, as 
local communities are often quite remote and the ECOWAS Court is located in the capital of 
Nigeria.157 This challenge could also be mitigated by strong involvement of CSOs and NGOs, 
working with local communities to ensure justice. However, ultimately, the creation of a fund 
                                                          
157 See the location of the ECOWAS Court, online: 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=109&Itemid=19   
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within the ECOWAS that perhaps provides for public interest litigation may ultimately reduce 
reliance on civil society. 
2.6.3.2. Enforceability of ECOWAS Court Decisions and its Limited Jurisdiction 
Perhaps, the biggest challenge to employing the ECOWAS Court is the enforceability of decisions 
of the Court. While jurisdiction of the Court stretches throughout the West African region, there 
seem to be conflicting views as regards enforceability of its decisions. The establishing protocol 
of the Court provides that its decisions of the Court “shall be final and immediately enforceable,”158 
however some scholars argue that decisions are advisory or persuasive; others argue that they are 
not enforceable while some others argue that they are directly enforceable.159  
Some writers however argue that the genius of the Court is in employing strategies that encourage 
compliance by parties such as employing strict proof requirements when adjudicating rights 
claims, insisting that complainants “specify the particular human right which has been violated”.160 
The Court also attempts to make compliance easier for states in the manner of remedies it provides 
to complainants161 as well as pressuring states to comply in the face of public international 
pressure. Some scholars, writing in relation to the court state that: “…The [ECOWAS] judges are 
also aware of ongoing concerns about noncompliance and are responding in their jurisprudence 
and actions outside the courtroom.”162 
As discussed earlier, a significant challenge of the Court is its limited jurisdiction. Its inability to 
adjudicate claims against TNCs provides a significant challenge to environmental protection in 
Nigeria. Admittedly, the employment of the ECOWAS Court to provide environmental protection 
may not immediately remedy the problem of environmental protection in the Niger Delta, however 
it provides impetus to the struggle for environmental justice and vests a recognized right in addition 
to the African Charter Act in the hands of local communities. The pith of the argument therefore 
                                                          
158 Article 19(2) of the ECOWAS Court Supplementary Protocol, supra note 106. 
159 See Ekhator supra note 34 at 75. 
160 Alter, Hefler and McAllister, supra note 136. 
161 See Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Niger Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/07, Judgment, paras. 74-75, 77 (Oct. 27, 2008), 
unofficial translation available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/496b41fa2.pdf. In that case the Court refused 
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162 Alter, Hefler and McAllister, supra note 136. 
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is that the jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Court can potentially affect and direct state behaviour 
into recognizing environmental protection cases as rights based claims.  
2.7. Reviewing the Potential Contributions of the ECOWAS Court to the Development a 
Right to a Healthy Environment  
This thesis situates the discussions relating to the right to a healthy environment within framework 
of the norm “life cycle” theory.163 The theory draws from Finnemore and Sikkink’s work which 
argues that there are three main stages to a norm’s development: the norm emergence, the norm 
cascade and the norm internalization stage. 
 At the norm emergence, the norm entrepreneur (usually an NGO) creates a general consciousness 
about the norm and attempts to convince norm leaders (identified as a critical mass of states) to 
embrace these new norms.164 The second stage is the norm cascade where these norm leaders 
attempt to socialize other states to become followers of the norm.165 Finnemore and Sikkink 
speculate that states are convinced by norm leaders to accept new norms for a number of reasons 
including: pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation and perhaps a 
desire for states to enhance their self-esteem.166 The final stage of the cycle is internalization, the 
authors posit that this is when the norm acquires a “taken-for-granted quality”167 and is no longer 
a matter for broad public debate.168 The third stage is particularly significant to this thesis because 
it is the stage at which the norm acquires a “taken-for-granted” quality. The theory also identifies 
a “tipping point”, described as a point between the first and second stage of the norm life cycle, 
when the norm receives acceptance from a sufficient number of states.  
Situating the right to a healthy environment within the theory, it can be gleaned from the arguments 
made earlier in this chapter that the right is yet to achieve a fully legal nor normative “taken-for-
granted” quality in the Nigerian legal system. The failure of the constitution to recognize the right 
as a substantive right and the uncertainty surrounding establishing the right as a justiciable right, 
                                                          
163 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) 52 
International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics 887 at 895. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. 
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as well as other barriers to access to justice suggest that a right to a healthy environment is not 
perceived as settled law which has achieved the “taken-for-granted” quality.   
This chapter has suggested that the use of the ECOWAS Court to protect and promote the right to 
a healthy environment in Nigeria holds great potential for entrenching the right to a healthy 
environment. Given the reach and wide human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Court, it can make 
decisions that compel or encourage the Nigerian state to recognize the right to a healthy 
environment as a substantive right. Further, the ECOWAS Court as a supranational entity has 
jurisdiction over other ECOWAS states and therefore potentially influences other states in West 
Africa to also recognize the right to a healthy environment, further driving the “tipping point” and 
aiding the right to a healthy environment to achieve internalization.  
The thesis presents the ECOWAS Court as both a “norm entrepreneur”, creating awareness about 
the right to a healthy environment as a norm and a “norm leader” as it has the power to directly 
influence a number of states to adopt the right to a healthy environment as a norm. The functioning 
of a supranational organization such as the ECOWAS as both “norm entrepreneur” and “norm 
leader” not only encourages Nigeria to accept new norms relating to the right to a healthy 
environment, but also possesses great potential for the promotion of the acceptance of new norms 
in other West African states.  
It has been argued earlier in the thesis that at the core of this research is the drive towards better 
effective regulation in Nigeria in order to reduce environmental pollution. The potential 
contribution of the establishment of a right to a healthy environment as a substantive right is that 
it creates an obligation on the state to better regulate TNCs in order to ensure a healthy 
environment.  
2.8.  Conclusion 
Thus far, the thesis has identified the effects of oil pollution on Niger Delta communities and state 
complacence towards the effects of oil pollution in the Niger Delta. This chapter has demonstrated 
that constitutional and judicial reform are fundamental to establishing a right to a healthy 
environment and creating an obligation on the state to ensure a healthy environment. Given the 
issues identified in the first chapter as potentially hampering the government’s willingness to 
undertake reform, this chapter identifies the potential of the ECOWAS Court to contribute to the 
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creation of an obligation on the Nigerian state to ensure a healthy environment and contribute to 
the process of the right to a healthy environment achieving a “taken-for-granted” quality. Also, 
given that the broader enquiry in this thesis is assessing the potential contributions of the 
ECOWAS to performing regulatory oversight over the Nigerian state, the identified potential 
contributions of the ECOWAS Court inspires confidence in the potential of the ECOWAS to 
provide oversight. 
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CHAPTER 3: FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATION OF THE OIL AND GAS 
INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA  
 
3.1. Introduction 
As seen in the previous chapters, the argument that oil pollution in Nigeria (in the form of oil spills 
and gas flaring) persists as a result of ineffective regulation is central to this thesis. This chapter 
examines the reasons for ineffective regulation which are related to the legislative and institutional 
framework for regulation in Nigeria. In other words, it examines existing regulation as well as 
regulatory enforcement institutions with a view to identifying why oil pollution continues to persist 
in Nigeria and the barriers to effectiveness inherent in the regulatory framework. It commences 
with an examination of the effects of oil production in Nigeria, the chapter then identifies the series 
of regulation aimed at regulating oil exploration in Nigeria, making the argument for better 
enforcement of regulations which promise to curb oil pollution. Ultimately, the chapter identifies 
a need for regulatory reform which would further drive effectiveness.   
In examining the effects of oil pollution and the need to end continued pollution, the chapter 
examines the implications of oil pollution on the health of local communities, the environment, its 
implications for climate change and global warming and incidentally implications of continued 
gas flaring on further economic growth in Nigeria.  
The first section of this chapter, examines the impacts of dumping of waste, oil spills and gas 
flaring on the wellbeing, health and livelihood of local communities and the environment. The 
chapter then proceeds to examine regulatory framework for the oil industry, specifically focusing 
on regulation that have implications on oil pollution. The chapter identifies the inherent 
deficiencies of regulatory and institutional framework for regulation of the oil industry and makes 
recommendations for reform. After examining existing regulation however, the central argument 
in the chapter is not simply for regulatory reform but for better enforcement of existing regulation. 
In line with the central theme of the thesis, the chapter argues that regulatory reform such as the 
ones being advocated in this chapter might be difficult to implement in Nigeria, given the reasons 
discussed in the first chapter, to wit, the chapter proposes the use of ECOWAS regulatory oversight 
over regulatory institutions in Nigeria in order to drive increased effectiveness.   
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3.2 Oil Pollution in the Niger Delta 
 There are three main sources of oil pollution in Nigeria: oil spills, flaring of natural gas and 
dumping of waste generated during oil exploration in waterbodies. This section discusses the 
implications of each type of oil pollution on the environment, local communities and the economy 
of Nigeria.  
3.2.1 Disposal of Waste 
Oil exploration and production activities produce wastes of varying chemical compositions.1 The 
disposal of this waste into rivers and the sea pollutes land, water and affects agriculture and 
damages fisheries.2 According to a senior official from the Rivers State Ministry of Environment, 
“effluent and waste from the oil industry which should be treated is dumped and finds its way into 
the surface water of the Delta…”3 
When oil is pumped out of the ground, a mixture of oil, gas and water emerges alongside the oil.4 
Treatment is supposed to follow the water that emerges with oil (known as “produced water” or 
“formation water”) before it is returned into the sea. Experts have questioned the amount of 
treatment such water receives before it is returned into the sea.5 Some argue that only some of the 
oil can be removed from the water before it is discharged into the sea and such water may contain 
heavy metals and other dangerous substances.6 While this thesis was not able to uncover any 
specific studies carried out in the Niger Delta to measure the effects of dumping on the 
environment, oil companies themselves concede that dumping of waste is not good practice.7 
Another source of waste from oil exploration involves seismic surveys by oil companies, drill 
cuttings, drilling mud and fluid used for stimulating production as well as chemicals used during 
                                                          
1 Amnesty International Nigeria, “Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta” (2009) online: Amnesty 
International http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/nigeria-petroleum-pollution-and-poverty-in-the-
niger-delta-report at 17 [Amnesty Report]  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
5 World Bank, “Defining an Environmental Development Strategy for the Niger Delta”, 25 May 1995, Volume 2, 
Industry and Energy Operations Division West Central Africa Department, p35 which states “concentrations of 
dissolved petroleum hydrocarbons have been found to be elevated near refineries in the region (10-50 mg/l), 
which supports the inference that little or no wastewater treatment, is performed.” 
6 O. Obire and F. O. Amusan, “The Environmental Impact of Oilfield Formation Water on a Freshwater Stream in 
Nigeria”, (2003) 7 Journal of Applied Sciences & Environmental Management 61. 
7 See Amnesty Report, supra note 1 at 18. 
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seismic activities.8 Olawuyi writes that when major constituents of drill cuttings such as baryotes 
and bentonitic clays are dumped on the ground, they prevent local plant growth and can potentially 
kill aquatic life if dumped in the water.9 
Waste is also generated when oil fields are decommissioned or abandoned as a result of the oil in 
that field becoming depleted. Decommissioning involves plugging, flushing or cementing oil wells 
to make them safe for rig removal and shutting down operations.10 Because decommissioning is 
inevitable in oil exploration, the process of decommissioning, particularly of offshore oil 
exploration facilities, has raised significant questions regarding its impact on the environment. 
Studies have shown that deep sea disposal of oil facilities have potentially hazardous effects on 
the marine environment with uncertain long term impacts.11 Human exposure to residual wastes 
through fishing or water consumption could have serious health consequences including effects on 
reproduction, immune systems, neurobehavioral disorders and cancers.12  
Evidently disposal of waste generated as a result of oil exploration produces a number of risks to 
local communities as well as the environment. The next subsection discusses oil spills, which is a 
form of environmental pollution that has generated significant concern within the literature.       
3.2.2 Oil Spills 
Oil spills occur when there is an unsafe discharge or release of oil into the human environment, 
such as waterbodies like oceans, rivers and seas.13 Such spills are often as a result of oil exploration 
and production, mainly due to accidental or negligent rupture or blow out from wellheads, flow 
stations, drilling rigs, pipelines and offshore platforms and facilities.14 Oil facilities and pipelines 
often rupture due to poor maintenance, corrosion, age and in some cases vandalism, sabotage and 
poor installation.15 They have also been known to occur as a result of transportation and or loading 
                                                          
8 Damilola S. Olawuyi, The Principles of Nigerian Environmental Law (Ado Ekiti, Nigeria: Afe Babalola University 
2015) at 189 [Olawuyi].  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid at 190. 
11 D. G. Gorman and June Nielson, Decommissioning Offshore Structures (New York: Springer 1997) cited in 
Olawuyi, supra note 8 at 189.  
12 L. Ritter etal, “Persistent Organic Pollutants” online: UNEP 
http://www.pops.int/documents/background/assessreport/en/ritteren.pdf  
13 Olawuyi, supra note 8 at 177. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
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leakages.16 The immediate effect of oil spills is the release of dangerous hydrocarbons such as 
benzene and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons into the soil and water sources.17 Prolonged 
exposure to these dangerous hydrocarbons has adverse effects on the environment, health of local 
communities, drinking water, aquatic life, soil fertility and natural growth of plants and crops, 
which can last for decades.18 
Since oil exploration began in Nigeria, incidences of oil spills have achieved increasing regularity. 
Between 1993 and 2007, there were 35 reported incidences of oil spills in Nigeria.19 There are also 
speculations that some incidences of spills are unreported and perhaps unnoticed.20 As a result of 
these alarming degrees of spills, the health and livelihood of local communities have often been 
severely compromised. Studies show that a year’s supply of food can be destroyed by even a minor 
leak of oil, thereby frustrating food supply as well as livelihood of farmers who depend on such 
produce.21 Other effects include contamination of drinking water as access to pipe borne water in 
these local communities is often unavailable and they are forced to drink from wells, rivers and 
creeks that have been contaminated by oil pollution.22 It is estimated that over 3000 inhabitants of 
the Niger Delta have died from drinking contaminated water since oil exploration began.23 
Incidentally, health risks associated with oil spills also occur as a result of chemical used in 
cleaning up spills. It appears that many years after clean-up of spills, water contamination from 
spills still persist in the form of residual oil or the effects of chemicals used during clean ups.24  
Olawuyi writes that: 
“Offshore spills, which are usually much greater in scale, taint coastal environments in the 
Niger Delta, causing decline in local fishing production. The rainforest, which previously 
occupied 7,400 km2, has disappeared. Similarly, oil spillage in the Niger delta has 
destroyed its mangrove forests. Estimates suggest that 5-10% of Nigerian mangrove 
                                                          
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid at 178. 
22 Ibid at 178-179. 
23 Ibid.  
24 See Deborah Zabarenko, “Oil Clean-Up Chemicals Worry Environment Watchdogs” Reuters (4 May 2010), online: 
Reuters http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN04110283. See also Olawuyi, supra note 8 at 183.  
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ecosystems have been wiped out by oil, which acidifies the soils, thus halting cellular 
respiration and starving plant roots of oxygen”25  
In December 2011, Shell Nigeria (one of the leading TNCs in Nigeria) admitted to what it 
described as the worst spill in a decade.26 Over 40,000 barrels of oil was spilled, contaminating 
waterbodies and coastal communities.27 This event occurred shortly after the UNEP Report had 
described the effects of previous oil spills as “widespread and severely impacting many 
components of the environment”28 and made several recommendations for the Nigerian 
government and TNCs to remediate the effects of oil pollution.29 Specifically, the report identified 
the specific nature of the environment in the Niger Delta and the effects of oil spills in the region. 
An excerpt from the report reads: 
As Ogoniland [one of the local communities in the Niger Delta] has high rainfall, any delay 
in cleaning up an oil spill leads to oil being washed away, traversing farmland and almost 
always ending up in the creeks. When oil reaches the root zone, crops and other plants 
begin to experience stress and can die, and this is a routine observation in Ogoniland. At 
one site, Ejama-Ebubu in Eleme local government area (LGA), the study found heavy 
contamination present 40 years after an oil spill occurred, despite repeated clean-up 
attempts.30 
What can be gleaned from the above set of facts is that in spite of the desperate effect of oil spills 
on the environment and health of local communities, oil spills still seem to occur in alarming 
degrees. The UNEP Report cited above was conducted at the behest of the Nigeria government in 
an attempt to pervade the “seemingly intractable”31 situation that described the relationship 
between the state and local communities.32 Specifically, the study was intended to provide reliable 
                                                          
25 Olawuyi supra note 8 at 179. 
26 John Vidal, “Nigeria on Alert as Shell Announces Worst Spill in a Decade” The Guardian (22 December 2011), 
online: The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/22/nigerian-shell-oil-spill [Shell’s 
worst spill] 
27 Olawuyi, supra note 8 at 179. 
28 United Nations Environment Programme, “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland Report” Online: 
http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/EnvironmentalAssessmentofOgonilandrep
ort/tabid/54419/Default.aspx [UNEP Report]  at 9. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Foreword of UNEP Report, supra note 28 at 6. 
32 Ibid.  
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information which could serve as a baseline for government and local communities to remediate 
the tensions between them, given the long bitter history of repression of local anxieties33 and 
remedy the effects of oil pollution. The foreword of the UNEP report read: 
The history of oil exploration and production in Ogoniland is a long, complex and often 
painful one that to date has become seemingly intractable in terms of its resolution and 
future direction. 
It is also a history that has put people and politics and the oil industry at loggerheads 
rendering a landscape characterized by a lack of trust, paralysis and blame, set against a 
worsening situation for the communities concerned. The reality is that decades of 
negotiations, initiatives and protests have ultimately failed to deliver a solution that meets 
the expectations and responsibilities of all sides. In an attempt to navigate from stalemate 
to action, the Government of Nigeria, in consultation with many of the relevant actors, 
invited UNEP to consider undertaking an assessment of oil pollution in Ogoniland.34   
The report was intended to serve as a catalyst to spur government into action. It was expected that 
a report from a credible and independent observer such as the UNEP would allay any concerns the 
government might have had regarding the degree of environmental pollution in the Niger Delta 
being exaggerated by local communities. It was further expected that educated recommendations 
made by UNEP would aid the government in identifying ways and means to remediate the degree 
of pollution in the Niger Delta.   
However, not only did the worst spill of the decade occur shortly after the report was published,35 
rights groups allege that years after the report no progress has been made regarding implementing 
the recommendations of the report.36 This chapter therefore seeks to examine how the existing 
                                                          
33 See for example the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa where the Nigerian government executed activists fighting for 
the rights of one of the Niger Delta communities in Project Underground, “The Life & Death of Ken Saro-Wiwa: A 
History of the Struggle for Justice in the Niger Delta”, Online: 
http://www.ratical.org/corporations/KSWlife+death.pdf   
34 UNEP Report, supra note 28 at 6.  
35 Shell’s worst spill, supra note 27. 
36 See generally, Amnesty International , “No Progress: An Evaluation of the Implementation of UNEP’s 
Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, Three Years On” Online: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/013/2014/en/ 
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legislative and institutional frameworks potentially contribute to the persisting phenomenon of 
regulatory ineffectiveness evidenced by oil pollution. 
However, before proceeding to examine regulatory and institutional framework in Nigeria, it is 
important to examine the effects of other forms of oil pollution such as flaring of natural gas. 
3.2.3 Natural Gas Flaring 
The discussion on natural gas flaring in Nigeria is particularly significant to this thesis because 
unlike oil spills which occur by accident or from neglect, gas flaring is a deliberate burning or 
release of natural gas into the atmosphere. The effects of gas flaring on the environment and the 
health of local communities is not difficult to discern as natural gas contains hydrogen sulfide 
(H2S) and carbon dioxide (CO2) which is harmful with prolonged exposure. The discussions in 
this subsection examine the effects of gas flaring on health and wellbeing of local communities, 
climate change and the economic growth of the country.  
It is often the case that TNCs in Nigeria do not like finding natural gas alongside oil when mining.37 
Such gas is referred to as associated gas, and presents a challenge to TNCs as it becomes necessary 
to then dispose of such associated gas in order to profit from the oil, which is the primary 
motivation for their exploration.38 The existence of large deposits of natural gas within Nigeria’s 
oil fields has led a number of TNCs to resort to flaring natural gas in an attempt to dispose of this 
gas and preserve the oil.39  
Gas flaring emits a number of toxic substances into the atmosphere and has been likened to “setting 
a match to an enormous container of lighter fluid”.40 It is said that flares are so hot that nothing 
can grow next to them.41 Combustion of associated gas produces a mixture of smoke (more 
precisely referred to as particulate matter); combustion by-products such as sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen dioxides and carcinogenic substances such as benz[a]pryne and dioxin; and unburned fuel 
components including benzene, toluene, xylene and hydrogen sulfide.42 The Canadian Public 
                                                          
37 The Climate Justice Programme, “Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, Environmental and Economic 
Monstrosity” (2005) online: https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/gas_flaring_nigeria.pdf at 10 
[Gas Flaring in Nigeria] 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid at 24. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid.  
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Health Association identified over 250 toxins released into the atmosphere as a result of gas 
flaring.43 They write:  
“There have been over 250 identified toxins released from flaring including carcinogens 
such as benzopyrene, benzene, carbon di-sulphide (CS2), carbonyl sulphide (COS) and 
toluene; metals such as mercury, arsenic and chromium; sour gas with H2S and SO2; 
nitrogen oxides (NOx); carbon dioxide (CO2); and methane (CH4) which contributes to the 
greenhouse gases. Improper combustion of natural gas, as witnessed by visible smoke from 
a flare stack, contributes to increased hazardous chemicals being released into the 
environment including volatile organic compounds.”44 
The effects of such gas flaring on local communities is also captured in reports by environmental 
and health agencies. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), writes that 
“exposure to these substances [carcinogenic substances emitted during gas flaring] has been 
demonstrated to cause adverse health effects such as irritation to the lung, skin, and mucus 
membranes, effects on the central nervous system, kidney damage, and cancer.”45 In another 
report, the US EPA having studied the effects of prolonged exposure to benzene wrote that: 
“It has long been clearly established and accepted that exposure to benzene and its 
metabolites causes acute nonlymphoctic leukemia and a variety of other blood-related 
disorders in humans”46 
Reports indicate that local communities in the Niger Delta having been exposed to gas flaring over 
several decades have been victims of premature death, respiratory problems among children, 
asthma attacks and cancer.47 Evidently, oil pollution in Nigeria has gravely affected the life 
expectancy of residents of local communities. 
                                                          
43 The Canadian Public Health Association 2000 Resolutions and Motions, Background to 2000 Resolution No.3 Gas 
Flaring online: http://www.cpha.ca/uploads/resolutions/2000_e.pdf at 2 
44 Ibid.  
45 United State Environmental Protection Agency, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
Industrial/ Commercial/Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters online: US EPA 
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/boiler/fr13ja03.pdf  
46 United States Environmental Protection Agency, “Carcinogenic Effects of Benzene: An Update” (1997) online: US 
EPA http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/3000293X.PDF?Dockey=3000293X.PDF at 4 
47 Gas Flaring in Nigeria, supra note 37 at 25.  
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Equally disturbing is the effect that continued flaring portends for the environment and climate 
change. The production of sulfur oxides as a result of flaring of natural gas creates what is known 
as acidic precipitation.48 The result of the combination of such toxins with atmospheric compounds 
such as oxygen and water produces acid rain which is detrimental to aquatic life, forests and 
vegetation, robs soils of essential nutrients and releases aluminium into the soil.49 Gas flares also 
produce “soot”50 which often rests at the roofs of houses in local communities as well as on other 
structures found within the communities.51 This soot is often washed into drinking water, wells 
and the soil in local communities during rainfall, further affecting their health, the virility of the 
soil and the growth of crops and vegetation.52    
In reference to climate change, the burning of fossil fuel, mainly coal, and oil and gas has led to 
the creation of greenhouse gases.53 Greenhouse gases increase heat in the atmosphere and lead to 
global warming and climate change.54 The significance of gas flaring to global warming is that gas 
flaring releases a considerable amount of carbon dioxide which is the most potent greenhouse gas, 
as well as methane which is another greenhouse gas.55 According to the Nigerian government, 
temperatures in West Africa, and particularly the Sahel, have increased more sharply than the 
global trend, and the average predicted rise in temperature between 1980/99 and 2080/99 is 
between 3°C and 4°C, which is more than 1.5 times the average global trend.56 While there is no 
evidence that gas flaring alone is responsible for this increased temperature in West Africa, reports 
indicate that gas flaring has contributed to more emissions of greenhouse gases than all other 
sources in sub-Saharan Africa combined.57  
                                                          
48 Olawuyi, supra note 8 at 188. 
49 National Geographic, Acid Rain: Effects Felt Through the Food Chain online: National Geographic 
http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/acid-rain-overview/   
50 Olawuyi, supra note 8 at 188. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
53 A greenhouse gas is any gaseous compound in the atmosphere that is capable of absorbing infrared radiation, 
thereby trapping and holding heat in the atmosphere. Online: http://www.livescience.com/37821-greenhouse-
gases.html  
54 Ibid.  
55 Gas Flaring in Nigeria, supra note 37 at 20. 
56 Nigeria’s Second National Communication Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(February, 2014) online: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/nganc2.pdf  
57 Gas flaring in Nigeria, supra note 37 at 21.  
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Climate change is particularly significant to developing countries and the African continent is 
regarded as highly vulnerable with a limited ability to adapt.58 According to the United Nations 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), there are six main areas which provide the 
most risk to Africa in the face of climate change.59 They are: water resources, especially in 
international shared basins where there is potential for conflict and a need for regional coordination 
of water management, food security at risk from declines in agricultural production and uncertain 
climate, natural resources productivity at risk and biodiversity that might be irreversibly lost, 
vector and water-borne diseases, especially in areas with inadequate health infrastructure, coastal 
zones vulnerable to sea-level rise, particularly roads, bridges, buildings and other infrastructure 
that is exposed to flooding and other extreme events and exacerbation of desertification by changes 
in rainfall and intensified land use60 
 In the recently concluded 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, commonly referred 
to as the Paris conference, the Nigerian President said: 
“like many countries, Nigeria continues to witness the adverse effects of climate change 
in all its ramifications. Presently, we are reeling under the challenges of climate change as 
the frequency and intensity of extreme events like floods and drought are on the increase. 
These challenges have resulted in the destruction of many economic and social structures 
and more worryingly, threatening our national food production and security.”61  
Evidently, the threat of climate change is real, and the Nigerian President admits it. However, 
Nigeria alone is responsible for flaring 10.7 billion cubic meters of gas a year, equivalent to 11%, 
of the total volume of gas flared in 2012.62 The country flares more natural gas than any other 
                                                          
58 Ibid at 19.  
59Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Third Assessment Report, Working Group 2, Impacts, 
Adaptations and Vulnerability, Executive Summary, online: IPCC  https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/   
60 Ibid.  
61 Statement by His Excellency Muhammadu Buhari, President of the Federal Republic Of Nigeria at the Leaders 
Event of The 21st Session of the Conference of Parties (Cop-21) to the United Nations Framework Convention On 
Climate Change And The 11th Meeting Of The Parties To The Kyoto Protocol, Paris, France (30 November 2015) 
online: http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/items/9331.php   
62 OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 50th Edition (2015) Online: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), Vienna, Austria: 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2015.pdf    
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country in the world except Russia (Figure3.1).63 Evidently, Nigeria is complicit in contributing 
to global warming.     
  
Figure 3.1: Top 20 gas flaring countries in the World (source: World Bank) 
Continued gas flaring has implications not only for the health of local communities in Nigeria but 
also the rest of the world. Another argument for the elimination of gas flaring in Nigeria is its huge 
potential for energy generation. It is estimated that Nigeria has lost an estimated 575,563 Giga 
Watt hour (GWh) of electricity within the period 2005 – 2015 through flared gas alone (Figure 
3.2). Increased energy generation in a country such as Nigeria holds potential for all aspects of the 
Nigerian economy. It is estimated that Nigeria lost revenues exceeding $2.5bn per year from the 
year 1970 to 2006 as a result of flaring of natural gas.64 Another implication for utilization of 
natural gas for electricity generation is its huge potential to drive industrialization and economic 
growth in the country. Bazilian etal note that: 
“If developing economies are to follow the historical pattern of development through a path 
of industrialization, then the adequate provision of access to electricity is crucial. After all, 
                                                          
63 World Bank, The Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, February 2012 online: World Bank 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/gasflaringreduction   
64 Morgan Bazilian etal, “Oil, Energy, Poverty and Resource Dependence in West Africa” (2013) 31 J. Energy & Nat. 
Resources L. 33 at 36 at 44 [Bazilian etal] 
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it was electricity that enabled the transition from small-scale batch production to 
continuous processing during the US ‘Second Industrial Revolution’; today, continuous 
processing technologies represent the standard technologies for bulk material 
manufacturing in a large number of industries. In this sense, energy – more specifically 
electricity – is one of the key channels through which oil wealth can fuel industrialization 
in small, hydrocarbon-rich, least-developed economies"65   
Given that only 47% of the Nigerian population has access to electricity66 which is often inconstant 
and unreliable, utilization of Nigeria’s natural gas is greatly advantageous to remedying the 
problem of power. 
 
Figure 3.2 Analysis of Estimated Loss of Electricity Through Flared Gas (Source NNPC 2016)67 
Oil pollution in Nigeria has grave impacts on human rights of local communities, on the health 
and well-being of local communities, on the environment, on climate change and on the economy 
of Nigeria. One has to wonder why such pollution continues to persist. The next subsection 
undertakes an analysis of regulatory framework for oil and gas production in Nigeria, identifying 
the abundance of regulation for oil extraction in Nigeria and the problems associated with 
enforcement of these regulations. 
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3.3 Regulatory Framework for Environmental Protection in Nigeria 
The regulatory framework being examined in this section places particular focus on regulation of 
oil production and its effects on the environment and local communities. We examine regulation 
that relates to pollution arising from gas flaring, oil spills and oil pipeline related spills as well as 
institutions responsible for enforcing existing regulation. The import of such analysis is to 
demonstrate that there is an abundance of regulation for oil pollution in Nigeria. This subsection 
explores the possible reasons for the ineffectiveness of regulatory framework in the oil and gas 
industry, identifying challenges and making recommendations for reform.  
3.3.1 Regulation Applicable to Oil Production in Nigeria   
Regulation in the sense that it is used in this subsection includes legislation, subsidiary legislation 
(regulations) as well as guidelines provided by environmental protection agencies aimed at 
regulating oil production and incidental oil pollution Nigeria. We commence our inquiry with the 
Nigerian Petroleum Act. 
3.3.1.1. The Petroleum Act of 1969 
The Petroleum Act68 is the primary regulation for oil exploration and production in Nigeria. The 
Act vests ownership of petroleum resources in the Federal Government and provides for matters 
incidental to oil production.69 Incidental to oil production is the issue of oil pollution. Section 9(1) 
of the Act empowers the Minister of Petroleum Resources to make regulations for safe working of 
petroleum operations; prevention of pollution of water courses and the atmosphere, the 
conservation of petroleum resources, among others. 
Pursuant to the powers of the Minister of Petroleum Resources under the Act to make regulations, 
the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) undertakes regulation of oil extraction as it relates 
to environmental pollution as well as other aspects of petroleum exploration, production and 
processing.70 Further to regulating oil extraction under the Petroleum Act, other subsidiary 
legislation including the Petroleum Refining Regulation, the Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations, and 
the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations were enacted under the Act specifically 
targeted at regulation oil pollution.   
                                                          
68 The Petroleum Act 1969 (as amended) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, cap P10. 
69 Preamble of the Petroleum Act, Ibid. 
70 Olawuyi, supra note 8 at 31. 
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a) The Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations 1997 (MOSR) 
The MOSR71 was made pursuant to the powers of the Minister under Section 9 of the Petroleum 
Act.72 The Regulation was designed to ensure safe handling of mineral oil. It contains provisions 
designed to ensure safety in all facets of oil extraction ranging from loading to transfer to storage 
of petroleum products. It specifically contains provisions relating to maintenance of oil pipelines, 
storage tanks and other apparatus as regards oil exploration which can lead to oil spills and 
contaminate the environment.  
Olawuyi has criticised Regulation 6 of the MOSR, arguing that tying environmental best practices 
in Nigeria to international standards without adaptation to local environmental concerns is a key 
weakness of the regulation that has often resulted in ambiguities and difficulties in proper 
implementation. The regulation provides that every drilling, production and other operation which 
is necessary for the production and subsequent handling of crude oil and natural gas shall conform 
with good oil field practice. It provides that good oil field practice will be considered adequate if 
it conforms with the appropriate current Institute of Petroleum Safety Codes; or the American 
Petroleum Institute Codes, or the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Codes, or any other 
internationally recognized and accepted systems. 
However, the argument being made in this chapter respectfully disagrees with Olawuyi’s position. 
A failure to adapt regulations to local environmental concerns is not sufficient reason for TNCs to 
fail to uphold standards because TNCs by their nature have interests in other countries where they 
recognize and uphold international standards. Professor Steiner in carrying out research into what 
he terms “double standards” by Shell argues that internationally recognized “good oil field 
practice” globally, have followed the those developed in the United States,73 proof perhaps is seen 
in the fact that Regulation 6 of the MOSR cites two American institutions as being competent to 
provide standards for good oil field practice. Steiner writes that “the US system called Integrity 
Management (IM), is required by law and is used around the world as international “best practice” 
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standard to meet.”74 He writes that an example of such double standard was seen during the oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico. He argues that while there was prompt action by Shell to clean up the 
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico following the oil spill in the summer of 2010, “most spills in the 
Delta are left unattended”.75 Steiner’s report concluded that “Shell has conducted its petroleum 
operations far below commonly accepted international standards used elsewhere in the world”.76 
The argument therefore is that the challenge of regulatory effectiveness of the MOSR in Nigeria 
is not that it is tied to international best practices, but that it is hardly enforced.   
b) The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 
The Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations77 were also made pursuant to the powers of 
the Minister under Section 9 of the Petroleum Act. The Regulations contain provisions relating to 
applications for oil prospecting licences, obligations, fees as well as regulatory restrictions to oil 
companies as regards drilling and production of oil. The most instructive regulation of the Drilling 
and Production Regulation in the context of environmental pollution is Regulation 25 which 
provides:  
The licensee or lessee [of the oil prospecting license] shall adopt all practicable 
precautions, including the provision of up-to-date equipment approved by the Director of 
Petroleum Resources, to prevent the pollution of inland waters, rivers, watercourses, the 
territorial waters of Nigeria or the high seas by oil, mud or other fluids or substances which 
might contaminate the water, banks or shoreline or which might cause harm or destruction 
to fresh water or marine life, and where any such pollution occurs or has occurred, shall 
take prompt steps to control and, if possible, end it. 
Other relevant regulatory provisions contained in the Drilling and Production Regulations relate 
to preventing oil companies from interfering with fishing rights and obligating them to pay 
compensation in the event that their activities affect fishing rights.78 Another regulation seeks to 
                                                          
74 Ibid at 4-5. 
75 Ibid at 4. 
76 Ibid.  
77 The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations to the Petroleum Act 1969, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
2004, cap P10 [PDPR]. 
78 Ibid, Regulation 23 of the PDPR.  
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protect “productive” 79 and “protected” trees from being cut or taken by oil companies in the course 
of their oil exploration.80  
One of the criticisms of the Regulations within academic literature is that they fail to define what 
constitutes “all practicable precautions” or “prompt steps” required under the regulations to uphold 
environmental standards.81 Coming to the defense of the Regulations, Oshionebo argues that their 
open-ended language creates room for evolution of regulatory practices as regulations created in 
1969 may have allowed certain practices which today are deemed undesirable.82 He however 
expresses some concern regarding the discretionary power the Regulations vest in the Director of 
Petroleum Resources arguing that such vast power may be influenced by bribes and suggests that 
perhaps such power be subject to scrutiny by an independent body such as a legislative 
committee.83   
It can be gleaned from the provisions of the Petroleum Drilling and Productions Regulations that 
they are designed to not only protect the environment from oil pollution but to hold oil companies 
accountable for interfering with fishing rights and productive trees which oil pollution ultimately 
affects.  
3.3.1.2 The Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1968 
 The Oil in Navigable Waters Act84 domesticates the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954 – 1962.85 Section 1 of the Act prohibits the discharge of crude 
oil, fuel, lubricating oil and heavy diesel from ships into Nigeria’s territorial waters or shorelines. 
Section 3 of the Act makes it an offence for a shipmaster, occupier of land, or operator transferring 
oil to discharge it into Nigerian waters. It also requires the installation of anti-pollution equipment 
                                                          
79 Productive trees are defined in the regulation as trees having commercial value. See Regulation 21 of the PDPR  
80 Ibid Regulation 21.  
81 See Emeka A. Duruigbo, Multinational Corporations and International Law: Accountability and Compliance Issues 
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on such ships. Section 6 of the Act stipulates punishment for contravention, while section 7 
requires that details of all occasions of oil discharge be kept.  
The Oil in Navigable Waters Regulations of 1968 implements the provisions of the Act and 
requires ships to install oily water separator equipment capable of preventing pollution of the 
navigable waters by oil. These Regulations also require that precautions be taken when loading, 
discharging or bunkering oil to prevent spills, and also that regular inspections of ships be carried 
out to prevent oil leakages.   
Evidently, the Act and its implementing Regulations contain provisions that are designed to protect 
the marine environment from pollution as a result of oil spills. Proper enforcement of the 
provisions of the Act would greatly reduce incidences of oil spills into the sea. 
3.3.1.3 The Oil Pipelines Act of 1956 
The preamble of the Oil Pipelines Act86 reads: “An Act to make provision for licenses to be granted 
for the establishment and maintenance of pipelines incidental and supplementary to oilfields and 
oil mining and for purposes ancillary to such pipelines.”87 The Act contains provisions for applying 
for grants to survey routes for oil pipelines and obtaining licenses to construct oil pipelines. Section 
11(5) (c) of the Act obligates holders of oil pipeline licenses to pay compensation “to any person 
suffering damage (other than on account of his own default or on account of the malicious act of 
a third person) as a consequence of any breakage of or leakage from the pipeline or an ancillary 
installation, for any such damage not otherwise made good.” The Act further provides that “if the 
amount of such compensation is not agreed between any such person and the holder, it shall be 
fixed by a court in accordance with Part iv of this Act.” As seen in the previous chapter, access to 
justice for local communities provides a significant challenge to effectively litigating and obtaining 
justice for concerns relating to environmental justice. Section 17(4) of the Act however, requires 
that holders of oil pipeline licenses avoid interference with works of public utility and prevent 
pollution of land and water.  
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The Oil Pipelines Regulations made pursuant to the Oil Pipelines Act requires that environmental 
emergency plans be put in place by oil pipeline operators88 and makes any contravention of the 
Regulations punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment.89   
3.3.1.4 Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIAA) 1992 
The Environmental Impact Assessment Act90 enacted in 1992 provides a significant contribution 
to environmental protection in Nigeria. It requires oil and gas operators as well as project 
developers in other sectors, to consider the environmental impact of their activities at the early 
stages of project development except exempted by law.91 TNCs or other project developers are 
required to undertake an environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the likely or potential 
environmental impact of their activities as well as measures available to mitigate its adverse 
environmental impacts.92 The Act prohibits undertaking or embarking on projects which may 
significantly affect the environment without prior consideration of their environmental effects.93 
The schedule to the EIAA designates mining and petroleum industries as requiring Mandatory 
Study Activities and the implications of such is that the Federal Ministry of Environment (FME) 
is required to vet and approve the environmental audit undertaken by the corporation or other 
project developer.  
The EIAA punishes non-compliance with fines or imprisonment.94 It has however been applauded 
for adopting a “pluralist approach”95 to regulation.96 The Act enjoins the Federal Ministry 
Environment to receive comments from government agencies, members of the public, experts and 
interest groups who wish to make an intervention on any EIA submitted for approval.97 Although 
it is unclear what weight the FME attaches to such interventions, it ought to take them into 
consideration at various stages, including the screening or mandatory study stage.98 Concerns 
regarding the environmental effects of a project may prompt the FME to refer it to mediation or to 
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the review panel.99 Where it is found that the project is likely to result in unjustifiable, immitigable 
and significant adverse environmental effects, the agency will not permit the project to be carried 
out.100 
While the contributions of the EIAA to curbing causes and effects of environmental pollution and 
degradation in Nigeria are commendable, one of the challenges of the Act are the exceptions that 
it creates. One of such exceptions is that EIAs are not required where (i) the President of Nigeria 
or the President of the Federal Environmental Protection Council determines that the 
environmental effects of a project are likely to be minimal; (ii) the project is to be carried out 
during a national emergency for which temporary measures have been taken by the government; 
and (iii) the FME is of the opinion that, given the circumstances, the project is in the interest of 
public health or safety.101 Oshionebo writes that the first exception is particularly troubling because 
it can be used by persons with political connections to the President or Council to bypass the 
requirement for an EIA.102 He argues further that the exception granted to the president seems to 
be intended to afford the president discretion over matters which he considers to be in the overall 
interest of Nigeria, although the discretion must be exercised reasonably where the project poses 
“minimal”103 adverse effects to health and the environment.104 
Evidently, vast discretionary powers of the president of Nigeria and the president of the Council 
afforded by the EIAA would perhaps benefit from some regulatory oversight. When discussing 
the Drilling and Productions Regulations, we had earlier discussed Oshionebo’s suggestion of 
review of a legislative body in order to curtail the vast discretionary powers of the Director of the 
DPR under those regulations. Clearly, independent oversight in relation to the discretionary 
powers of the president of Nigeria and the president of the Council would potentially allay some 
of the concerns regarding the effectiveness of the EIAA. 
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3.3.1.5 Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 1984 (AGRA) 
In principle, gas flaring has been prohibited in Nigeria since 1984 with limited exceptions. The 
Associated Gas Re-Injection Act105 and the regulations enacted pursuant to the Act, prohibit the 
flaring of natural gas unless the Minister of Petroleum resources is satisfied that it is not feasible 
or appropriate to re-inject or utilize produced gas.106 Upon satisfaction of the above requirement, 
the Minister may then issue a certificate to the oil company granting it permission to flare gas 
“specifying such terms and conditions as he may at his discretion choose to impose, for the 
continued flaring of gas in the particular field or fields;”107 or “permitting the company to continue 
to flare gas in the particular field or fields if the company pays such sum as the Minister may from 
time to time prescribe for every  28.317 Standard cubic metre (SCM) of gas flared.”108 
The Associated Gas Re-injection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations of 1984 requires 
however that the issuance of the certificate by the Minister for continued gas flaring shall be subject 
to one or more of the following conditions: 
(a) Where more than seventy-five percent of the produced gas is effectively utilized or 
conserved; 
(b) Where the produced gas contains more than fifteen percent impurities, such as N2, H2S, 
CO2, etc. which render the gas unsuitable for industrial purposes; 
(c) Where the on-going utilization programme is interrupted by equipment failure: 
provided that such failures are not considered too frequent by the Minister and that the 
period of any one interruption is not more than three months; 
(d) Where the ratio of the volume of gas produced per day to the distance of the field from 
the nearest gas line or possible utilization point is less than 50,000 SCF/KM: Provided 
that the gas to oil ratio of the field is less than 3,500 SCF/bbl, and that it is not 
technically advisable to re-inject gas in that field; 
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(e) Where the Minister, in appropriate cases as he may deem fit, orders the production of 
oil from a field that does not satisfy any of the conditions specified in these 
Regulations.109  
It is also significant to note that Regulation 2 of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Regulations, 
provide that: “the Minister may from time to time, review, amend, alter, add to or delete any 
provision of these Regulations as he may deem fit.”110 This provision grants the Minister purely 
discretionary power to “review, amend, add to or delete any of the regulations” as he deems fit. 
The implication of this provision is that the Minister can decide to “delete” the provisions of the 
regulation that provide conditions for issuance of the ministerial certificate that permit continued 
flaring. It would seem that Regulation 2 undermines the effectiveness of the regulations by 
granting purely discretionary powers to the Minister to override the provisions.    
Evidently, the AGRA and its supporting regulations are intended to promote re-injection and 
utilization of natural gas in Nigeria and prevent gas flaring. The Ministerial certificates are usually 
issued for a period of six months after which the DPR reviews the performance of the oil fields in 
order to determine whether they qualify for continued flaring or ought to be penalized for violation 
of the Act.111 Regardless of these regulations however, gas flaring in Nigeria seems to be unabated 
for over two decades since regulation was put in place. Statistics show that in the first half of 2005, 
116 oilfields were penalized for gas flaring while 75 others were given permission to flare.112 
Statistics from previous years showed what is described as a “blatant disregard for the Act by oil 
TNCs in Nigeria”.113     
A number of concerns arise from the and its seeming disregard of the AGRA by oil TNCs. The 
concerns relate to the criteria for the grant of permits, compliance with the AGRA and 
consequences for non-compliance. Oshionebo argues that the criteria for the grant of the permit 
are skewed in favour of oil TNCs,114 showing that the criteria for issuing the certificate are easy to 
meet. Another concern relates to the penalty for gas flaring without the Minister’s permission 
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which is fixed at 10 Naira (about US$0.05) per 1000scf of gas flared.115 Some scholars have argued 
that the amount is so meagre that it is more economically prudent to pay the fines than to re-inject 
or utilize the gas.116 Concerns raised by rights groups regarding the Ministerial certificates 
permitting flaring are that TNCs have often failed to disclose whether ministerial certificates have 
been issued to them which would legalize their continued flaring. Rights groups argue that such 
failure to disclose the existence (or lack) of these ministerial certificates makes it impossible to 
verify the legality of the issuance of those certificates.117 
The problems relating to continued gas flaring in Nigeria are quite significant. While there is a 
need to review the AGRA in order to make the penalty for flaring without a permit more stringent, 
there is an equally important need to review the procedure for grant of permits for continued 
flaring. The attitude to be adopted regarding gas flaring ought to be a zero-tolerance attitude. As 
seen in the previous subsections, continued flaring has grave consequences on the health, human 
rights, the environment and the economy of Nigeria, it is unwise to continue to allow state 
institutions or officials to grant oil companies permission to destroy the environment and a 
potential source of wealth for the country. As regards gas flaring therefore, a review of existing 
regulation is required in order to make consequences of non-compliance more stringent.  
Odumosu writes that gas flaring persists because of challenges to utilizing associated gas in 
Nigeria, such as inaccessibility of the markets, lack of infrastructure for utilization and the oil 
industry’s unwillingness to invest in gas utilization.118 Evidently however, the harm that results 
from natural gas flaring present cogent need for finding alternatives to gas flaring.  
As discussed in previous chapters, the Federal High Court of Benin has declared the provisions of 
the AGRA allowing continued flaring, unconstitutional.119 However, the decision has been 
appealed and the AGRA remains in force in Nigeria.120 In a similar vein, the Petroleum Industry 
Bill of Nigeria was promoted as the Bill that would revolutionize the petroleum industry in Nigeria 
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and eliminate gas flaring and other problems in the Nigerian oil industry.121 The Bill has since 
suffered significant setbacks since it was introduced to the National Assembly in September 2008 
and re-introduced in 2012.122 It has been plagued by allegations of tampering by governments 
officials in a bid to remove contributions of trade unions and NGO’s to the Bill.123 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the Bill as is currently worded speaks of enforcing environmental and air quality 
standards only “to the extent practicable”.124 Evidently, the reform the Bill sought to initiate in 
relation to gas flaring has been negated by the language of the Bill.   
As the regulatory framework in Nigeria currently exists, independent oversight over the power of 
the Minister to grant permits for continued flaring of natural gas will greatly reduce incidences of 
blatant disregard of existing regulation.    
3.3.1.6 The Environmental Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) 
The Environmental Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria125 was issued by the DPR in 
an attempt to control pollution as a result of oil extraction and address the environmental concerns 
relating to petroleum operations. Originally issued in 1981 and reviewed in 2002, the EGASPIN 
sets out detailed guidelines and standards for the exploration, production, storage, refining, 
transportation, and marketing of petroleum products in Nigeria.126 Specifically, it establishes 
industry-wide standards for pollution prevention, abatement and remediation; management, 
treatment, and control of oil related wastes; compliance monitoring; and sustainable 
decommissioning of oil and gas facilities.127 The EGASPIN also restates the various obligations 
placed on oil corporations by law, including prohibition of discharges of oil related wastes such as 
drilling muds, produced water and produced sand and sludge into inland, coastal, or offshore 
waters, swamp, and pits.128  
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Although the primary responsibility for enforcing the EGASPIN lies with the DPR, the EGASPIN 
also encourages self-enforcement within the industry.129 It requires that oil companies perform 
certain acts at every stage of their operations. The overarching aim of EGASPIN is to ensure that 
“unforeseen, identified and unidentified environmental issues are contained and brought to an 
acceptable minimum.”130 It requires that oil companies undertake audits to assess their compliance 
with environmental management systems and other regulatory requirements. These audits must be 
conducted by professionally competent auditors, independent of the activities being audited and 
registered with the DPR. In addition to the self-audits, oil companies are also required to undertake 
self-monitoring of discharge of oil related wastes, monitoring of gaseous point source emissions 
and monitoring of radioactive substances. Records and results of such monitoring activities are to 
be submitted to the Director of Petroleum Resources at prescribed intervals. 
Markedly, the EGASPIN lays out a very elaborate scheme for prevention and control of 
environmental pollution in the oil industry. However, the requirement for industry self-monitoring 
and compliance with the standards potentially sabotages the process as it is susceptible to 
manipulation as TNCs may fail to report incidences of violations. More specifically, Steiner argues 
that the requirement of for an oil spill contingency plan131 contained in EGASPIN is not being 
complied with by Shell as several requests to obtain a copy of such plans were ignored by the TNC 
and “their actual performance in responding to some large spills leaves no doubt that they are not 
in compliance with these EGASPIN requirements.”132 Oshionebo identifies however that perhaps 
the reason for the requirement of industry self-monitoring and compliance by the EGASPIN is due 
to the technical nature of enforcing such standards, experience which is lacking at the DPR.133 
Following that line of argument, he writes that “indeed, it is unlikely that TNCs will take these 
duties [duties of self-regulation under EGASPIN] seriously because the of the lack of credible 
threat of enforcement by regulatory agencies…”.134    
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3.3.1.7. National Environmental Standards Regulatory and Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act 2007 
(NESREA) 
The NESREA135 is regarded as Nigeria’s principal legislation on environmental protection.136 It 
establishes an agency entrusted with the regulation and enforcement of environmental standards, 
regulations, laws, policies and guidelines.137 The provisions of the Act however are not aimed at 
regulation of activities in the oil industry but at general environmental protection in Nigeria. The 
Act prohibits the discharge of “harmful quantities” of any hazardous substances into the air or 
upon the land and waters of Nigeria or at adjoining shorelines, except when permitted under any 
law.138 Oil related wastes qualify as hazardous substances under the Act as they are defined in 
broad terms as “any chemical, physical or biological and radioactive material that poses a threat 
to human health and the environment.”139  
One of the greatest criticisms of the Act is that it is accused of undermining itself. Specifically, the 
Act prohibits wastes only in “harmful quantities”. It is argued that such proviso presents difficulties 
in implementation as institutions will have to determine what constitutes “harmful quantities”.140 
Deficiencies relating to institutional capacity, expertise and equipment at the NESREA, further 
undermine the effectiveness of this Act and the concern is that public health may be compromised 
as a result of these deficiencies.141 Also the prohibition of discharge of hazardous materials is not 
absolute but subject to “any law in force in Nigeria” that permits such discharge. 142 This 
undermines the sincerity of the state’s commitment to curb discharge of hazardous waste into the 
environment. The Act however empowers the Agency to impose fines on violators of the Act and 
the Minister of environment may impose certain obligations on violators of the NESREA Act.143 
It is important to note however that the Act excludes the Agency from investigating environmental 
audits relating to the oil and gas sector.144 The exclusion is perhaps designed to avoid duplication 
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of roles with the National Oil Spill Detection Agency which has the responsibility of detection and 
response to oil spillages in Nigeria.145  
In spite of the express exclusion of the NESREA from undertaking environmental audit as regards 
oil and gas related concerns, oil pollutants meet the definitions of hazardous waste as contained in 
the Act. Secondly, the Agency is responsible for setting standards for the protection and 
enhancement of Nigeria’s air, the provisions of the Act are however “subject to any law in 
Nigeria”.146 It is the argument of this chapter that the proviso subjecting the provisions of the 
NESREA Act to any law in Nigeria, was created to further excuse continued flaring of natural gas 
which compromises air quality. These circumstances further demonstrate the unwillingness of the 
Nigerian government to adopt a zero-tolerance approach to environmental pollution.   
3.3.1.8. National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (Establishment) Act 2006 (NOSDRA Act) 
The NOSDRA Act147 establishes an agency for detecting and responding to oil spills in Nigeria.148 
Section 5 of the Act sets out the objectives of the Agency to include coordinating and implementing 
the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan, ensuring a safe, timely, effective and appropriate response 
to major or disastrous oil pollution,149 identifying high-risk areas as well as priority areas for 
protection and clean up,150 establishing the mechanism to monitor and assist or where expedient 
direct the response, including the capability to mobilize the necessary resources to save lives, 
protecting threatened environment, and clean up to the best practical extent of the impacted site,151 
ensuring funding and appropriate and sufficient pre-positioned pollution combating equipment and 
materials, as well as functional communication network system required for effective response to 
major oil pollution152.  
The functions of Agency include surveillance and ensuring compliance with existing 
environmental legislation. Section 6(2) of the Act prescribes a penalty for failure to report oil spill 
in writing, no later than 24 hours after the spill occurred. Section 18 of the Act establishes a 
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National Control and Response Center responsible for receiving and processing reports of all spills 
within Nigeria and serves as the command and control center for monitoring all existing legislation 
on environmental control, surveillance for oil spill detection and monitoring and coordinating 
responses.153    
The responsibilities of the NOSDRA, while clearly designed to detect and responds to spills in 
Nigeria, seems to be a duplication of effort the EGASPIN and the role of the DPR in upholding 
regulatory standards. The function of the Agency as regards surveillance and ensuring compliance 
with regulatory standards is already being carried out by the DPR. The other functions outlined in 
the Act refer to receiving reports of oil spillages and coordinating oil spill response activities 
throughout Nigeria;154 coordinating the implementation of the Plan (oil spill contingency plan) as 
may be formulated, from time to time, by the Federal Government;155 and coordinating the 
implementation of the Plan for the removal of hazardous substances as may be issued by the 
Federal Government.156 While these functions are laudable, their existence duplicates the efforts 
of the EGASPIN in achieving industry wide regulation and therefore presents TNCs with two sets 
of regulation with no clear precedence of one over the other. While the EGASPIN is enforced 
through the DPR, NOSDRA also seeks to enforce the same standards through its own agency. This 
situation creates a lack of coherence in the regulation of the industry and also creates an 
opportunity for TNCs to play government agencies against each other and avoid meeting 
standards.  
3.4 Barriers to Efficient Regulation: The Case for Regulatory Oversight 
Discussions in the previous subsection outlined a number of legislation and regulations aimed at 
curbing oil pollution in Nigeria. We identified some criticisms of the regulations and legislation 
as presently constituted and briefly highlighted the institutions responsible for enforcement of such 
regulation. This subsection summarizes some of the challenges of regulatory effectiveness in 
Nigeria identifying the specific challenges of regulatory institutions, and other external factors 
such as the government’s involvement in the oil industry that further hinder regulatory 
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effectiveness in Nigeria. Ultimately, the subsection argues the merits of employing an oversight 
mechanism for regulatory institutions which would serve to further regulatory effectiveness. 
A recurring concern that pervades the literature on regulation and legislation in the oil industry is 
the vast discretionary powers given to specific office holders which tend to undermine the 
effectiveness of regulation. This was seen in specific relation to the Drilling and Production 
Regulations, the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, the Petroleum Act and the Associated 
Gas Re-Injection Regulation. The lack of provision for audits of these vast discretionary powers 
further undermines the effectiveness of regulation. The adoption of a mechanism that can review 
and audit decisions of office holders in specific reference to oil and gas regulation would have 
great implications for increased effectiveness. 
From the previous subsection, it can be gleaned that there are a number of institutions responsible 
for enforcing regulatory standards in Nigeria. We have seen the functions of the Minister of 
Petroleum Resources who acts through the DPR, the FME, NESREA and the NOSDRA and their 
role under the various enabling legislation. The DPR exercises the powers of regulation granted to 
the Minister of Petroleum under section 9 of the Petroleum Act.157 The research indicates that a 
number of concerns further stifle the effectiveness of these institutions in carrying out their 
mandates.  
Firstly, there are concerns relating to lack of capacity, resources and expertise within regulatory 
agencies in Nigeria. A report states that “most states and local government institutions involved in 
environmental resource management lack funding, trained staff, technical expertise, adequate 
information, analytical capability and other pre-requisites for implementing comprehensive 
policies and programs.”158 The World Bank also reports that regulatory agencies in Nigeria are 
constrained by limited funding, lack of monitoring equipment, lack of expertise and inadequacy 
of properly trained staff.159 In the face of these significant deficiencies, it is perhaps not surprising 
that regulatory effectiveness is such a challenge in the oil industry. Other challenges to regulatory 
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effectiveness relate to allegations of corruption. Officials of regulatory institutions have been 
accused of being compromised in effectively carrying out their duties. For example, the director 
of Nigeria’s DPR was reportedly dismissed on allegations of corruption, following allegations that 
the director allocated an oil prospecting license to an undeserving company.160 
Another concern regarding regulatory effectiveness is the multiplicity and lack of cooperation 
among regulatory institutions. As seen above, the DPR and the NOSDRA have similar mandates 
when it comes to enforcing regulatory standards, and the NESREA is frustrated by its inability to 
enforce environmental standards in the area of oil and gas or if any other law in Nigeria permits 
the activity it seeks to regulate. The existence of a number of these agencies with similar mandates 
is quite significant because it dissipates already scarce funds amongst a number of regulatory 
agencies as opposed to simply strengthening just one or two institutions to carry out regulation. 
Another challenge is that it has a tendency to create conflict or inaction on the part of these agencies 
and sends confusing signals to the oil companies which these agencies seek to regulate.         
Given these significant challenges to effective regulation in Nigeria, there is clearly a need for an 
intervention that would boost regulatory effectiveness. This thesis proposes the adoption of an 
independent regulatory oversight framework that provides a system for coordination within 
existing regulatory institutions and also provides much needed resources to boost capacity for 
regulatory effectiveness. The proposed framework will be discussed in greater detail in the fourth 
chapter of the thesis. The proposed framework is designed in part to be able to review decisions 
of office holders who are given vast discretionary powers under legislation. It is also designed to 
provide technical support as well as build capacity within staff of regulatory institutions in Nigeria. 
The existence of the proposed regulatory oversight potentially curbs problems of corruption as 
oversight subjects all decisions of regulatory institutions to review.    
3.4.1 Other Barriers to Effective Regulation in Nigeria 
The thesis suggests that the most significant challenge to regulatory effectiveness in Nigeria is the 
country’s heavy reliance on the proceeds of the oil industry to sustain its economy, and its 
involvement in oil extraction.161 The government operates joint venture agreements (JVAs) with 
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TNCs through the state-owned oil company, the NNPC. The two issues identified, though separate 
are related because they are tied to Nigeria’s political will to enforce regulations against TNCs and 
the NNPC. An imposition of fines or other sanctions in pursuance of regulation affects not only 
TNCs but also the government’s bottom line as government earnings from the oil sector are 
affected.162  
The significance of the government’s reliance on the oil industry can be explained through the 
theory of the resource curse. Studies of the resource curse suggest that positive wealth shock from 
natural resource sectors drives up exchange rates and higher wages in that sector than in other 
sectors which in turn reduces profits in manufacturing and other non-primary export sectors.163 
The subsequent decline of manufacturing and other sectors in turn slows down economic growth, 
leading to what is termed “the Dutch Disease”.164 The term is derived from the Dutch experience 
following the discovery of large fields of natural gas in the Netherlands in the late 1950s. When 
the country witnessed a huge inflow of revenues due to the rapid development when it became a 
gas exporter, the initial result was an increase in overall welfare, but soon the manufacturing sector 
declined as a result of a large inflow of foreign currency that made manufacturing exports less 
competitive on international markets and increased production costs internally.165 
The phenomenon of the resource curse suggests that large and newfound resource endowments 
can both directly and indirectly result in poor forms of governance that incite violent conflict, 
political instability and graft and weak institutions.166 Other studies of the resource curse suggest 
that large windfalls from natural resources contribute to rising income gaps between the rich and 
the poor, institutionalize corruption and enable oppressive regimes to maintain political power.167 
                                                          
162 Unless the NNPC is able to establish that the fines were imposed due to an act of negligence on the part of the 
operator (the TNC). 
163 Fuelling the World - Failing the Region? Oil Governance and Development in Africa’s Gulf of Guinea (Abuja, 
Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011) cited in Bazilian etal supra note 64 at 36. 
164 Bazilian etal, supra note 64 at 37. 
165 Ibid.   
166 Ibid.  
167 Terry Lyn Karl, “State Building and Petro Revenues”, in Marc Garcelon, Edward W Walker, Alexander Patten-
Wood and Alexsandra Radovich (eds), The Geopolitics of Oil, Gas, and Ecology in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea 
Basin (Berkeley: Berkeley Institute of Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies, 1998), 3-14.  
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In the case of Nigeria, the country is described in many texts as one beset by the resource curse.168 
Other studies into the resource curse show that resource abundance has been linked to rent seeking 
behaviour and political corruption which weakens political institutions.169 While there is not much 
empirical certainty surrounding the process of the resource curse, the existing findings are 
suggestive that resource abundance has contributed to crippling state institutions in Nigeria and 
perpetuated corruption and rent seeking behaviour that weaken regulatory effectiveness. Oil is the 
country’s only major export and accounts for a significant amount of the country’s GDP.170 Oil 
exports have dwarfed all other sectors of the economy.171  The significance of the resource curse 
to this discourse reveals the precarious nature of the Nigerian state; it reveals the significance of 
oil to its economy and exposes some of the motives behind its relations with the oil industry and 
local communities. The oil industry can be described as the country’s “cash cow” and the 
government is perhaps unwilling to enforce any sanctions that may be detrimental to its primary 
source of income.   
This subsection has shown that Nigeria suffers two challenges: the resource curse and regulatory 
ineffectiveness. It has been suggested that diversifying the economy could potentially reverse the 
effects of the resource curse in Nigeria. However, there is no proof that diversifying the economy 
will address concerns relating to regulatory ineffectiveness in the oil industry. The literature on the 
resource curse emphasizes the significance of strong political institutions in order to effectively 
undertake economic reforms in a resource-rich country.172 In agreement with the literature, this 
thesis suggests strengthening state institutions in order to undertake economic, legislative and 
institutional reforms in the Nigerian oil industry. The thesis therefore suggests the adoption of a 
framework that will strengthen regulatory institutions in Nigeria and ultimately drive reforms. 
                                                          
168 Annegret Mahler “Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil Violence Link in the Niger 
Delta” (2010) 120 GIGA Working Papers at 5. [Mahler] See also Richard Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral 
Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (London: Routledge 1993), Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and 
Grievance in Civil War (Washington DC: World Bank 2001), Phillipe Le Billon, “The Political Ecology of War: Natural 
Resources and Armed Conflict” (2010) 20 Political Geography 561-584, Jeffery D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, 
“The Curse of Natural Resources” (2001) 45 European Economic Review, Elsevier 827-838.  
169 James A. Robinson, Ragner Torvik and Theirry Verdier, “Political Foundations of the Resource Curse” (2006) 79 
Journal of Developmental Economics 447 at 448 [Robinson etal]. 
170 The oil and gas sector accounts for about 35% of gross domestic product, and petroleum exports revenue 
represents over 90% of total exports revenue. See OPEC, supra note 161. 
171 Ibid.   
172 See Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik, “Institutions and the Resource Curse” (2006) 116 The 
Economic Journal at 1 [Mehlum etal]. 
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Recently Michael Ross opined that “perhaps the problem is not that oil states have exceptionally 
weak institutions and need normal ones; perhaps they already have normal institutions but need 
exceptionally strong ones.”173 Evidently, the government’s involvement in oil extraction, the 
inherent challenges within the regulatory framework, and the resource curse hinder the 
development of strong regulatory institutions and effective regulation of oil pollution in Nigeria. 
Regulatory oversight over the regulatory institutions in Nigeria, has the potential to strengthen 
these institutions, drive better regulatory effectiveness and garner political will towards enforcing 
regulation and perhaps diversifying the economy. 
3.5 Conclusion  
 The pith of the arguments being made in the chapter can be summarized thus: that terrible oil 
pollution persists in the Niger Delta and there is a need for better enforcement of existing 
regulations to curb it. To quote Oshionebo on this point, “…the crisis of environmental protection 
in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry lies not so much with the defects in Nigerian laws as with their 
non-enforcement.”174 The case for better regulation of the oil industry has implications for human 
rights and health of local communities as well as the environment, climate change and the Nigerian 
economy.  
Discontinuing natural gas flaring for example, has the potential to increase energy generation in 
Nigeria which would in turn give rise to other sectors of the Nigerian economy. It is important to 
note that following the initial mismanagement of Dutch resources in the 1950s and the subsequent 
decline of the Dutch economy, the Dutch government started to build gas reserves and other 
physical infrastructure which led to higher economic growth.175 This phenomenon was regarded 
as the “Dutch cure”.176 The argument therefore is that discontinuing deliberate oil pollution in the 
form of natural gas flaring has the potential to not only “cure” some of the challenges in Nigeria’s 
oil industry, but also benefits local communities, climate change and the environment. Oil spills 
and disposal of wastes can be regulated using the numerous regulations for environmental 
protection currently in force in Nigeria, provided there is the will to enforce them.   
                                                          
173 Michael L. Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Shapes the Development of Nations, (U.S.A.: Princeton University 
Press 2012) at 215. 
174 Oshionebo, supra note 82 at 60. 
175 Bazilian etal, supra note 64 at 43. 
176 Ibid  
91 
 
In addition, given the government’s involvement in the oil industry and its heavy reliance on 
revenue from the oil industry, it has a conflict of interest and may not be able to fully enforce 
regulations against TNCs or undertake sincere reforms of the regulatory framework of Nigeria. 
This thesis therefore recommends the employment of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) to provide oversight over regulatory institutions in order to drive regulatory 
effectiveness. The adoption of regulatory oversight from an independent regional body such as the 
ECOWAS promises much needed review into vast discretionary powers given to office holders 
under a number of regulations (as seen earlier in the chapter) and has the potential to address 
challenges relating to institutional capacity and effectiveness of regulatory institutions in Nigeria. 
A detailed analysis of the ECOWAS and its potential for oversight is undertaken in the next chapter 
and proposes a framework for regulatory oversight of the mechanisms for regulating Nigeria’s oil 
industry. Oversight has the potential to remedy challenges relating to regulatory effectiveness and 
ultimately protect local communities and the environment.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: PROPOSED OVERSIGHT OF THE NIGERIAN OIL INDUSTRY 
BY THE ECOWAS 
 
4.1. Introduction  
Thus far, this thesis has demonstrated the failure Nigeria’s regulatory framework to effectively 
regulate the oil industry and protect the rights of local communities affected by oil pollution and 
other oil mining related activities and has argued the need for regulatory oversight in order to foster 
effective regulation. Central to this thesis is the potential role of the ECOWAS in providing such 
regulatory oversight.  
The hypothesis of this chapter is that regulatory oversight will provide much needed supervision 
to regulatory institutions in Nigeria in order to drive effectiveness. The chapter presents a 
framework for oversight under the ECOWAS. The proposed framework is designed to address 
certain concerns regarding lack of capacity or resources within regulatory institutions in Nigeria 
thereby driving effectiveness. The chapter suggests that the ECOWAS and the ECOWAS Court 
can play a significant role in regulatory oversight (in addition to its role in protecting human rights 
identified in the second chapter of this thesis) and delineates certain responsibilities for it.   
Ultimately, the chapter examines the ECOWAS, its growth, development and its potential for 
regulatory oversight over Nigeria. Following discussion establishing that the ECOWAS has the 
potential to provide regulatory oversight over the framework for regulation of the Nigerian oil 
industry, it proposes a framework for the said regulatory oversight. 
The chapter is divided into six sections. The first is the just concluded introductory paragraphs, 
reiterating the need for regulatory oversight over the Nigerian oil industry and highlighting the 
implications of the use of the ECOWAS to provide such oversight. The second section undertakes 
a brief but sufficient history, background, structure and evolution of the ECOWAS. This analysis 
highlights the growth and evolution of the organization, inspiring confidence in the potential of 
the ECOWAS to develop and undertake oversight functions. The third section introduces the 
concept of supranationality as a significant factor in the proposal of ECOWAS for regulatory 
oversight. The section interrogates the supranationality of the ECOWAS, the concept of 
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supranationality and specific challenges to the ECOWAS as a supranational organization. This 
analysis underscores the legitimacy of the ECOWAS to perform oversight over a sovereign state 
such as Nigeria. The next section identifies a specific role for the ECOWAS in the proposed 
regulatory oversight, outlines a framework under which the ECOWAS can perform oversight and 
identifies the prospects and proposed challenges that face the adoption of such a framework. 
Reviewing the potential contributions of the framework through the optics of the norm “life cycle” 
theory, the chapter argues suggesting that the adoption of the framework ultimately aids 
transposition of new norms relating to regulatory effectiveness in the oil industry in Nigeria. The 
chapter concludes on an optimistic note, identifying certain issues seen while conducting research 
into this thesis that require further research, while maintaining optimism that the ECOWAS is well 
suited to implement the framework being proposed and provide regulatory oversight to Nigeria.  
4.2. The ECOWAS 
4.2.1. Background to the Development of the ECOWAS  
The region of West Africa extends from Mauritania in the northwest to Niger in the northeast, 
Nigeria in the southeast and the Gulf of Guinea in the south and the southwest.1 These 6.1 million 
square kilometers originally included 16 countries including the landlocked Mali, Niger, Burkina 
Faso, the island of Cape Verde and 12 other coastline states.  
It is necessary to acknowledge the colonial history of West Africa in a discussion regarding the 
ECOWAS and resource extraction as it provides some context into part of the motivation for 
economic integration amongst West African states and ultimately the creation of the ECOWAS. 
West Africa was one of the first regions south of the Sahara to have contacts with Western Europe.2 
Slave trade had initially characterized relations between the West and Africa and subsequently 
colonialism defined the relations. Scholars have argued that early contacts, which were initially 
slave trade motivated, frequently interrupted the orderly development of the people’s socio-
economic life.3 They argue that early economic activities and development of West African people 
were interrupted and even arrested by European influence seeking the trade of slaves.4 Slave trade 
                                                          
1 Julius Emeka Okolo “Integrative and Cooperative Regionalism: The Economic Community of West African States” 
(1985) 39 Int’l Org. 121 at 123 [Okolo]. 
2 Uka Ezenwe, ECOWAS and the Economic Integration of West Africa, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1983) at 1 
[Ezenwe]. 
3 Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa, (USA: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969) at 34 and 35 [Dumont]. 
4  Ibid, Ezenwe supra note 2.  
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encouraged internal wars which were profitable to feed the trade, further diminishing the economic 
development of the African people and denigrating the fabric of society.5  
The advent of colonization replaced the trade of slaves with the exploitation of raw materials in 
West African forests.6 A significant event in the history of West Africa was the Berlin Conference, 
said to be responsible for the “initial carve up of Africa”.7 Portugal called for the Conference and 
it was organized by Otto von Bismarck, first Chancellor of Germany. The outcome of the 
Conference was the General Act of the Berlin Conference (seen as the formalization of the 
Scramble for Africa) which saw European powers agreeing on the principles to guide the partition 
of Africa.8 There was subsequently a Convention between Britain and France for the delimitation 
of their respective possessions to the West of the Niger and their respective possessions and 
spheres of influence to the East of the River Niger. It involved Britain and France staking claims 
to particular territories in West Africa and agreements by the other country to waive any claims to 
such identified territories.9 Britain and France exerted their influence on the region through 
political policies aimed at administering their territories.10 The agreement between European 
powers granted the colonial powers unhindered access to raw materials in West Africa.11 It is 
interesting to note that in some instances, formal administrative responsibilities were not directly 
assumed. For example, Britain in 1885, constituted the territories between Lagos and the 
Cameroons, together with the banks of the Niger up to Lokoja and of the Benue up to Ibi, into the 
Niger Coast Protectorate and conveniently relinquished the administration of that region of Nigeria 
to the National African Company “as the cheapest and most effective way” of discharging the 
obligations to maintain free navigation which had been accepted at the Berlin Conference.12 
Company rule even then had many faults and weaknesses, but the British were still content to leave 
their major West African interest beneath “this light administrative umbrella”.13 This perhaps 
                                                          
5 Dumont, supra note 3 at 35. 
6 Ezenwe, supra note 3 at 2. 
7 Kwame Nkurmah, Challenge of the Congo (New York: International Publishers 1967) p. x [Nkurmah] cited in 
Adekunle Ajala, “The Nature of African Boundaries”(1983) 2 Africa Spectrum, 177 at 178 [Ajala]. 
8 Ajala, supra note 7 at 178. 
9 Ibid at 179. 
10 Ezenwe, supra note 3 at 3-4. 
11 Ibid.  
12 John D. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa, (London: Macmillan, 1963) at 338. 
13 Ibid at 339. 
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provides some insight into the history of plunder and exploitation that characterized the 
relationship between the region and TNCs.  
The colonial history of West Africa is relevant to this thesis as it aids understanding of the 
background to the creation of the ECOWAS and the need for economic integration. Years of 
exploitation of both human and natural resources as a result of colonization created a significant 
degree of underdevelopment and arrested development within the region. Slave trade had 
encouraged wars which further divided already weak communities and exploitation of raw 
materials did not encourage the economic growth of the region.14 Upon gaining independence, 
there was a need for states which were already disadvantaged to band together to lift themselves 
out of the already precarious situation.  
Economic integration within West African states post colonization would be valuable to the 
economically disadvantaged region as it was designed to open up borders, encourage free 
movement of goods and services and bolster economic activities between states. There was also a 
need to have a West African institutional instrument for bargaining with the industrialized world 
and a need to pry control of the West African economy and political terrain from the continued 
influence of colonial powers.15 However, states were reluctant to embrace such ideas perhaps 
afraid to cede any part of their newly acquired sovereignty in the name of regionalism.16 Other 
concerns involved the influence of France over its former territories, rivalry and suspicion between 
Francophone and Anglophone West African states, the rivalry between Nigeria and Ghana and 
fear of “Nigerian domination”17 especially within Francophone countries.18   
4.2.2. Origin and Development of the ECOWAS   
The inspiration for the ECOWAS was drawn from the groupings of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) in the mid-1960s, which had divided Africa into regions for the 
purposes of economic development.19 Fourteen West African countries were included in the 
projected West African grouping with the exclusion of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde because 
                                                          
14 See Dumont, supra note 3 at 36. 
15 Olatunde J.B. Ojo, “Nigeria and the Formation of the ECOWAS” (1980) 34 International Organization, 571 at 600 
[Ojo]. 
16 Ezenwe, supra note 2 at 6. 
17 Ojo, supra note 15 at 580. 
18 See Ojo, supra note 15.     
19 Okolo, supra note 1 at 124. 
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they were still under colonial rule.20 The ECA held specialized meetings which led to the signing 
of an Article of Association of the proposed Economic Community of West Africa and the 
formation of an interim Council of Ministers. A subsequent summit led to the establishment of the 
West African Regional Grouping but this initiative recorded disappointing results as only nine out 
of the fourteen countries attended the meeting and signed the treaty and a subsequent conference 
to sign the West African Common Market Treaty never came to fruition.21 Professor Adedeji, the 
Nigerian Commissioner for Economic Development, referred to as the Father of ECOWAS,22 
claimed that the “initiatives were frustrated by the agents of imperialism and colonialism who 
concentrate on what divides us rather than what unites us”.23 It was highly speculated that France 
and Francophone countries which were largely loyal to France were the targets of his comments.24 
The formal launching of ECOWAS came at the end of an April 1972 visit to Togo by General 
Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria’s head of state. Gowon and President Eyadema of Togo issued a 
communique announcing their decision to create an economic grouping, “an embryonic West 
African Economic Community,” between their two countries.25 A commission of experts was set 
up and areas such as transport and communications, trade, industry, money payments and the 
abolition of transit tax were considered by the experts.26 Within about a year and a half of its first 
meeting, the Commission produced a draft treaty which was signed by the original fifteen 
ECOWAS member states at Lagos on 28 May 1975.27 
4.2.3. The 1975 ECOWAS Treaty 
 The main aims of the ECOWAS were to promote cooperation and development in industry, 
telecommunications, energy, agriculture, commerce, monetary and financial issues and the social 
and cultural matters.28 Cooperation was designed to raise the living standards of people in the 
Community, maintain economic stability, foster closer relations among Community members and 
                                                          
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Alhaji Sarjoh Bah, “ECOWAS and the Legitimacy Question: A Normative and Institutional Approach”, ed by 
Dominik Zaum, Legitimating International Organizations (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press 2013) at 90 
23 Ojo, supra note 15 at 576.  
24 Ibid.  
25 See Okolo, supra note 1 at 128 and Ojo, supra note 15 at 591.  
26 Okolo, supra note 1 at 128. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Kofi Oteng Kufuour, Institutional Transformation in The Economic Community of West African States (Great 
Britain: Ashgate 2006) at 23 [Kufuor, Institutional Transformation]. 
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contribute to the progress and development of Africa.29 Member states were to enhance access to 
markets for goods and services in the Community, to be achieved through the progressive 
elimination of customs tariffs and other such barriers. The ECOWAS treaty of 1975 aimed to 
create a customs union, enhance free movement of persons and capital within the Community, and 
establish harmonization programs as well as common community programs.30  
Article 4 of the ECOWAS Treaty of 197531 entrusted governance to a set of Community 
institutions. It established the Authority of Heads of State and Government (AHSG), the Council 
of Ministers, the Executive Secretariat, the Tribunal of the Community, and the Technical and 
Specialized Commissions (TSC).32 The Authority of the Heads of State and Government was the 
supreme policy-making body composed of the heads of the member states.33 It was to meet at least 
once a year and had the responsibility for the Community’s executive functions.34 Next in the 
hierarchy was the Council of Ministers which met twice a year and was composed of two ministers 
from each member state.35 It was responsible for monitoring the functioning of the community, 
making recommendations to the AHSG,36 giving direction to the community’s subordinate 
institutions37 and exercising such other powers conferred on it and performing such other duties 
assigned to it by the Treaty.38  
The Treaty established the Executive Secretariat, headed by an Executive Secretary,39 responsible 
for servicing and assisting the institutions in the Community, keeping the Community under 
continuous examination, and submitting a report of the activities to all sessions of the Council of 
Ministers and all the meetings of the AHSG. It was also to undertake work and studies to perform 
such services relating to the community as assigned to it by the Council of Ministers.40 The Treaty 
also established TSCs made up of representatives from each member state. They were to submit 
                                                          
29 Kufuor, Institutional Transformation Ibid, Article 2, 1975 Treaty of ECOWAS reprinted in XIV International Legal 
Materials (1975) pp. 1200-09 [The 1975 Treaty] 
30 Kufuor, Institutional Transformation, supra note 28 at 23; the 1975 Treaty  
31 1975 Treaty of ECOWAS supra note 28. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Okolo, supra note 1 at 137, Article 4 (1)(a) of the 1975 Treaty. 
34 Kufuor, Institutional Transformation supra note 28 at 23, Article 5 (4) and (2) of the 1975 Treaty.  
35 Ibid, Article 4 (1)(b) of the 1975 Treaty. 
36 Ibid, Article 6 (2)(b) of the 1975 Treaty. 
37 Ibid, Article 6 (2)(c) of the 1975 Treaty. 
38 Ibid, Article 6 (2)(d) of the 1975 Treaty. 
39 Ibid at 24, Article 8 (1)-(2) of the 1975 Treaty. 
40 Ibid, Article 8 (10)(a-d) of the 1975 Treaty.  
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periodic reports and recommendations through the Executive Secretary to the Council of Ministers. 
They could also perform any function assigned to them pursuant to the Treaty.41 Judicial power 
was granted to the tribunal of the Community to interpret provisions of the Treaty and settle 
disputes in accordance with Article 56 of the Treaty.42 The willingness of the ECOWAS states 
even then to limit their sovereignty to some degree by establishing a body that would 
authoritatively interpret the Treaty and ensure the “observance of law and justice”,43 is particularly 
significant to note. The specific provisions of the tribunal were later set out in the Protocol of the 
Community Court of Justice.44  
Other provisions of the 1975 Treaty were elaborated through a number of protocols and decisions. 
They include the Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment,45 
Protocol on Non-Aggression,46 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense,47 and the 
Community Trade Liberalization Scheme (TLS) among others. The TLS was aimed at the total 
removal of tariffs on all unprocessed goods and handcrafts to be followed by the progressive 
elimination of tariffs on all industrialized products from 1981 to 1989.48 
Although the 1975 Treaty had the advantages of great craftsmanship and the benefit of drawing 
from the European Economic Community (EEC) and CEAO49 Treaties before it,50 it had a number 
of failings. Kufour writes that a major failing of the Treaty was the failure of the TLS.51 Another 
flaw of the Treaty was the vagueness of the article defining the powers of the AHSG. It was seen 
                                                          
41 Ibid, Article 9 (4) (a)-(b) of the 1975 Treaty. 
42 Ibid, Article 11 (1) of the 1975 Treaty. 
43 Article 11 (1) of the 1975 Treaty, Okolo supra note 1 at 138. 
44 Protocol on the Community Court of Justice, 19 Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African 
States (July 1991).  
45 Ibid, Protocol of Free Movement of Persons is reprinted in the Protocols annexed to the Treaty of the ECOWAS, 
supra note 28 at 87-95. The Protocol on free movement was an elaboration of Article 27 of the 1975 Treaty 
entitling Visa and Residence of Member states as Community citizens. 
46 Ibid, Protocol on Non-Aggression reprinted in Protocols annexed to the Treaty of ECOWAS, supra note 28 at 81-
86. The Protocol was designed to guarantee regional peace and obligated Member states to refrain from the 
threat or use of force or aggression in their relations with one another.      
47Ibid, Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense, reprinted in 3 Official Journal of the Economic 
Community of West African States, (June 1981) at 9-13 
48 Ibid.   
49 CEAO is the acronym for the Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de I'Ouest comprising seven Francophone 
West African states. It was also an economic integration union whose treaty was signed in June 1972. See Kunle 
Amuwo, “France and the Economic Integration Project in Francophone Africa” (1999) 4 Afr. J. Pol. Sci. 1 at 8  
50 Ojo, supra note 15 at 597. 
51 Kufuor, Institutional Transformation supra note 28 at 26. 
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that responsibility for general direction and control for progressive development52 was quite 
ambiguous and a specific and definitive statement of the role of the AHSG would better serve the 
integration process.53 Others also criticized the Council of Ministers’ lack of power to give 
directions in connection with the task of harmonizing socio-economic policies of the 
Community.54 Another problem that went to the effectiveness of the ECOWAS was that there 
seemed to be no binding force to the decisions of the Community. Except for sanctions regarding 
non-payment of budgetary contributions under Article 54(3), no other decisions of the Community 
had binding force.55  
The shortfalls of the Treaty led to the establishment of the Committee of Eminent Persons (CEP)56 
mandated to undertake a review of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty in order to “adjust itself to the 
dramatic changes taking place in West Africa and other parts of the World”.57 The report of the 
CEP culminated in the creation of a new treaty for the ECOWAS, designed to create a new regime 
of legal obligations for members, outline a new set of policy objectives and increase the number 
of powers of regional institutions.58 The most significant recommendation of the CEP in the 
context of this thesis was the introduction of supranationality to the ECOWAS. The CEP advised 
that the ECOWAS adopt a new approach to its governance and move away from an 
intergovernmental agency to a supranational agency. The 1975 Treaty had adopted an 
intergovernmental approach to governance, based on national sovereignty and non-interference in 
affairs of members.59 However, the CEP advised that the ECOWAS replace the intergovernmental 
approach and turn the ECOWAS into a supranational entity.60 The arguments made by the CEP 
included arguments about the modern day reconceptualization of the concept of national 
sovereignty especially in the face of globalization and technological advances. It argued for 
                                                          
52 Article 5 (2) of the 1975 Treaty, supra note 28. 
53 Kofi Oteng Kufuor, “Law, Power, Politics and Economics: Critical Issues Arising Out of the New ECOWAS Treaty” 
(1994) 6 Afr. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 429 at 432 [Kufuor, New ECOWAS Treaty]  
54 Ibid at 433. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Findings of the Committee of Eminent Persons of the ECOWAS Treaty, located in the Draft Report of the CEP, 
ECW/CEP/TREV/VI/2, Lagos, 1992 [CEP Report] cited in Kufuor, New ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 53 at 433. 
57 CEP report, supra note 56 at 1 
58 Kufuor, New ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 53 at 430. 
59 Jadesola O. Lokulo-Sodipe & Abiodun J. Osuntogun, “The Quest for a Supranational Entity in West Africa: Can the 
Economic Community of West African States Attain the Status?” (2013) 16(3) Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regbald 255 [Lokulo-Sodipe & Osuntogun]. 
60 Ibid.  
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example that issues of human rights abuses were no longer restricted to national intervention but 
were concerns for the entire international community.61 Ultimately it argued that the best strategy 
for the growth of economic power had to involve at least a partial transfer of sovereignty to a 
supranational body.62   
Thus far, the chapter has discussed the background to the creation of the ECOWAS, highlighting 
the need for economic integration in the region, the challenges to its realization and most 
significantly the challenges to ECOWAS under the 1975 Treaty. The next subsection examines 
the 1993 ECOWAS Treaty, identifying the remedies it presented to the problems that had plagued 
the 1975 treaty, evidencing the evolutionary tendencies of the ECOWAS. 
4.2.3 The ECOWAS TREATY of 1993 
The new ECOWAS Treaty was signed at Cotonou, Benin Republic on 24 July, 1993.63 The 
ECOWAS adopted the recommendations of the CEP and created a new regime of legal obligations 
for member states, developed a new set of policy objectives, increased the number and powers of 
regional institutions and set a new legal framework for intra-Community relations.64 The new 
treaty sought to strengthen the ECOWAS and established, in addition to the existing institutions, 
an ECOWAS Parliament, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and an ECOWAS Court of 
Justice and significantly, it introduced the concept of supranationality of the ECOWAS.65  
Part of the problems that had plagued the previous ECOWAS Treaty was that decisions of the 
AHSG were not binding on member states. In this Treaty, therefore, the CEP recommended that 
decisions of the AHSG be binding on member states and automatically enter into force, sixty days 
after their publication in the Official Journal of the Community.66 In addition, the Community was 
also given power under the Article 7(c) of the new Treaty to enforce its decisions using the 
Community Court of Justice in instances where “it confirms that a Member State or Institution of 
the Community has failed to honor any of its obligations or an institution has acted beyond its 
authority or has abused its powers.” The CEP, however, recommended that legal action be an 
                                                          
61 Kufuor, New ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 53 at 430. 
62 CEP Report, supra note 56  
63 ECOWAS Doc. ECW/LEX/IV/2A/Rev.3, Lagos, October 1992, signed at Cotonou, 24 July 1993. It is reprinted in 
International Legal Material No.14, 1975, p.1200 cited in Kufuor, New ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 53 at 430.  
64 Kufuor, New ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 53 at 430.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid at 441. 
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option of last resort, and subtler means of compliance be pursued with member states first, such 
as regular submission of status reports on their implementation.67 Another significant innovation 
of the Treaty was that the decision-making process of the AHSG which had previously been based 
on unanimity would now involve, depending on the subject being considered, consensus and two-
thirds majority of member states.68 
The advent of the new Treaty inspired confidence in the ECOWAS in some quarters and 
skepticism in others. Evidently, the new Treaty had acknowledged the problems of the old Treaty 
and had provided innovative solutions to such problems. However, skeptics were uneasy about the 
possibility of the ECOWAS successfully implementing the changes created under the new Treaty 
which would make it a more formidable force in the field of integration.69 This thesis, however, 
argues that the changes under the new Treaty have recorded modest success in establishing the 
ECOWAS as a medium of integration within the region. While discussions regarding the promise 
of the ECOWAS will be undertaken in the fourth subsection of this chapter, discussions regarding 
the supranationality of the ECOWAS form the focus of this next section. Firstly, the subject of 
supranationality flows from discussions regarding the new treaty as it was introduced by the new 
Treaty and secondly, it provides the argument under which regulatory oversight such as the one 
being proposed by the thesis rest.    
4.3. The Suprantionality of the ECOWAS  
The question of supranationality of the ECOWAS has been a source of concern amongst skeptics. 
In his earlier work, Kufuor described the need for supranationality of the ECOWAS as 
“problematic”; he argued that there was insufficient evidence of economic relations between 
member states of the ECOWAS to warrant a supranational state [the ECOWAS] acting as a 
regulator or an umpire.70 He further argued that it was obvious that the new treaty sought to 
“unravel the web of laws that prevent free flow of goods within the Community”, however, the 
resultant effect was that it had superimposed a new legal framework on a virtually non-existent 
base as economic conditions did not exist for the establishment of a supranational regime.71 In his 
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later work, Kufuor maintains his position arguing that the CEP’s recommendations were informed 
by the need to mimic the successes of the European Union (EU) even where the forces responsible 
for the transformation of the EU were not applicable in West Africa.72 He undertakes an analysis 
of the factors responsible for the EU emerging as a supranational entity such as cross-border capital 
flows and the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies after the Second World War which 
led to states relinquishing control of their respective armed forces to a regional body, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.73 He argues that no such circumstances existed in West Africa both 
at the time of adopting the new Treaty and now; intra-ECOWAS capital flows are “infinitesimally 
small” and there is no evidence to support the need for a supranational organization to safeguard 
the capital of the Community’s industrial-commercial class.74 Kufuor’s argument regarding the 
absence of the factors present in Europe in West Africa are certainly not misplaced. His theoretical 
analysis of the motivations of the CEP in recommending supranational status for the ECOWAS 
supports the premise that the growth of the organization must be gradual.75 Perhaps, attempting to 
“copy” a “successful” organization’s structure or treaty or form76 would propel such an 
organization to achieve such success. While admitting to the veracity of Kufuor’s assessment 
regarding the current state of the ECOWAS’ supranationality, the thesis expresses significant 
optimism about the potentials of ECOWAS’ supranationality. The chapter undertakes an analysis 
of the reasons for such optimism when discussing the promise of the ECOWAS in the fourth 
subsection.  
For the purposes of this chapter, we adopt Kufuor’s definition of supranational organization. He 
defines a supranational organization as one that is empowered to pierce the surface of its members’ 
national jurisdictions and bind the decision makers to the laws that it promulgates.77 One scholar 
undertakes the definition of a supranational organization by distinguishing a supranational union 
from a Federation or a Confederation and arguing that the reach of a supranational union extends 
to having: 
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74 Ibid.  
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“supranational sovereign competences, albeit such competences are conferred upon it by 
the sovereign member states. The Union can only act within the bounds of the competences 
conferred upon it, and any competences not conferred upon it remain with the member 
states. Any competences delegated can be revoked. A member state is also entitled to 
revoke its commitment and secede from the Union. Supranational decision-making does 
not require unanimity; qualified majority is used, yet decisions so taken are binding upon 
the member states and directly affect their legal system.”78 
Another scholar notes that supranationality is a difficult term to define but there are contexts to 
it.79 The first context of supranationality proposes the existence of a system which involves 
institutionalization of a mode of problem-solving that is unavailable to nation-states acting on their 
own.80 The second involves a system of “taming”81 nation-states to a “new discipline of 
solidarity”,82 mitigating tensions between state actors and between state actors and the 
Community.83 In other words, supranationality exists to solve problems related to decision making 
and tackles concerns which states cannot handle when acting alone.84  
Central to the arguments in this thesis, is the need for the ECOWAS to provide oversight over the 
regulatory framework in the Nigerian oil industry. As a supranational organization, decisions of 
the ECOWAS are of a supranational nature, therefore, capable of legally binding Nigeria and other 
ECOWAS Countries despite their sovereignty.  
In summary, the supranationality of the ECOWAS provides two main advantages to the framework 
being proposed by this thesis. Firstly, as a supranational organization, member states are 
immediately legally bound by the decisions of the ECOWAS and there will be no need to subject 
deliberations regarding the adoption of the framework to lengthy ratification processes within 
states.85 Secondly, a framework that proposes oversight by an international organization over the 
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affairs of a state offends the concept of sovereignty. A supranational organization avoids 
allegations of such infringements on state sovereignty as it is empowered by the states to make 
such interventions on their behalf. As seen in Kijunen’s definition of a supranational organization, 
such organization possesses sovereign competencies over member states.86 The import of 
sovereignty of the supranational organization to the framework being proposed by this thesis is 
that it provides competence to the ECOWAS to adopt and implement the framework and lends 
legitimacy to the process. Evidently the supranationality of the ECOWAS provides a huge 
advantage to the framework for oversight being proposed in this chapter and makes ECOWAS 
well suited to provide oversight.  
4.4. The Proposed Role of the ECOWAS 
The choice of the ECOWAS to provide regulatory oversight is inspired in part by its supranational 
nature. Given that the ECOWAS is a supranational organization whose decisions are immediately 
binding on member states, the adoption of the framework being proposed will not be subjected to 
ratification or domestication by Nigeria and will in fact be immediately binding on Nigeria. This 
thesis proposes a framework for oversight over regulation of the Nigerian oil and gas industry that 
delineates not only the scope of oversight but also the mode of such oversight.  
Another factor supporting the proposal of a framework for oversight under the ECOWAS is the 
decision of the ECOWAS Court in the case of SERAP v. Nigeria,87 delivered in December 2012. 
In that case, the ECOWAS Court found the Nigerian government responsible for failing to 
effectively regulate TNCs. The court then ordered Nigeria to "take all measures" to restore the 
environment, prevent future damage, and hold the perpetrators accountable.88 However, the Court 
failed to specify a means of implementation for the said judgment.89 This thesis seeks to help 
bridge such gaps. Given the arguments demonstrating a clear need for oversight in the regulation 
of the Nigerian oil industry, and a judgment of the ECOWAS Court finding the Nigerian state 
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responsible for ineffective regulation of TNCs, this thesis proposes a more definitive role for the 
ECOWAS in effecting change in the regulation of the Nigerian oil industry.   
4.4.1. The Proposed Framework under the ECOWAS 
The framework proposed in this thesis is inspired in part by Penelope Simons and Audrey 
Macklin’s work in The Governance Gap.90 However, while Simons and Macklin focus on home 
state regulation, this thesis focuses on regulation by strengthening host state regulatory capacity. 
Lessons drawn from the work include what is described by the authors as the concept of “Carrots, 
Nudges, and Sticks”.91 They describe the “carrots” as the public incentives which home states 
would offer to TNCs (considered citizens of the home states) in order to encourage TNCs to respect 
human rights of local communities. The “nudges” refer to mechanisms that allow and encourage 
private actors and individuals to comply with best practices and respect human rights. The “sticks” 
then refer to sanctions which home states can resort to in the event that TNCs fail to comply.    
Adopting a similar concept for the ECOWAS in the context of providing oversight to host states, 
the thesis anticipates a framework that will offer “carrots” in the form of incentives to states that 
avail themselves of regulatory oversight. These proposed incentives will come in the form of 
priority placement for compliant states when it comes to situating developmental projects in states 
in order to grow amenities such as energy, transport, water and telecommunications in states. The 
consequences of such regional integration development projects are that they provide amenities 
which serve to encourage economic growth and development.    
Given the background of the ECOWAS, this thesis is more confident in its gaining compliance in 
Nigeria through the use of redress mechanisms conceptualized by Simons and Macklin as 
“nudges”. While the authors saw the use of “nudges” as criminal responsibilities for TNCs, this 
thesis advances the argument that the nudges can take the form of a regulatory oversight 
framework.  
The ECOWAS has a number of specialized agencies focused on relevant areas of development 
such as the ECOWAS Regional Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERERA), the ECOWAS Centre 
for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) and the West African Power Pool 
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(WAPP).92 The thesis proposes that the framework be implemented through a specialized agency93 
such as the ones identified. It is proposed that the agency will be responsible for receiving 
complaints from local communities or persons acting on behalf of local communities and will be 
empowered to review decisions and activities of existing regulatory agencies in Nigeria in order 
to ensure that such decisions and activities are in the best interest of local communities and the 
environment.  
Funding for the agency will be derived from the treasury of the ECOWAS. However, an internal 
fund could be created within this agency to receive funding from NGOs, other ECOWAS 
institutions, donor institutions, and foreign governments. The funds can be directed towards 
operational costs of the agency as well as specific projects aimed at environmental remediation 
which may be carried out in collaboration with Nigeria’s regulatory agencies. Brown for example 
suggests that regulatory agencies derive funding through two major approaches; the regulator may 
receive funding through formal allocation from the government’s budget94 or collect monies from 
the industry through fees, penalties or contributions95 or the regulator may elect to combine both 
approaches.96 Given that the proposed agency is designed for regulatory oversight, this thesis 
proposes the agency receive funding through formal allocation from the ECOWAS and receive 
funds from NGOs, CSOs, donor institutions and even foreign governments.Further, the agency 
will be empowered to perform on-site inspections of local communities and areas of alleged oil 
pollution. It will be able to direct relevant regulatory agencies to enforce necessary sanctions 
against relevant TNCs in event of oil pollution. In order to be able to prove oil pollution or 
responsibility of TNCs, there is a need for the agency to have the technical knowledge regarding 
the oil industry and its activities. The thesis therefore anticipates that the agency will be assisted 
by a body made up of civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations 
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(NGOs).  A coalition of CSOs and NGOs provides a pool from which the framework can draw in 
order to provide financial, technical and capacity building resources to the framework for 
regulatory oversight. In the event that CSOs and NGOs are not able to provide technical expertise 
to the agency, their combined resources enable them hire consultants that will be able to provide 
technical knowledge.  Although executed through an agency under the ECOWAS, the framework 
proposes that civil society form an integral part of the agency. This hybrid nature of the framework 
is advantageous because the agency through which the framework is implemented might be 
perceived as an agency of the state by local communities and CSOs and NGOs can provide 
valuable credibility to the process as they mostly enjoy neutrality and independence from relevant 
actors.97 The proposed role of CSOs and NGOs is particularly significant as it provides resources 
which address concerns regarding resources (financial and technical) which might threaten the 
implementation of the framework. Another factor that supports this coalition of civil society is its 
reach. Several civil society organizations have coalitions with other organizations in the West, 
where they have great reach as regards shaming TNCs into compliance and affecting investments. 
The evidence is seen in a number of campaigns against TNCs by CSOs attempting to shame TNCs 
into compliance and discourage investors from investing in particular TNCs who have a poor 
record of human rights protection.98 Civil society can also shame states into compliance by 
campaigning against them within the international community. 
The proposed agency can also provide technical advice to both local communities and government 
agencies in the event of negotiations regarding siting of oil wells or relocating persons in the 
community that need relocation as a result of oil extraction. The agency will be responsible for 
providing technical advice to local communities in the event of negotiations with the Nigerian 
government or TNCs and will accept mandatory reports from regulatory agencies in order to 
ensure best practices. It is expected that this hands-on approach of regulatory oversight and 
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directing state institutions to perform their duties ought to “nudge” states into better regulating 
extractive industries and also provide a buffer between states and local communities 
It is significant to note that certain initiatives such as the African Commission Working Group on 
Extractive Industries and Natural Resource Governance (WGEI) exist under the African Union 
(AU) to make recommendations on issues relating to resource extraction.99 The WGEI was 
established by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, under the African Union, 
in November 2009. The mandate of the Commission includes examining the impact of extractive 
industries in Africa within the context of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, undertaking research into violations of human and peoples’ rights by non-state actors in 
Africa, and formulating recommendations and proposals on appropriate measures and activities 
for the prevention and reparation of violations of human and peoples’ rights by extractive 
industries.100 The work of the WGEI is instructive in advising relevant African states as well as 
the African Union on human rights based approaches to resource governance.101 The 
recommendations of the WGEI seek to inform policy and may become an incentive for states to 
address their behaviour. Evidently regional groupings such as the AU have also recognized the 
need to address challenges relating to resource extraction in African states. 
 In the event that these “carrots” and “nudges” fail, the thesis proposes the use of “sticks”. There 
are various mechanisms through which the ECOWAS has expressed its displeasure with member 
states. An example is the suspension of Niger Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea102 from the 
ECOWAS for engaging in military coups contrary to the Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance. The ECOWAS Court can be utilized as a tool in seeking reform in extractive 
industries. Article 15 of the Revised Treaty establishes the ECOWAS Court,103 and by virtue of 
Article 15(4), the “judgments of the Court are binding on all [ECOWAS] member states, 
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Community institutions, and on individuals and corporate bodies.” Article 15 establishes the Court 
and sets out its functions: 
(1) There is hereby established a Court of Justice of the Community. (2) The status, 
composition, powers, procedure and other issues concerning the Court of Justice shall be 
as set out in a Protocol relating thereto. (3) The Court of Justice shall carry out the functions 
assigned to it independently of the Member States and the institutions of the Community. 
(4) Judgments of the, Court of Justice shall be binding on the Member States, the 
Institutions of the Community and on individuals and corporate bodies. 
The ECOWAS Court Protocol requires that member states shall, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes, “take all necessary measures to ensure the enactment and dissemination 
of such legislative and statutory texts as may be necessary” for the implementation of the 
provisions of the revised ECOWAS Treaty.104 However, despite the existence of this Protocol from 
1991, an actual court was not established until November 1996 when supplementary Protocol 
entered into force establishing the ECOWAS Court.105  
The new court was created by the ECOWAS to settle disputes between member states inter-se, or 
between member states and the Community, or between ECOWAS nationals and either an 
ECOWAS Member State or an institution of the Community. Article 9(4) of the supplementary 
Protocol authorizes the ECOWAS Court to hear and determine “cases of violation of human rights 
that occur in any Member State,” and Article 10(d) allows access to the court to “individuals on 
application for relief for violation of their human rights.” The fact that the court possesses this 
competence has now been affirmed in a long line of cases,106 and is not at all controversial.  
Admittedly, the Court has already decided on the culpability of the Nigerian state as regards 
ineffective regulation of TNCs in its oil industry.107 However, the argument of this thesis is that 
the failure of the ECOWAS Court to prescribe sanctions for failure to implement its decisions or 
prescribe a means for the Nigerian state to remediate ineffective regulation hampers the 
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effectiveness of the judgment. The framework being proposed remedies the failings of the 
decisions as it prescribes a means for the Nigerian state to better regulate TNCs. 
There is a great deal of optimism within scholarly circles regarding the potential of the ECOWAS 
Court.108 Its emergence as a reputable human rights court within the ECOWAS has been a source 
of inspiration for most observers.109 Given the political climate, civil unrest and weak legal and 
other domestic institutions within member states, it was expected that a Court under the ECOWAS 
would be restricted by national governments in the exercise of jurisdiction over human rights and 
if at all it was given a human rights jurisdiction, political checks would be put in place to restrict 
such.110 However, contrary to popular opinion the Court was given a broad human rights 
jurisdiction by member states111 which has not been restricted despite several opportunities to do 
so.112 Scholars note that major challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction have left the Court “largely 
unscathed and arguably strengthened.”113 However, a significant challenge facing the Court lies in 
improving member states’ compliance with decisions of the Court. While there is some promise 
as regards state implementation of decisions of the Court, there remains considerable challenge 
regarding the lack of implementation of ECOWAS Court decisions.114 The Court is, however, 
aware of this challenge of implementation and responds by adopting strategies that promote 
compliance. It appeals to public sentiments through public statements and engages civil society as 
well as tailors remedies provided to litigants in a way that encourages state actors to comply with 
the said judgments.115 The Registrar of the Court remarked that, “although the record of 
enforcement of the decisions of the Court is not impressive, we have never been told by any 
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Member State that it will not enforce the judgment of the Court.”116 In further expression of its 
great potential, scholars note that “the ECOWAS Court’s status as a human rights court is far more 
settled than that of sub-regional community courts elsewhere in Africa.”117  
In summary, the Court does have some potential to serve as a stick. However, this thesis does not 
ignore the limitations of the Court in strictly enforcing decisions. It is expected that a combination 
of the “carrots”, the “nudges” and the threat of the “stick” would encourage states to adopt the 
proposed framework in order to respond to challenges regarding regulation of TNCs and resource 
extraction in a way that protects local communities from oil pollution. This approach finds support 
in recommendations of the CEP when advising on the revision of the ECOWAS Treaty and 
expanding the powers of the AHSG to compel compliance of member states. It notes: 
Legal proceedings against member states should however be a weapon of last resort for 
obvious reasons. As a rule, the Community should seek accountability from Member states 
through subtle means as regular submission of reports by Member states on implementation 
of Community decisions and regulations…The Executive Secretariat [now a Commission] 
may also be authorized to invite status reports on implementation from Member states on 
a regular basis and also bring to the attention of Council or the Authority breaches of 
Community laws by Member states.118   
Having outlined the scope and framework of the proposed regulatory oversight, the chapter 
undertakes an analysis of the prospects and challenges of implementing the said framework under 
the ECOWAS. 
4.4.2. Prospects and Challenges of Adopting the Proposed Framework Under the ECOWAS 
The ECOWAS has been described as “strong developers and weak implementers of governance 
standards”.119 While some of its protocols have received a greater measure of adoption and 
                                                          
116 Anene-Maidoh, supra note 89 at 40. 
117 Ibid at 768. 
118 CEP Report, supra note 56. 
119Christoff Hartmann, “Governance Transfer by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)” 
(2013) 47 SFB-Governance Working Papers Series at 7 [Hartman].    
112 
 
implementation, other protocols of the ECOWAS have not received the desired level of 
implementation.120 
Scholars have attributed the poor performance of the ECOWAS regarding the implementation of 
its protocols to the structure of the organization.121 In 1993, when the current Treaty was adopted, 
the AHSG which is the supreme decision-making body had no supranational organization to 
implement its decisions. However, the conversion of the Secretariat to a Commission has now 
remedied this failing. Another criticism of the ECOWAS is that the ECOWAS Parliament also has 
no power to make decisions and is only an avenue for debating issues.122 Another significant 
challenge to the ECOWAS process is the duplication of similar Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) in West Africa and the commitment of several member states (particularly the 
Francophone countries) to other similar RECs.123 This situation creates a duplication of 
commitments on the part of member states to the ECOWAS, as well as duplication of financial 
commitments member states make to these RECs. This lack of commitment often undermines the 
functioning of the ECOWAS as uncommitted member states only pay lip service to decisions taken 
with little intention to commit to implementation.124 The duplication of commitment from member 
states who are members of other RECs within Africa poses the biggest challenge to the realization 
of a number of the ECOWAS’ ambitions. Achieving compliance within member states will require 
some leverage on the part of the ECOWAS and this can be achieved through the creation of a 
strong economic union between compliant member states that will not only attract compliance but 
will incentivise already compliant states. A major failing of the 1975 Treaty was the lack of 
actualization of the Trade Liberalization Scheme (TLS) which would have opened up borders, 
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increased intra-regional trade and empowered the ECOWAS Economic Fund responsible for 
compensating states that lost revenue as a result of tariff reduction.125 A number of factors, some 
not unrelated to ideological differences between Anglophone and Francophone countries, 
contributed to the failure of the TLS.126 However given present day trends of globalization, and as 
evidenced in the European Union, intra-regional trade as well and the creation of a strong central 
economic union lends credibility to a supranational entity. There is a need for the ECOWAS to 
dedicate itself to creating a strong economic union if it is to overcome many of its challenges going 
forward. 
There is, however, some indication that the ECOWAS is learning from its experiences. This can 
be seen from the move to redefine the TLS in 1992 which removed restrictive conditions relating 
to origins of firms (particularly foreign firms) that could take advantage of the scheme.127 Further 
indications are seen in the ECOWAS restructuring of 2007 which transformed the Secretariat into 
a Commission and adopted a new legal regime addressing a number of concerns surrounding the 
organization.128 The transformation of the Secretariat to a Commission created an implementing 
organ for decisions of the AHSG as well as monitoring framework of member state compliance 
and the new legal regime translated all protocols adopted by the AHSG to Supplementary Acts, 
thereby adhering such Acts to the ECOWAS treaty.129 This eliminated the challenges that faced 
ECOWAS as regards waiting for states to ratify protocols adopted by the AHSG, thereby rendering 
a number of its decisions redundant. These circumstances create optimism that the ECOWAS has 
the potential to overcome its internal challenges and therefore help states strengthen their political 
institutions. Kufuor writes: 
The evidence supports this presumption of gradualism as an explanation for ECOWAS’ 
institutional change. The ECOWAS system as a whole has undergone gradual changes and 
elaborations…the essence of this perspective on ECOWAS is that it will most probably 
continue to evolve gradually.130  
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The discussions above have identified a number of criticisms of the ECOWAS as well as the 
reasons why the thesis is optimistic that the organization is poised to overcome its challenges and 
able to adopt and implement the framework being proposed by the thesis. The next section 
discusses in greater detail the promise of the ECOWAS. It analyzes the successes of the 
organization while making a case for why it is well suited to provide regulatory oversight to 
Nigeria’s oil industry.  
4.5. The Promise of the ECOWAS 
As seen in the previous section, the ECOWAS faces significant challenges regarding 
implementation of its decisions. There is a tendency in scholarly work to focus on the challenges 
of a process and not the promise. One scholar writes that “the scholarly tendency toward criticism 
can be a matter of habit as much as an appropriate intellectual stance.”131 Without dismissing the 
scholarly criticism that has trailed the ECOWAS as simply habit, this chapter attempts to chart a 
distinct course, focusing on the promise of the ECOWAS. This section highlights a number of 
policies and projects of the ECOWAS that have enjoyed compliance and support among member 
states, and then identifies successes of the ECOWAS in affecting political action, institutional 
action and economic integration initiatives, arguing that these successes of ECOWAS are great 
indicators of the immense potential the ECOWAS has to implement the proposed framework.    
At a political level, the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and 
Establishment of 1979 demonstrates the success of an ECOWAS policy. One scholar writes in 
relation to the Protocol that “if one asked ordinary ECOWAS citizens which ECOWAS policy has 
mattered most in their lives, they would probably answer by naming the 1979 Protocol Relating to 
Free Movement…”132 The significance of the success of this protocol lies in the fact that national 
legislation within member states had to be amended in order to allow citizens of member states 
free movement within the ECOWAS pursuant to the protocol. Further to that, eight member states 
of the ECOWAS, in demonstration of their political will to respect and promote this policy, 
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adopted a regional passport enhancing free movement of citizens across national borders.133 
Interstate roads have also been constructed in order to aid free movement of persons.134   
Another initiative that speaks to the promise of the ECOWAS is the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) launched under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
which the ECOWAS coordinates. The APRM has gained some traction since its launch as eight 
ECOWAS countries have acceded to become parties to it. Acceding to the APRM entails 
“undertaking to submit to periodic peer reviews, as well as to facilitate such reviews, and be guided 
by agreed parameters for good political governance and good economic and corporate 
governance.”135 The APRM review covers four areas: democracy and political governance, 
economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. 
The review seeks to oblige participating states to “provide what assistance they can, as well as to 
urge donor governments and agencies also to come to the assistance of the country reviewed” 
provided that the “Government of the country in question shows a demonstrable will to rectify the 
shortcomings”.136 The significance of the APRM to this thesis is that it demonstrates the 
willingness of African states to submit themselves to scrutiny and review, in order to overcome 
some of their challenges.137 The willingness of states to submit to periodic review under the APRM 
being coordinated by the ECOWAS inspires confidence that member states would be willing to 
adopt the oversight framework proposed in this thesis.    
In responding to challenges regarding governance standards of member states, the ECOWAS takes 
very seriously its role in resolving conflicts and preventing conflicts capable of destabilizing 
member states. The ECOWAS Protocols on conflict prevention, and democracy and good 
governance led to its suspension of Guinea, Niger and Cote d’Ivoire following coups and 
repression of dissent in the countries.138 Democratic elections held in Guinea in 2010 led to the 
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reintegration of the country into both the ECOWAS and the AU.139 The ECOWAS used sanctions 
to force President Faure Gnassingbe to step down as the President of Togo and allow elections to 
hold as he was installed by the military after the death of his father.140 Although President Faure 
Gnassingbe was still re-elected following the elections, the sanctions the forced elections in Togo, 
after which the country was readmitted into the ECOWAS.  
A further indicator of the immense potential of the ECOWAS is the ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG). Though contentious,141 the work of the ECOMOG has contributed to peace within 
the region. A military force from five countries was constituted by the ECOWAS Mediation 
Committee in 1990 pursuant to the Protocols on Non-aggression and Mutual Assistance with a 
view to intervening in the Liberian civil war.142 The ECOMOG not only fought to end the war in 
Liberia but also monitored the resulting cease-fire.143 The ECOMOG was instrumental in 
overthrowing a military government that had dispossessed a democratically elected government in 
Sierra Leone and reinstating the previously overthrown government.144 Before intervening in 
Liberia in 1990, ECOMOG sought and received endorsements from the Organization of African 
Unity (now the African Union) and the United Nations often using the theme “an African solution 
to an African problem”.145 One scholar notes that the ECOMOG: 
…became the first sub-regional military force in the third world since the end of the cold 
war with whom the United Nations agreed to work as a secondary partner. Liberia was one 
of the first conflicts where both the United Nations and the major regional organization the 
OAU, redefined traditional concepts of sovereignty in order to permit external 
intervention.146   
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Military interventions were undertaken by the ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau in 1998-1999, in Cote 
d’Ivoire in 2003-2004 and again in Liberia in 2003.147 With each attempt, the ECOWAS seemed 
to have learned from mistakes made in the past and it was observed that its intervention in Liberia 
along with UN supervision “laid a better foundation for peace making”.148     
The significance of highlighting the achievements of the ECOMOG serves to demonstrate and 
perhaps exemplify that in the past ECOWAS has superimposed on the sovereignty of member 
states in order to “restore law and order…”149 which ultimately served to protect human lives. The 
framework proposed in this thesis is debatably less controversial than a military intervention on 
states. The proposed framework is nuanced and comprises actions and incentives that are designed 
to encourage compliance as opposed to brazen impositions on national sovereignty, further 
inspiring confidence that member states will consider the merits of such a framework.  
At an institutional level, the reform of the ECOWAS Secretariat into a Commission demonstrates 
the evolution of the ECOWAS. Decisions of the AHSG will now have a vehicle for implementation 
as well as one for monitoring implementation within states. Indicators of progress are seen in 
regional trade facilitation through the establishment of joint border posts, the creation of an 
observatory for bad practices in order to monitor, report and shame practices that are contrary to 
the spirit of integration in regional trade facilitation.150 The emergence of such implementation 
strategies at an institutional level inspires confidence in the process of the ECOWAS. Further 
indicators are seen in the response of the international community to this change in the ECOWAS 
as a number of countries are now establishing permanent missions with the ECOWAS in order to 
facilitate trade and economic cooperation between their countries and the ECOWAS.151 
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A further indicator is seen in the confidence reposed in the ECOWAS Court by the international 
community. The Court has undergone a transformation with the amendment of its enabling 
protocol now including human rights in its jurisdiction and allowing individuals to access the 
Court.152 The ECOWAS is also in the process of transforming the ECOWAS Parliament from an 
advisory body to one with power to be able to fulfil the objectives of the Parliament as set out in 
its Supplementary Protocol.153 The “new legal regime” of the ECOWAS is another extremely 
significant indicator of the promise of the ECOWAS.154 That protocols and conventions will no 
longer be subject to inordinate delay and lengthy ratification process in member states and will 
immediately apply to states indicates that the ECOWAS is demonstrating a serious commitment 
to better implementing its decisions.155   
Finally, the long list of programs and initiatives aimed at advancing regional integration 
encourages faith in the ECOWAS. The range of integration initiatives involves infrastructure 
development, private sector development, education, health, information and communication 
technology among others, all at various levels of implementation.156 However, the most significant 
in the context of extractive industries is perhaps the West African Gas Pipeline Project (WAGP). 
It involves a Public Private Partnership where Chevron and Shell partnered with government-
owned entities in Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana to construct a pipeline to supply natural gas 
from Nigeria to the other three countries.157 The WAGP, being an initiative of the ECOWAS, 
indicates that ECOWAS recognizes the immense potential of integration in resource extraction. 
Evidently, a case can then be made for the regulatory oversight being proposed in this thesis.  
4.6. Potential Challenges to the Proposed Framework 
Having discussed both the failures and the promise of the ECOWAS, this section anticipates 
challenges that the framework (as currently) proposed might encounter in adoption and in practice. 
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In identifying such potential challenges, it remains confident that such challenges are not 
intractable.  
The first issue relates to state sovereignty. When a state surrenders part of its sovereignty to an 
international organization for oversight or control, it offends the Westphalian concept of 
sovereignty which professes that a state should not take orders from outside it or from another 
authority.158 In the context of potential challenges to the proposed framework, state sovereignty 
presents a challenge both in the case of states submitting to oversight of regional institutions, as 
well as in the context of the West African leaders conceding to adopt such a policy. Even given 
the supranational status of the ECOWAS, it would prove both ambitious and naïve to expect states 
to be eager to further concede some part of their sovereignty to an international organization. As 
Lokulo-Sodipe and Osuntogun write: 
It is difficult to see why a country would consent to surrender even a part of its sovereignty, 
particularly in the case of West African States, most of which fought bloody wars for years 
to gain their independence – their sovereignty.159 
However, the same scholars argue that perhaps the concept of state sovereignty is outdated. While 
making a case for supranationality, they argue that “a supranational institution is in a position to 
strengthen national governments by helping them to solve their problems”.160 Further buttressing 
their argument, they cite Fukuyama, who states that, “weak nations can be helped by strong 
nations, that is philanthropic but it is the responsibility of supranational institutions to do that as a 
matter of duty”161 (emphasis added) 
Given the example of the APRM, there is some indication that states are able to look beyond what 
one writer when speaking of the concept of sovereignty, described as “rules and commands issued 
by distant strangers”.162 This thesis is confident that states would be willing to further concede part 
of their national sovereignties in order to adopt the proposed framework.  
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Perhaps, however, the best way to incentivize the adoption of the framework being proposed by 
this thesis under the ECOWAS is to deliver an appealing “carrot”. As presently constituted, the 
ECOWAS faces great challenges in the area of financial resources. The duplicity of commitment 
of member states discussed earlier takes its toll on the organization as member states are often 
reluctant to pay membership fees.163 While the organization has adopted a strategy aimed at 
financial independence by placing a levy on import taxes into ECOWAS Countries, this strategy 
has not earned it the financial weight it had hoped.164 The international community is therefore 
often responsible for funding a number of its initiatives.165 This challenge affects both the “carrot” 
being the incentive that will be given to member states for cooperating with the process as well as 
the process of implementing the framework.  
Having anticipated this challenge, however, the proposed framework is designed to receive both 
financial and technical resources from donor agencies, CSOs and other governments and NGOs 
willing to invest in the process. The creation of a Fund within the agency that is designed to receive 
contributions from NGOs, the ECOWAS and other institutions, which can be directed towards 
operational costs of the agency, as well as remediating environmental pollution within local 
communities in collaboration with Nigeria’s regulatory agencies, also alleviates potential funding 
challenges.  The overarching goal of the proposed framework impacts local communities, state 
institutions, and the environment. The thesis is confident therefore that donor agencies, CSOs, 
NGOs and foreign governments will be interested in investing in a framework that has such far 
reaching ramifications.   
There also exists the potential challenge of implementation and the challenge of compelling 
compliance. While they are separate challenges, both challenges are related and so will be 
addressed together. The proposed framework anticipates member state cooperation through state 
institutions. It is quite possible that state officials might resent the process of oversight and resist 
changes which might frustrate the process. This concern is the reason why implementation is 
paired with compelling compliance as a related challenge. Given that the framework proposes 
encouraging compliance and only proposes the use of sanctions as a last resort, a situation where 
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state officials deliberately frustrate the process of oversight might severely slow down the process 
and frustrate all parties. In this instance, public shaming of uncooperative agencies through the 
civil society coalition and public support from ECOWAS institutions might compel uncooperative 
agencies to cooperate, thereby restricting the use of sanctions to the last resort.     
4.7. Reviewing the Potential Contributions of the Framework through the Optics of the 
Norm “Life Cycle” Theory 
As demonstrated in the first and second chapters of this thesis, the theoretical framework through 
which the author seeks to review the contributions of the thesis is the theory of the norm “life 
cycle” theory.166 As seen earlier, Finnemore and Sikkink posit that there are three main stages to 
the development of a norm. This section uses the optics of the norm “life cycle” theory to 
demonstrate the potential contributions of the framework to influencing the internalization of the 
effective regulation of oil and gas industry in Nigeria. Essentially, the thesis argues that better 
regulation of the oil industry leads to better protection of the environment from oil pollution. As 
such, the thesis is interested in what contributions the proposed ECOWAS framework can make 
to entrenching better regulation of TNCs and in turn environmental protection from oil pollution.   
As seen in the previous chapters, the norm “life cycle” theory posits that there are three main stages 
to a norm’s development, norm emergence, norm cascade and the norm’s internalization.167 
Finnemore and Sikkink posit that internalization occurs when the norm assumes a “taken-for-
granted quality” and is no longer a matter for broad public debate.168  
The norm being put forward by the thesis is the effective regulation of TNCs and environmental 
protection. As demonstrated in the thesis, there has been a failure of the regulatory framework to 
effectively regulate TNCs and a failure of the legal and political framework to remedy this failure. 
The thesis therefore argues that the proposed contributions of the ECOWAS through proposed 
framework and the ECOWAS Court, can serve to influence better regulation of TNCs and 
ultimately lead to the internalization of effective regulation. Presenting the ECOWAS as a norm 
leader and a norm entrepreneur, this thesis identifies the potential of the ECOWAS to create 
                                                          
166 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) 52 
International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics 887 at 895 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid.  
122 
 
awareness regarding the new norm also influence states (Nigeria and other West African states) to 
internalize the new norm. Finnemore and Sikkink speculate that states are convinced by norm 
leaders to accept new norms for a number of reasons including pressure for conformity, desire to 
enhance international legitimation and perhaps a desire for states to enhance their self-esteem.169 
If the proposed framework is adopted, states will be thrust towards accepting these new norms 
based on the supranationality and influence of the ECOWAS.  
Viewed through the optics of the norm “life cycle” theory, this thesis expresses confidence that 
the proposed framework executed through the ECOWAS can encourage the internalization of the 
norm of effective regulation of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. When effective regulation 
becomes internalized norm, it achieves a “take-for-granted” quality which prioritizes the 
protection of the rights of local communities and the environment over any other political interests. 
4.8. Conclusion  
Three important conclusions can be drawn from the discussions in the thesis. The first main one is 
that the Nigerian constitution does not provide robust protection for the environment. In this 
context, local communities and those affected by pollution face increased challenges when 
attempting to vindicate a right to a healthy environment. The second conclusion is that there is an 
urgent need for regulatory reform to the framework that addresses the activities of TNCs in the 
extractive industry. The discussions in the thesis, have illustrated that constitutional and regulatory 
failures, justify the need for a regulatory oversight framework. The third conclusion would be 
essentially that the ECOWAS system can be deployed as an external oversight mechanism to 
guarantee environmental protection in Nigeria and promote a right to a healthy environment.   
Specifically, the thesis demonstrates a failure of the Nigerian constitution to provide a substantive 
right to a healthy environment and the implications of such failure. It also highlights further 
challenges to the protection of human rights of local communities, making recommendations for 
reform as well as identifying the potential of the ECOWAS Court to address some of the challenges 
to protection of rights of local communities.  
Further, this thesis demonstrates the failures of the Nigerian framework for regulation of TNCs. It 
identifies the numerous legislation and regulations which provide for regulation of the Nigerian 
                                                          
169 Ibid.  
123 
 
oil and gas industry, arguing that if effectively enforced, these regulations could greatly reduce oil 
pollution in Nigeria. The thesis however identifies inherent weaknesses of these statutes and 
regulations and other challenges to the institutional framework for enforcement of regulation. It 
concludes that the framework for regulation of TNCs in Nigeria can achieve greater effectiveness 
if reformed and proposes the use of a regulatory oversight mechanism to drive further 
effectiveness.  
The thesis proposes a framework for oversight which the ECOWAS can adopt in performing 
regulatory oversight over resource extraction in member states. However, the thesis does not define 
a specific institutional mechanism for the implementation of such framework under the ECOWAS. 
The lack of a suggestion is deliberate as it is informed by the methodology adopted for the research. 
Given that the research is library and internet-based, it would prove speculative to suggest an 
institutional mechanism for the implementation of the ECOWAS framework as access to 
information regarding the ECOWAS is limited when conducting library and internet based 
research. Further research with an expanded methodology that includes visits to the ECOWAS and 
interviews with ECOWAS officials as well as CSOs and NGOs (given their integral role in the 
proposed framework) is necessary in order to develop an institutional mechanism for the proposed 
framework. Such work is however beyond the scope of the present research. 
It is important to acknowledge that if the framework being proposed by the thesis is adopted by 
the ECOWAS, issues regarding ownership of resources, free prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
and rights of local communities to self-determination are likely to be encountered when dealing 
with natural resources and local communities. While this thesis does not anticipate the use of the 
proposed framework to address such issues, it is confident that the reprieve that the proposed 
framework avails local communities and governments will assuage tensions between both parties 
and perhaps encourage the evolution of a framework that will address those concerns. 
The arguments being made in the thesis are designed to advance the protection and promotion of 
human rights, the health of local communities and the environment. Incidentally the proposals 
appeal to economics as well because the elimination of gas flaring can lead to such natural gas 
being utilized to generate power. The arguments therefore appeal to humanity, prudence, 
economics and sound judgment.  
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The framework being proposed in this thesis also fits into the vision of the ECOWAS.170 Under its 
regional strategic plan of 2011-2015, the need for the ECOWAS to reinforce institutional capacity 
is identified as the fifth strategic pillar for operation.171 Evidently, the research undertaken in the 
writing of this thesis demonstrates that there is both need and means for the adoption of the 
framework being proposed and the ECOWAS is well suited to provide the proposed oversight.  
Ultimately, this thesis has argued that environmental pollution as a result of activities of TNCs has 
had devastating effects on the environment, human rights of local communities and the Nigeria 
economy. It has demonstrated the need for regulatory oversight over Nigeria’s regulatory 
framework and proposed the use of the ECOWAS to perform such oversight function. 
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